Implementation of the Erasmus+ Programme (Regulation EU No 1288/2013)
PE 581.414 69
documents of the EU, “simplification”, is indisputably more palatable than its less
appealing sibling “structural rationalisation”.
In a sense, all kinds of structural rationalisations in organisations tend to oppose
processes, values, transactions, and practices to results and efficiency. Whichever term is
used to characterise the managerial changes which Erasmus+ embodies in comparison
with the Lifelong Learning Programme (LLP), such changes entail processes which must
necessarily replace not only procedures and rules, but also values and emotions tied to
practices that are programmed to disappear or to be repurposed. Promoters of such
change-oriented processes may also be tempted to offer less laudatory narratives about
previous structures, i.e., the Lifelong Learning Programme, which is now defunct. It may
be tempting to sell the story about simplifying the implementation of Erasmus+ as a
rejuvenation cure, or as a pure product of necessity that is needed in order to mobilise
sufficient energy to achieve the new ambitions of Erasmus+. However, whichever
rationale is chosen, there may be a price to pay before the expected benefits may be
reaped. The main cost may not be directly observable through measuring the sheer
volume of budget means activated, or by counting and locating the millions of
individuals enrolled, or by monitoring the level of formal recognition of stays abroad. A
more pernicious side-effect of simplification may be the unintended but very real
increase of the perceived power distance between individuals, users, learners, teachers,
youth, etc. and European institutions. The main message underlying this study is that not
all measured progresses necessarily guarantee the overall success of the implementation,
if one contemplates all the facets that make up a good learner, citizen and professional.
Paraphrasing Dan Hill’s widely disseminated and profusely cited essay on the smart city,
one could consider that the whole of Erasmus+, like a city, is made of all its architects,
builders, stakeholders and beneficiaries. Erasmus+ was not primarily created to produce
frameworks, rules and regulations, or administrative infrastructures. The primary raison
d’être of Erasmus+, and the mobility of individuals in Key Action 1, is to let learners,
teachers, educators, trainers, workers and youth come together, to acquire and exchange
knowledge, to open oneself up for new professional environments, to immerse in cross-
cultural experiences, and acquire both informal and formal skills, and, in a deeper sense,
to quote Paul Ricœur, ‘to experience oneself as another’.
As a consequence, many of the potential beneficial side-effects of the mobility of
individuals in education and training are neither easily nor solely apprehended by
measures of volumes, patterns of displacement, and formal recognition (indeed, such
first-order outcomes, are, no doubt, crucial indicators of progress). As knowledge-seeking
individuals, mobile learners, teachers, trainers and workers choose to go abroad and
interact in unfamiliar environments with other people, where they also learn, teach,
experience, and reflect. Actions, sub-actions, programmes, regulations, are to be
understood as elements of an infrastructure that are meant to be just enablers, not drivers,
to reuse Hill’s key concepts. The structures, processes and procedures that characterise
Key Action 1 should be approached and studied as a side-effect of people and culture,
rather than well-oiled, or inversely, malfunctioning mechanisms.
Akin to the smart city vision defended by Dan Hill, the ultimate vision in this study sets
the focus not only on first-order outcomes in the implementation of Key Action 1, but,
also on the second-order outcomes, which are potentially more interesting for the long-term
impact of Erasmus+ and its potential successors.