1122 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 97:1095
understanding what the law is,” which seems to run counter to the right to be
informed.
147
Finally, opacity and complexity will often lead to outcomes for taxpayers that
many will view as unfair. If taxpayers make expenditures that they reasonably expect
will provide tax benefits, perhaps in response to specific incentives created by
Congress, but later learn that the tax benefit was subject to an opaque limitation and
thus was reduced or eliminated, this simply seems unfair.
148
E. Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Tax Complexity and Opacity
In terms of overall social welfare, the complexity and opacity of the Code likely
result in a tradeoff between reduced excess burden, on the one hand, and individual
losses due to suboptimization and perhaps impeded political accountability, on the
other. Commentators vary in their assessment of the net impact on social welfare.
149
In my view, the potential reductions in labor supply distortion and cheating
associated with complexity and opacity are attractive features. On the other hand, I
worry about suboptimal decision making and impairment of tax incentives,
particularly at the low end of the income distribution. Further, although it simply
147. Blank & Osofsky, supra note 41, at 187.
148. This situation can arise even with relatively straightforward Code provisions.
Itemized deductions, for example, provide tax benefits only to the extent that they exceed the
standard deduction, in aggregate. Thus, taxpayers who donate used vehicles to charity in
response to advertisements touting tax benefits and later find that the tax benefit is small or
nonexistent may feel aggrieved. See Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable
Deduction: An Introduction to Hypersalience, 92 B.U.
L. REV. 1307, 1320–23 (2012).
However, as long as the tax rules are straightforward and easily accessible, sympathy will
likely be limited. Once the complexity of the rules and interplay of rules creates a high degree
of opacity, fairness arguments seem more compelling.
149. For example, Gamage and Shanske argue that reducing the economic or “market”
salience of taxes is socially valuable because the reduction in distortions and deadweight loss
is a first-order effect, while income effects, externalities, and distributional effects are second
order. See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 26, at 60–79. With respect to political salience,
Gamage and Shanske are agnostic, emphasizing that there is no coherent baseline for
determining the optimal political salience of taxes. Id. at 79. To be sure, Gamage and Shanske
focus on salience, not complexity, and the additional downsides of complexity might suggest
a different result for them. Galle concludes that the social welfare effects of hidden taxes are
indeterminate and that the answer depends, at least in part, on the mechanism through which
taxes are hidden. Galle, supra note 83, at 64 (arguing that “[h]idden taxes are likely progressive
in a rational ignorance model, but regressive otherwise”). Again, there is not one-to-one
correspondence between complex taxes and hidden taxes, but significant overlap. Schenk
cautiously supports exploitation of low-salience taxes, primarily on political economy
grounds. Schenk, supra note 25, at 284. She is somewhat more cautious about the use of
complexity to reduce salience given other costs to complexity. Id. at 286. Zelenak, on the other
hand, tends to focus on the downsides of complexity; in particular, the adverse impact on fiscal
citizenship. Zelenak, supra note 35, at 102–03; Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph
Kramden, and the Civic Virtues of a Return Filing Requirement, 61 T
AX L. REV. 53, 66 (2007).
McCaffery, as noted above, has expressed discomfort with purposeful exploitation of
cognitive error, i.e., exploitation of complex and low-salience taxes, on both practical and
moral grounds. McCaffery, supra note 27, at 1943.
367408-ILJ 97-4_Text.indd 40367408-ILJ 97-4_Text.indd 40 6/15/22 12:55 PM6/15/22 12:55 PM