Real Cost of Buy to Let Q4 2015 3
© Mortgages for Business 2015
alongside low interest rates and low returns on alternative assets in the post-crisis
period, had boosted the attractiveness of borrowing for buy-to-let investment.
21. Increased competition among lenders in the buy-to-let sector had not to date led
to a widespread deterioration in underwriting standards of UK banks. But some
smaller lenders had loosened their lending policies, for example by raising their
maximum LTV thresholds. The Committee noted that new loans to buy-to-let
investors were often subject to less stringent affordability tests than loans to owner-
occupiers.
22. Assessed against relevant affordability metrics, buy-to-let borrowers appeared
more vulnerable to an unexpected rise in interest rates or a fall in income. The
Committee considered there to be a risk that during an upswing in house prices,
investors seeking capital gains would be able to increase leverage through the
purchase of multiple properties. The resulting boost in demand could add further
pressure to house prices, prompting both buy-to-let and owner-occupier borrowers to
take on larger loans, thereby increasing indebtedness. Since 2010, rates of credit
loss on buy-to-let loans in the United Kingdom had been around twice those incurred
on lending to owner-occupiers.
23. The FPC was alert to financial stability risks arising from rapid growth in buy-to-
let mortgage lending and supported the programme of work initiated by the
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) to review lenders’ underwriting standards. The
Committee also agreed that it would need to monitor developments in buy-to-let
activity closely following the tax changes to the buy-to-let market announced by the
Chancellor in the Budget and Autumn Statement.
24. HM Treasury would consult on powers of Direction for the FPC on buy-to-let
mortgage lending before the end of the year. Ahead of these powers being finalised,
the FPC stood ready to take action if necessary to protect and enhance financial
stability, using its powers of Recommendation.
I have highlighted para. 22 above since this demonstrates only too clearly that the Bank of
England is inclined to get involved in this market – and crucially it appears to be either
singularly ill-informed or else it is choosing wilfully to exaggerate the rates of credit loss on
buy to let mortgages.
Write-offs on buy to let mortgages since 2009 have averaged less than 0.2% p.a. and are
currently 0.1% p.a. having peaked in 2011/12 at around 0.3% p.a. Any rational person
would realise that when lenders typically operate on a Net Interest Margin (for BTL lending)
of at least 2% p.a. this represents a loss that should be readily affordable. The reality is that
only in two quarters in 2009 were arrears higher on buy to let than on residential mortgages
– and thus by that measure buy to let is less risky than normal residential lending.
The danger is that the Bank of England may seek to impose constraints on buy to let lending
which could simultaneously reduce the supply of mortgages and push up the cost of them. I
am sure that the lenders will be lobbying hard to correct the misunderstandings in the Bank
and it is to be hoped that the Bank will see the wisdom of waiting for the effects of the
various tax changes to wash through the system before acting precipitously.
Conclusion
The Governor of the Bank of England has effectively given up on “forward guidance”
regarding interest rates – but we do know that he is hell bent on trying to rein-in the buy to
let market. Whilst the industry will doubtless resist the more extreme elements of his
proposals, it is at least possible that at some point in the future there will be more
restrictions on buy to let mortgages and/or they could become more expensive as additional
(and objectively unwarranted) capital requirements are imposed on buy to let lenders.