NTSB Aircraft Accident Summary Report
2
Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey, for authorization to climb into Class B airspace
6
after the
flight was transferred from TEB to EWR. The Hudson River Class B exclusion area, which
comprises Class E and Class G airspace,
7
provides passage below the Class B airspace. (ATC
clearance directly into Class B airspace allows aircraft to climb above the exclusion area.) At the
time of the accident, the Class B exclusion area extended from the surface of the Hudson River
up to, and including, 1,100 feet.
8
At 1148:15, the pilot indicated that the airplane was ready for departure, and the TEB
local controller then cleared the airplane for takeoff and instructed the pilot to make a left turn to
the southeast (to avoid entering EWR airspace and the final approach course for EWR runway
22) and maintain 1,100 feet or below. Afterward, the controller contacted the pilot of an inbound
Bell 407 helicopter to advise him of the departing traffic.
At 1150:02, the TEB local controller contacted the airplane pilot to determine the
airplane’s altitude. The local controller then identified the airplane on his radar display and
executed an electronic radar handoff of the airplane to the EWR Class B airspace controller but
did not transfer radio communications.
9
Afterward, the controller advised the pilot of nearby
traffic (the inbound Bell 407 helicopter).
10
The controller then advised the pilot that the Bell 407
pilot had the airplane in sight and would maintain visual separation. The controller provided no
further advisories of known or observed traffic to the airplane pilot.
At 1150:32, the TEB controller initiated a telephone call (via a recorded landline) to
airport operations that was unrelated to his work.
11
During the call, at 1151:17, the controller
instructed the airplane pilot to start a left turn to join the Hudson River, which the pilot
acknowledged. The pilot was not advised to self-announce the airplane’s position on the
6
Class B airspace is intended to provide positive control of flight operations near the busiest U.S. airports and
separate aircraft operating under VFR from aircraft operating in an airport terminal area. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has designated as Class B airspace the area surrounding EWR; John F. Kennedy International
Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York; and LaGuardia Airport, Flushing, New York. The Class B airspace overlying
TEB begins at an altitude of 1,800 feet. According to 14 CFR 91.131, “Operations in Class B Airspace,” all aircraft
operating within Class B airspace are required to obtain ATC clearance before entry and comply with ATC
instructions while operating within the airspace.
7
Class E and Class G airspace allow pilots to operate under VFR without ATC services. The main difference
between Class E and Class G airspace is the minimum ceiling and visibility requirements for flight under VFR. At
the time of the accident, the Hudson River Class B exclusion area was Class E airspace from 700 to 1,100 feet and
Class G airspace from the surface to 700 feet.
8
After the accident, the FAA revised the New York airspace (as discussed further in section 3.1.3), and the
Class B exclusion area now extends from the surface of the Hudson River up to, but not including, 1,300 feet.
Similarly, class E airspace now extends from 700 feet up to, but not including, 1,300 feet.
9
An electronic radar handoff transfers a radar data block from one controller to another. A controller initiates
this process by “flashing” the radar data block to the receiving controller. Once the receiving controller accepts the
electronic radar handoff, the radar data block no longer flashes and is modified so that both controllers know that the
handoff is complete. Afterward, the controller that initiated the electronic radar handoff directs the pilot to contact
the receiving controller so that radio communications can also be transferred.
10
At that time, the airplane was climbing through an altitude of 400 feet, and the Bell 407 helicopter was at an
altitude of 1,000 feet.
11
According to the ATC recordings, the TEB controller had initiated a previous personal telephone call to
airport operations that began at 1135:01 and ended at 1136:40. During that time, a Learjet 40 pilot contacted the
tower three times between 1135:04 and 1135:27 to receive authorization to taxi. The controller provided the pilot
with taxi instructions between 1135:30 and 1136:00.