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Lucy J. Parry
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Deliberation in Democracy's Dark Times
Abstract
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Author Biography
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Keywords
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Acknowledgements
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Introduction
The theory and practice of democratic deliberation have often been framed as
responses to political pathologies. Voter apathy, declining trust in authorities,
increasing influence of spin doctors and corporate media contribute to democratic
malaise and public discontent. For many deliberative democrats, there are various
ways in which politics can be done differently. From taking part in citizens’ juries
on complex issues to convening citizen assemblies in deeply divided societies, a
case can be made that governance innovations not only address democratic
deficits but also create “real utopias” (Wright, 2010).
Advocates of democratic deliberation today, however, are faced with a new set of
challenges. The issue is not just about political disaffection or intractable conflict
but the seeming normalisation of disinformation, nativism, and bigotry in political
life. One could not help but wonder whether deliberative democracy has suffered
the same fate as liberal democracy—a promising ideal that has been taken over by
political realities (Curato, Hammond & Min, 2019).
Our aim in this short piece is to reflect on the legacies of democratic deliberation,
particularly mini-publics in relation to issues democracies face today. We
recognise that deliberative democracy is a much broader scholarly field and
political project than mini-publics, but we also acknowledge that mini-publics
remain to be the most practical, visible, and structured instantiation of democratic
deliberation among ordinary citizens. Our hope is to provoke conversations about
the limitations of mini-publics in promoting democratic renewal and reconsider
the functions of these forums in so-called “dark times” (see Hobson, 2018).
We offer three conjectures. First, we examine whether the problem with mini-
publics has to do with its limited application and influence in public life (we
haven’t scaled up enough). Second, we consider whether the field of deliberation
studies have focused too much on mini-publics while placing less emphasis on
other spaces that build deliberative capacities (we are scaling up incorrectly).
Third, we engage with the most critical take on this topic, whether mini-publics
have role in democratic politics in the first place (mini-publics are not the
answer). We conclude with modest proposals on possible trajectories for
deliberative politics in the context of global democratic erosion (see Freedom
House, 2018).
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Curato and Parry: Deliberation in Democracy's Dark Times
We Have Not Scaled Up Enough
The first is the issue of scale: Mini-publics have not yet been scaled up enough.
Their applications have been disparate, inconsistent, and, small scale. Had there
been more opportunities for people—especially the so-called category of “pissed
off white men”—to participate in deliberation, then they may have taken a more
complex view of issues that feel threatening to their identities, such as
immigration or gay rights. Had smug “cosmopolitan-liberal-types” engaged in
deliberation with “pissed off white men,” then societies could have developed a
shared vocabulary to cohabit a world with “meta-consensus” on the range of
legitimate discourses (Niemeyer & Dryzek, 2011).
Claudia Chwalisz (2015) provides evidence to support this claim. She argues that
contemporary populism should serve as warning for political institutions to up
their game and “revisit their approaches to governance and representation”
(Chwalisz, 2015, p. 97). She finds democratic innovations, particularly mini-
publics, as having “real potential to improve the legitimacy and efficacy of our
political system in the long term.” Drawing on UK survey data where UK
Independence Party (UKIP) voters—as well as displaying more dissatisfaction
with current political arrangements—are more enthusiastic about the prospect of
participating in citizens’ assembly-type forums, Chwalisz finds that “these ideas
have popular support, particularly among those groups in the electorate who
currently feel that they do not have a voice in the political decisions being made
by their governing elites” (Chwalisz, 2015, p. 55).
Decades of research on the acceptability of mini-publics among citizens bear out
Chwalisz’s (2015) argument. There are example of mini-publics working in
deeply divided societies, such as deliberative polls in Northern Ireland (Luskin et
al., 2014) or deliberative forums between ex-combatants and paramilitaries in
Colombia (Jaramillo & Steiner, 2014). There have been experiments that show
how group polarization can be overcome in carefully designed forums (Grönlund,
Herne, & Setälä, 2015). We can now only wonder how the American elections or
Brexit referendum could have turned out had a “deliberation day” been convened
where citizens deliberated systematically before the vote. Political competition
requires more than the people speaking, but the people thinking. Mini-publics
offer the space for political will formation—the “real opportunity to think in depth
about what they really want done” (Fishkin, 2018, p. 1).
What is it about mini-publics that deliver these dazzling outcomes? One oft-cited
reason is the composition of mini-publics. Representativeness—sourced through
random selection—is its source of democratic legitimacy. As well as ensuring
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who gets “into the room,” a representative sample will be perceived positively by
the wider population—those outside the room. One of the attractive things about
getting a randomly selected group of citizens to deliberate on an issue is that these
citizens are “people like me.” If those outside the room can identify with those
inside the room, then there is more likely to be trust and confidence in the process.
This is one of the reasons that Chwalisz (2015) suggests the populist voters are
more enthusiastic about the prospect of a randomly selected mini-public: if
“people like me” are able to participate in deliberative decision-making in this
way, then mini-publics could give “people a genuine voice in the decisions
affecting them” (Chwalisz, 2015, pp. 64-65).
There are, of course, many well-developed critiques of mini-publics. One such
assessment relates to the issue of design, especially when scaling up. Several
recent Citizens’ Juries have involved upwards of 100 citizens deliberating face to
face. The obvious implications of this are that dialogically, it becomes a lot harder
to adhere to deliberative quality and principles with that number of people
(Chambers, 2009). In practice, much of the discussion is carried in small groups
with plenary sessions. Another attempt at scaling up deliberative moments in
Australia involves a whole range of pre-engagement and outreach events: open
meetings held in communities, pop-up events at shopping centres, school
competitions—all aimed at engaging a broader public on an issue.
However, this carries its own risks. In the recent highly contentious issue of
nuclear fuel storage in South Australia, the overall program (which involved a
Citizen Jury of 350 people, as well as additional outreach and public engagement
events) was titled “Get to Know Nuclear” (see Participedia, 2016; Russell, 2017).
An explicit aim of the program was to ensure that the public properly understood
a recent Royal Commission Report into the possibility of nuclear fuel storage in
the state. This does not sit too comfortably with deliberative ideals, where citizens
educate themselves rather than having education imposed on them by elites
(Manin, 1987).
Another set of critiques question the extent of public enthusiasm towards mini-
publics. Some scholars (e.g. Mudde, 2004; Stoker, 2016) argue that populist
voters do not favour enhanced or increased participation. They just want
politicians to get on with the job. Responsiveness, not inclusiveness, is the answer
to the dangers of populism. According to Cass Mudde, “What [populism]
demand[s] is responsive government, i.e. a government that implements policies
that are in line with their wishes. However, they want the politicians to come up
with these policies without bothering them, i.e. without much participation from
them” (Mudde, 2004, p. 558).
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Curato and Parry: Deliberation in Democracy's Dark Times
Similarly, Will Jennings, Gerry Stoker, and Joe Twyman (2016) suggest that
those discontented with politics want “latent representation” (p. 880) rather than
more participation. Pauline Hanson, the headline-grabbing leader of Australia’s
One Nation Party, has called for further citizen participation in politics, with one
policy advocating a Citizen Initiated Referendum to vote on any changes to the
Australian Constitution. But the call is specifically for direct democracy and not
necessarily deliberative democracy. Moreover, calls for greater participation from
those with populist inclinations does not tell us anything about their willingness to
endorse or accept either the process or the outcome of a randomly-selected mini-
public. Chwalisz’s (2015) populist support for mini-publics is premised on being
in the room in the first place. For those outside the room, a mini-public remains as
closed-off and distant as the existing deliberations of political elites.
We Are Scaling Up Incorrectly
This leads to our second point. One could argue that mini-publics, by themselves,
are not the answer to democracy’s legitimacy deficit. This seems like an obvious
answer, especially in the context of deliberative democracy’s systemic turn where
scholars have turned their attention towards larger political projects and the public
sphere as sites for deliberation beyond the forum (e.g., Dryzek, 2009; Parkinson &
Mansbridge, 2012; Elstub, Ercan & Mendonça, 2018). For some time though,
deliberative democracy maintained an arguably disproportionate (though certainly
not exclusive) focus on these carefully designed forums. Simone Chambers
(2009) made this observation almost a decade ago, when she suggested that
scholarship had focused too much on democratic deliberation at the expense of
mass democracy.
Today, there is an increasing realisation that even when there are well-funded,
thoughtfully designed, and high-quality deliberations that occur in mini-publics,
these have little bearing if the epistemic gains and civic virtues developed in these
forums do extend to the broader public sphere. Simon Niemeyer (2014), as well as
Nicole Curato and Marit Böker (2016) have made these arguments when they
conceptualise the notion of “scaling up” deliberation. To scale up deliberation is
not simply to host bigger and better mini-publics but to think of ways in which
mini-publics can be linked to the discourses of the broader public sphere. These
arguments have a less enthusiastic, though not entirely unsupportive view of
sortition, as advocated by David Van Reybrouk (2016) and Brett Hennig (2017).
What use is it if we replace politicians with a randomly selected group of citizens
if the public sphere, for the most part, is still characterised by partisan point
scoring, cheap political tactics, spin doctoring and market-driven media? Reforms
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to deliberative politics should focus equally on reforming the broader structures
that shape the character of discourse in the public sphere. To this extent, we agree
with Cristina Lafont’s (2015) argument that democracy has no shortcuts.
Mini-publics are not the magic bullet antidote to democratic deficits. This is not a
novel point, but it bears repeating. When viewed from this perspective it becomes
clear how such democratic innovations, even at the larger scale, could not have
averted the rise of contemporary populism without the corresponding changes
needed in the broader public sphere (see Niemeyer, 2014).
Mini-Publics Are Not The Answer
Third, and perhaps the least developed of the ways to think about mini-publics,
has to do with the inherent limitations of these forums in processing bigotry and
hateful rhetoric.
The logic of mini-publics primes participants to be respectful, public-spirited,
other-regarding, and open-minded. Citizens who harbour deep scepticism,
strongly held views, and defensiveness in their private interests may not find
space for understanding and support of their views in these settings. In other
words, mini-publics—by design—aim to manage loud and insistent voices by
emphasising virtues of reflection, respect, and public-spiritedness. In turn,
discursive enclaves such as those found online, or in assemblies of populist
supporters, provide a more hospitable space for impassioned, confrontational and
sometimes bigoted discourses.
While mini-publics provide the opportunity to for citizens to carefully examine
their prejudices, it is possible that some do not want to reconsider their views.
Kersty Hobson and Simon Niemeyer’s (2012) work on climate change deniers
provide evidence to this point. Their research reveals how deliberation not only
fails to dispel the scepticism of climate deniers, but it also made them feel they are
not listened to. Qualitative data from the study suggested that climate deniers
were unmoved by the deliberations and ended up more dogmatic and belligerent,
with the authors concluding that “public climate change communication strategies
or interventions can unintentionally alienate such individuals further” (Hobson &
Niemeyer, 2013, p. 408). There is also data that demonstrates how people with a
“social dominance orientation” tend to see participatory processes as rigged, if
these forums to do not end up with their preferred outcomes (Werner & Marien,
2016).
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Curato and Parry: Deliberation in Democracy's Dark Times
Such alienation is further compounded by the importance of trust. Mini-publics
typically rely on information presented by experts, and we now know that many
people have reportedly “had enough of experts” (see Clarke & Newman, 2017).
Even though the best-designed forums are independently organised and
facilitated, we must consider that people may still simply not trust the process,
organiser or the expertise presented. This appears to be the case in South
Australia’s nuclear process (Russell, 2017). There was considerable speculation
that the state Premier, Jay Weatherill, explicitly supported the nuclear storage
proposal before the public engagement process even began. The perception that
the decision had already made arguably eroded trust in the subsequent deliberative
engagements. Ultimately, the jury rejected the nuclear storage proposal citing
distrust in the state government’s ability to handle major economic issues as one
of the reasons. Not long afterwards this outcome, the Premier called for a state-
wide referendum on the proposal (ABC News, 2016). Given the considerable
investment in the Citizen Jury, the referendum proposal served to further
undermine public trust in both the South Australian government and their program
of public engagement.
The above example highlights the importance of linking mini-publics to the
broader public sphere. As Carolyn Hendriks (2006) pointed out over a decade ago,
“micro” deliberative events do not reside in a political vacuum; it is not possible
to simply design out the broader context and power relations. However, we can
acknowledge that fact and begin to consider its implications in practice.
The Future of Democratic Deliberation
If these are the issues that deliberative democracy did not (yet) get right, what are
the options for moving forward in the face of surging populism? Below we offer
three conjectures for moving from today’s hateful rhetoric towards deliberative
reason.
First, deliberative democrats must push on in diversifying the strands of
deliberative theory. While the breadth and depth of current populism’s anti-
democratic tendencies did come as a surprise to many, this must not invalidate the
increasingly diverse body of work that deliberative democracy has achieved over
the years. There are things that we do know. We do know, for example, that
alternative forms of speech, those that do not rely on the aural quality of voice but
rely on the creative, playful, emotional, sometimes carnivalesque forms of claim-
making, can deepen democratic discourse more than carefully constructed
arguments (see Rollo, 2016). We do know the power of disruptive politics, of
spectacular protests, of democratic silences, and active listening in enriching the
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moral economy of democratic discourse (Dodge, 2009; Mendonça & Ercan, 2015;
Smith, 2016). These are important theoretical and empirical developments. The
challenge now is to imagine how these developments speak to the practical
demands of democracy in today’s troubled times—in the same way that
deliberative theorists were able to speak to democratic professionals in the field’s
“early days.”
Second, the supposed “populist apocalypse” can be taken as a signal to forge new
meaningful connections between deliberative theory and practice. The
considerable developments in the past fifteen years or so, especially the systemic
turn, have yet to gain ground in current deliberative practice. The critiques
presented here are hardly new (e.g., Parkinson, 2003, 2006), but practice is still
dominated by mini-publics. The spiteful rhetoric often associated to populism
renews that challenge for deliberative democrats to revisit the void between
theory and practice and to consider how theory can contribute to deliberative
democracy in practice. This will require greater collaboration between
deliberative theorists and practitioners not only in person but in substantive terms.
This is not beyond the realm of possibility, as Simon Burall’s (2016) report on
UK democracy as a deliberative system shows, or Thamy Pogrebinschi’s (2017)
LATINNO project which documents the meaningful impact of deliberative
processes in the everyday governance of Latin American countries.
Third, it is worth revisiting how deliberative democrats conceptualise power and
its relationship to knowledge. Today’s democratic erosion reminds us of the
insidious legacies of power, the kind that is taken for granted, but experienced
every day. Here we are reminded of C. Wright Mills’s (2007) epistemologies of
ignorance, where the solution is not to simply offer facts but to unpack the
structural phenomenon that disables people from seeing a certain way. There is a
form of ignorance that “resists . . . an ignorance that fights back . . . an ignorance
that is active, dynamic, that refuses to go away’ (Mills, 2007, p. 13). Ronald
Inglehart and Pippa Norris’s (2016) observation that populism is a cultural, not an
economic reaction resonates here, for we see a generation that aims to cling on to
a form of social dominance that is seemingly under threat by current trajectories
of cosmopolitan liberalism. Whether it is mini-publics that can best respond to
“epistemologies of ignorance” is worth debating, although arguments have
already been made in favour of disruption (Hayward, 2017), or pluralisation of
media sources as ways in which epistemologies of ignorance can be counteracted.
We conclude our comments on these three points of reflection. Deliberative
democracy may have been the punching bag of those who remain sceptical of the
virtues of participation governed by reason, but it has also been a beacon of hope
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for visionaries who keep on asking how we can make democracy better. This field
of democratic theory and practice has a lot more to offer, especially when we set
our gaze towards spaces for reform beyond the forum.
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Curato and Parry: Deliberation in Democracy's Dark Times
