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On defining behavior: Some notes

Filipe Lazzeri

University of São Paulo

ABSTRACT: This paper attempts to suggest some conceptual preliminaries to a definition

of behavior. I begin by distinguishing some different senses of the notion, with emphasis

upon that of behavior as the occurrence of an organism's action or reaction. Subsequently, I

provide a brief survey of different types of definition, and try to pick out those among them

that can in principle be suitable for the notion of behavior taken in that sense as well as for

theoretical concerns. Then, I offer a list of desiderata for a definition thereof framed in any

of the types picked out. Finally, I illustrate how the distinctions here established can help

the detection of conceptual difficulties in definitions of behavior (in that sense of the

concept) found in the literature and, more generally, how they can help determine what

behavior consists of and what it does not.

Key words: behavior, definition of behavior, definitions, teleology, conceptual analysis.

There are many definitions of behavior in the scientific and philosophical

literature, and scant consensus (apparently even among the practitioners within

particular behavior research programs) as to how to define it (see, e.g., Bergner,

2011; Levitis, Lidicker Jr., & Freund, 2009). To give some examples, Tinbergen

(1951) defines behavior as “the total of movements made by the intact animal” (p.

2); several authors (e.g., Davis, 1966, p. 2, p. 4-5; Lehner, 1996, p. 8; Pierce &

Cheney, 2004, p. 1) define it as “anything an organism does” (or “what an

organism does”); several others define it in terms of any activity in which an

organism engages (e.g., Donahoe & Palmer, 1994, p. 3; S. T. Watson & Brown,

2011, p. 221); still others (e.g., Jessor, 1958, p. 172-173; Maturana, 1995, p. 151-

152), in terms of a relation between the organism and its environment; Dretske

(1988, p. 1ss) defines it as a process of an inner entity bringing about a bodily

movement or environmental outcome; and so on. (For other definitions of

behavior, see, e.g., Bergner, 2011, p. 148-149; Hebb, 1958, p. 2; Holt, 1915, p.

371-372; Hornsby, 2006; Levitis et al., 2009, p. 108; Marken, 1982; Miller &

Dollard, 1942, p. 59; Millikan, 1993, p. 135ss; Moore, 2008, p. 66-68; Watson,

1919, p. 14). Among these and other definitions of behavior, which ones, if any,

turn out to be reasonable enough? This boils down to the question: what is an

accurate set of conditions or criteria that determine what counts as behavior? (As

will become clearer later on, I am not assuming that they must be individually

necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Nor am I assuming that there can be

only one possible definition of behavior that is plausible enough).

LAZZERI

I take this question to be of considerable importance. First of all, it has a

philosophical interest in its own right. Behavior is one of those concepts that have

a central place in our ordinary interpretative practices and of which, nevertheless,

there is usually only a tacit mastery (in contrast to an explicit understanding of its

features). Besides, arguably, it has relevant connections to several categories that

are of central concern in some areas of philosophy (e.g., connections to ordinary

mental concepts, studied in philosophy of mind). So I believe that the availability

of one or more accurate definitions thereof may help us avoid some conceptual

confusions in these areas and make progress in the analyses of such categories.

Similarly, the question is of importance to the empirical sciences. It merits

attention as far as we want prevent certain conceptual confusions in scientific

practices (see, e.g., Todorov, 2012) and to achieve greater integration among

distinct behavior research programs (see Bergner, 2011; Levitis et al., 2009). (I do

not assume that such integration depends on there being overall acceptance of a

unique definition by different behavior research programs. However, I believe that

once we have a larger agreement as to what makes and what does not make sense

to say that behavior is, our chances of sharing more common ground increase.)

This article attempts to suggest some conceptual preliminaries to a definition

of behavior, thus setting the stage for answering our question. The article is

structured in the following way. (1) It starts off by distinguishing some different

senses of the concept, to wit: (i) behavior as the occurrence of an organism's action

or reaction; (ii) behavior as a class or pattern; (iii) behavior as group behavior; and

(iv) behavior as a change or movement of an object. Emphasis is given upon (i),

which is overall the intended definiendum (i.e., the thing being defined) in the

definitions here at stake. I especially try to call attention to certain teleological

features thereof. Subsequently, (2) I provide a brief survey of different types of

definition, so as to pick out those among them that can in principle be suitable for

the definiendum, as well as for the context here relevant. I submit that behavior,

taken in the sense of (i), is not a family-resemblance concept if we assume that

family-resemblance concepts require what Cooper (1972) calls sufficiency

definitions; though also that a certain kind of disjunctive definition should not be

ruled out, at least from the outset, as possibly adequate for it. Then, (3) I devise a

list of desiderata for a definition thereof framed in any of the types picked out. I

suggest, inter alia, that the minimal nuances associated with the typical uses of the

concept should be taken into account in such a definition. Finally, (4) I illustrate

how the distinctions established throughout this paper may help guide the detection

of conceptual difficulties in definitions of behavior found in the literature and,

more generally, determine what behavior consists of and what it does not

1 The study I develop in this paper tries to call attention to some conceptual dimensions of

the enterprise of defining behavior. One can privilege other stances to the treatment of the

issue of defining behavior, but I believe a pure conceptual analysis has contributions to the

issue as well.

ON DEFINING BEHAVIOR

Some Different Senses of the Notion of Behavior

First of all, behavior is said in many ways. It has at least four different

meanings. In the following, I attempt to make explicit some of their minimal

nuances, with emphasis upon that which constitutes the definiendum here at issue.

(i) Behavior as the occurrence of an organism's action or reaction. This is

often called response in behavioral studies. It is something an organism emits, or

performs, at particular moments and places

. This sense of the concept

encompasses not only things an organism performs in a relatively spontaneous

way, such as the raising of a hand to ask a question or a cat opening a door in order

to get out of a box; but also things an organism performs in a relatively

automatized and rigid way, such as an instance of a rabbit's eye blink reflex

. Thus,

behavior, taken in this sense, contrasts with states of the organism (e.g., moods and

beliefs) (see, e.g., Kenny, 2003/1963, p. 120ss; White, 1968, p. 1, p. 3), since states

are not the sort of thing an organism performs, but rather things the organism is in.

It also contrasts with the bringing about of incidental happenings, such as the

typical cases in which an organism brings about shadows, air displacement,

attraction of the attention of a predator, and so forth (see, e.g., Wright, 1976).

Furthermore, it contrasts with things that happen to the organism entirely because

of forces exerted by the immediate external environment; for example, having an

arm raised by someone else, the typical cases of falling down, stumbling,

drowning, and so on (see, e.g., Allen & Bekoff, 1997, p. 42; Dretske, 1988, p. 1-2;

S. T. Watson & Brown, 2011). (I say 'the typical cases' of them because, of course,

there are cases of casting shadows, stumbles, slippages and so forth made on

purpose instead of accidentally. A caveat: in this paper, unless otherwise stated, the

sense of the term 'purpose' which matters is that of 'function', therefore not

necessarily implying that something that has a purpose is deliberate. 'Function', by

its time, is used here in a relatively neutral way).

One might think that instances of largely innate behavior patterns (such as

unconditioned reflexes and modal action patterns) and of other relatively

automatized behavior patterns (in particular, conditioned reflexes) ‒ instances of

what may be called reactions as opposed to actions ‒ are not really things the

organism performs, but rather things that simply happen to it by entire force of

immediate external objects or events. However, that is not the case, since they owe

2 I do not necessarily mean to imply that other systems, such as robots, cannot display

behavior in the sense of (i). However, the typical cases of behavior in this sense of the

concept are of phenomena displayed by organisms. In this paper, I leave open whether or

not these other systems exhibit phenomena with the same properties here being pointed out.

3 My use of the concept of action, in this paper, is quite neutral as to the exact nature of

actions. I am not assuming at all, for example, the standard causal view of actions, which,

roughly speaking, depicts them in terms of bodily movements caused by propositional

attitudes taken as entities located inside the body.

LAZZERI

their existence partially to past interactive (ontogenetic or phylogenetic) histories

with the environment. If, for example, a rabbit contracted its right forefoot given

the presence of, say, a certain sound, and if this was the occurrence of a

conditioned reflex, the phenomenon was not the result merely of that

environmental impingement. A rabbit that has not passed by an interactive history

of association between the sound (in this case, an eliciting conditioned stimulus)

and a relevant unconditioned stimulus (e.g., administration of a mild electric

shock) would not, everything being equal, tend to contract its right forefoot given

the presence of that sound. Hence, despite the differences between instances of

actions and of reactions ‒ the probability of occurrence of the latter, differently

from the former, being relatively very high given the presence of an associated

stimulus ‒, they all have salient commonalities.

(ii) Behavior as a class or pattern. Behavior meaning (i) is an occurrence, that

is, an instance of a class or pattern, or at least an entity that, together with entities

having one or more similar properties, makes up a class or pattern over time (For

an example of the latter view, see Baum [2004]). A behavior qua occurrence

happens in a specific time and place

; for example, the raising of a hand to ask a

question, at 3:39 pm of October 3

2012 at such and such auditorium. A behavior

qua class or pattern, on the other hand, is something in principle realizable at

different times and places, or at least is made up of things that happen at different

times and places, but without itself having such momentariness and localization

(cf., e.g., Lee, 1983). So, the raising of a hand to ask a question, qua behavior class

or pattern, can in principle exist in a person's behavioral repertoire (which can be

understood molarly) since his or her childhood and endure throughout his or her

whole life. It is the sort of thing of which it makes sense to say that can occur

today, tomorrow, and so on, in several contexts. Thus, when we speak about a

particular behavior in the sense of (i), we indirectly make reference to a behavior

class or pattern, but they are somehow different things. The contrast I am calling

attention to can be understood, roughly, in terms of the contrast between episodic

and dispositional character in Ryle's (1949) sense.

(iii) Group behavior. Not only individual organisms behave, but also groups

of them; for instance, worker bees build honeycombs in groups, lions often forage

in groups, people sometimes stage demonstrations, scientists often carry out

experiments in groups, and so on. Group behavior, like the behavior of the

individual organism, can be said either as an occurrence or as a class or pattern.

When it is an occurrence, it displays similar features to behavior in the sense of (i).

It is something performed at particular moments and places. Besides, it does not

make sense to say, for example, that the bringing about of incidental outcomes by

the group (such as noises and shadows upon the ground by lions hunting together)

counts as a behavior of the group, except in another sense of the concept (as we

4 I do not necessarily mean discrete time and space. Of course, the more molar a behavior

is, the more time it takes to be performed and, usually, the more space it requires.

ON DEFINING BEHAVIOR

will see in a moment). Nonetheless, occurrences of group behavior display some

special features. In particular, they are realized by two or more organisms in

cooperation. In other words, they comprise behaviors in the sense of (i) being

emitted by at least two organisms coordinately, so that the intended outcome is an

effect of such coordination, as opposed to being an effect of the members taken

isolated (cf., e.g., Pacherie, 2011, p. 174-175; Searle, 2002/1990, p. 94-95).

(iv) Behavior as any change or movement of an object

. The concept taken in

this sense is typically employed when we ascribe behavior to inanimate objects,

such as stones, particles, fluids, projectiles, and the like. For example, an arrow

flying in the air is a behavior in this sense. We can say, inter alia, that the arrow

behaved at a given average velocity. It is coherent to ascribe behavior with this

meaning to organisms too. However, such use is quite different from that related to

the first sense of the concept. Behavior as the occurrence of an organism's action or

reaction, as pointed out above, contrasts with things that correspond to the

bringing about of mere incidental consequences, as well as with things that happen

to the organism entirely because of immediate external forces. So, for example,

when a sunflower turns towards the sun, its behavior (in the first sense of the

concept) has to do with achievement of sunlight. Its casting shadow upon an ant

that happens to be close is no part of what it is performing. Besides, this ascription

of behavior implies that movements of the sunflower are not being caused simply

by the wind or the like. Hence, the sunflower casting shadow upon the ant and

moving toward the sun merely because of a breath of wind count as behaviors only

in another, very different sense. In other words, behavior meaning (i) has

teleological features ‒ it is something goal-directed, functional or purposive

‒,

whereas behavior as simple change or movement of an object does not (cf.

Millikan, 1993; Taylor, 1964; Wright, 1976)

. Therefore, change or movement is

not a sufficient (though, of course, it is a necessary) condition for there being

action or reaction. Behavior in the sense of (i) comprises change or movement of

an object (cf. Rosenblueth, Wiener, & Bigelow, 1943), but it supervenes upon

other properties as well.

Main Types of Definition Suitable for the Definiendum and the Context

at Issue

5 Movement is here understood as a kind of change; namely, as change of position in

space.

6 Again, purposes do not need to be interpreted as deliberate things or as causal entities

existing inside the body. Purposes can be modeled alternatively. See, e.g., O. Moore &

Lewis (1953), Rachlin (1994), Taylor (1964) and Wright (1976).

7 Tolman (1932, p. 4ss) is well-known for stressing the purposive character of behavior,

but I think he did not fully grasp the meaning of this feature. He thinks that conceiving of

behavior as “anything as organism does” is enough to preserve this feature, but, as I argue

later on, that is actually not the case.

LAZZERI

In this section, I attempt to distinguish the main types of definition that can in

principle be suitable for the concept taken in the sense of (i) (from now on,

'behavior' or its plural form for short, unless otherwise stated) and for the context

here relevant. I make a brief and non-exhaustive survey of types of definitions

trying to remain largely neutral regarding divergences existing among the available

classifications (for some of them, see, e.g., Copi, 1982, p. 138ss; Gorskij, 1970;

Pap, 1964; Robinson, 1954).

The following are three main premises I shall suppose in the arguments of this

section:

(A) The definition(s) we are looking for has (or have) the general function of

stating the nature of behavior, or the conditions that determine what is to

count as behavior. (Some authors may not be committed to the idea that

there is such a thing as the nature of behavior, but all the definitions here

in focus are supposed, either explicitly or implicitly, to state conditions

or criteria that determine what is to count as behavior.)

(B) Behavior is an ordinary notion, of which we already possess a tacit

mastery (i.e., it is not a new concept at all), and we are not looking for an

entire new meaning for it, but rather presupposing its basic, minimal

nuances.

common by the items denoted by the concept in question. (This particular

claim follows from the previous section.)

Definitions can be classified according to at least three aspects: (1) the

purposes they can fulfill; (2) their underlying technique; and (3) their focus (as

explained below). In respect to the first aspect (cf. Copi, 1982, p. 138ss),

definitions can be subdivided into:

(1.1) Stipulative definitions, which can serve either to prescribe a meaning

to a new term (e.g., as when we establish a meaning to a connective in

a system of logic), or to prescribe a new meaning to a term which is

already in use (e.g., as the notion of reinforcement is defined in

behavior analysis);

(1.2) Lexical definitions, which serve to increase a person's vocabulary

(e.g., as when we teach the meaning of a term to a foreign speaker), or

to eliminate ambiguity, that is, to prevent confusion between distinct

meanings of a term (e.g., as dictionary entries often attempt to do);

(1.3) Precising definitions, whose function is to reduce the vagueness (i.e.,

the imprecise boundaries) of a vague term (e.g., to establish that the

notion of personhood is applicable to any human being once it

ON DEFINING BEHAVIOR

becomes sentient)

;

(1.4) Theoretical definitions, whose function is roughly to express the

nature of, or model the items to which the definiendum applies,

typically within a framework of other definitions (e.g., to define

knowledge as true justified belief; water as a substance composed of

molecule of two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen) ; and

(1.5) Persuasive definitions, whose function is to engender a positive or

negative attitude as regards items denoted by the definiendum

(examples of them are easily found in political discourses).

Among the types of definition as to (1), theoretical definitions are the most

important for the definiendum and the context at issue, given the features pointed

out in the premises (A) and (B). Definitions of this type contrast with persuasive

definitions, which are inconsistent with (A). They contrast also with purely

stipulative, lexical and precising definitions, although not necessarily with those

that are partially of one or more of these types. Purely lexical definitions are not

adequate for the context here relevant, given (B) and the fact that it is clear enough

that the definiendum is not the notion of behavior in a sense other than (i)

Theoretical definitions may fulfill the purposes of lexical definitions, but the

definitions of behavior we are looking for are not primarily devised for them.

Similarly, precising definitions are not of interest here except to the extent that a

theoretical definition may partially involve the goal of allowing us to cope better

with borderline cases of the definiendum. Finally, purely stipulative definitions are

also excluded, given (B). However, a theoretical definition that eventually is

simultaneously a precising definition involves (ipso facto) partial stipulation of

meaning.

The definitions according to (2) (i.e, to the technique employed) include:

(2.1) Extensional definitions, whose technique is to indicate the items of

the extension of the definiendum (e.g., to define a given relation by

enumerating the ordered pairs that satisfy the relation; this is a case of

enumerative extensional definition, in particular);

(2.2) Synonymous definitions give the meaning of the definiendum by

replacing it with a (supposed) synonymous term (e.g., to say that

'remembering' means 'recalling');

(2.3) Definitions by genus and specific difference have as technique the

identification of conditions that are individually necessary and jointly

8 The examples given in this section as illustrations of different types of definitions do not

necessarily intend to be correct definitions.

9 Most of the definitions of behavior I have in mind have only (i) as definiendum. One

exception is Levitis et al.'s (2009, p. 108), who explicitly attempt to encompass both (i) and

(iii) at the same time in their definition.

LAZZERI

sufficient for the ascription of the definiendum (e.g., as in the

definition of knowledge as true justified belief).

(2.4) Disjunctive definitions specify (inclusive) disjunctions of two of more

conditions that are sufficient for the application of the definiendum

(e.g., to define artwork as anything that is an intended product of an

activity and has positive aesthetic properties, or anything that is an

intended product of an activity, expresses emotion and whose

interpretation requires imaginative activity, or etc.). It is typically

motivated by the idea that the definiendum does not admit of a

definition in terms of individually necessary and jointly sufficient

conditions. The items that satisfy the definiendum are thereby

understood as not having a set of common individual properties that

render all of them items of its extension (see Kingsbury & McKeown-

Green, 2009; Longworth & Scarantino, 2010). Among disjunctive

definitions, two subtypes stand out, viz.: sufficiency definitions (in

Cooper's 1972 terminology), which give no room for a relevant

necessary condition in the definiens (i.e., in the set of conditions that

make up the definition), not even implicitly (e.g., as an adequate

definition of game should be, according to a famous suggestion by

Wittgenstein, 1953, §65ss); and (2.4.2) those that give room for some

necessary condition in the definiens, by not excluding the possibility

of there being a condition shared by all the disjuncts, so that the

necessary condition can figure, although implicitly, in the definiens

(as in the example given above concerning the notion of artwork);

(2.5) Operational definitions specify operations – that is, test and

measurement procedures – which, once performed, establish whether

or not a given object, process or event falls under the definiendum

(e.g., to define acid is anything x such that, if x comes into contact

with litmus paper, then the color of the litmus turns to red) (see e.g.,

Gorskij, 1970, p. 323ss; Ribes-Iñesta, 2003); and

(2.6) Recursive definitions have a technique which comprises the following

three steps in sequence: first, identification of initial members of the

set being defined; second, specification of a condition stating that

certain entities are members of the set if they have certain specified

relations to members previously identified; and, third, assertion that

nothing else belongs to the set, unless its inclusion is mandated by the

previous steps (e.g., the definition of natural number as: 1 is a natural

number; if n is a natural number, then n + 1 is a natural number;

nothing else is a natural number) (see, e.g., Cook, 2009, p. 242).

Concerning (2), I submit that, given (A)-(C), the types of definitions possibly

suitable for the concept along with the context here relevant are definitions by

genus and specific difference, operational definitions, as well as the subcategory of

ON DEFINING BEHAVIOR

disjunctive definitions that gives room for some implicit necessary condition (i.e.,

respectively, 2.3, 2.5 and 2.4.2). Extensional and synonymous definitions are here

excluded, because they do not help us enhance our understanding of what behavior

as such is. As far as that is a concern, it is of no help simply to state (e.g.) that

behavior means conduct (a case of synonymous definition), or to enumerate some

supposed instances of behavior (a case of enumerative extensional definition).

Recursive definitions, by their time, seem to be adequate for behavior taken in the

sense of (ii) (the usual definition of operant class, e.g., may be interpreted as a

definition of this type), but apparently not for the specific definiendum at issue; for

one can hardly imagine the second step of a recursive definition for it. Anyway, the

desiderata suggested in the next section apply to an eventual recursive definition

thereof as well.

Among the disjunctive definitions, sufficiency definitions (i.e., 2.4.1) are not

to be expected for the definiendum, given (C). As a corollary, if we take family-

resemblance concepts to be those that require sufficiency definitions, then

behavior ‒ taken in sense of (i) ‒ is not a concept of this sort. On the other hand,

the other subcategory of disjunctive definition should not be ruled out from the

outset because, even though the definiendum has some core nuances which should

in a way or another be expressed as one or more necessary conditions in the

definiens, it is possible that these conditions are not jointly sufficient for an item to

count as behavior.

Finally, definitions are also classified as (3.1) nominal and (3.2) real. The

former have as focus a concept or predicate (e.g., to say that the concept of artwork

means such and such sort of thing), whereas the latter define a class of entities at

the ontic, extra-linguistic level (e.g., to say that an artwork is such and such sort of

thing). In many cases, they are interchangeable (for more on this, see Gorskij,

1970, p. 315ss; Robinson, 1954, p. 16ss. Both nominal and real definitions are

consistent with (A)-(C) as long as they are purported to specify conditions that

determine what is to count as behavior.

Some Desiderata for a Definition of Behavior

A desideratum for a definition is not absolute (or invariable), but rather

relative to the purposes and, more generally, to the types of definition one has in

mind. The desiderata suggested in the following are relative to the types of

definition picked out in the previous section. Here they are:

(a) The definition should not be too large, i.e., the definiens should not

encompass more things than what the definiendum denotes;

(b) It should not be too narrow, i.e., the definiens should not encompass less

things than what the definiendum denotes;

LAZZERI

implicitly, in the definiens, except in case the circularity is not vicious

;

(d) It should be informative, i.e., the definiens should enhance our intuitive

understanding of the definiendum;

(e) It should, in general, grasp the basic nuances of the concept, i.e., the

definiens should be consistent with the rules underlying the typical uses of

the definiendum, unless there is some good justification for making a

conceptual revision.

Here are some examples. According to (a), a definition of behavior (like

Tinbergen's, 1951, p. 211) simply in terms of movements made by an organism

turns out to be implausible; for it ends up including in the extension of the

definiendum entities that count as behavior in the sense of (iv) and not in the sense

of (i), such as the event of an animal falling down or turning around the sun

together with the Earth. According to (b), a definition of behavior (like Marken's,

1982) implying that it is something necessarily deliberate leaves much to be

desired too; for it leaves out from the extension of the concept relatively

automatized behaviors, such as instances of (unconditioned or conditioned) reflex

patterns. According to (c), a definition of behavior (like, it seems, Dermer's, 2011)

in which the concept of action appears in the definiens, either meaning a subclass

of the concept in the sense of (i) or being a synonym of behavior in the sense of (i),

is inadequate, for then it turns out to be viciously circular. Desideratum (d), by its

time, helps us prevent the definition from not fulfilling the role of a theoretical

definition. Defining behavior (as some authors do) as any activity in which an

organism engages is little informative, thus not serving as a theoretical definition,

although it may serve as a lexical one.

Finally, desideratum (e) is proposed as an answer to a question that

naturally comes up at this moment, viz.: On what grounds are we to put into

practice these criteria, in particular (a) and (b)? I submit that the basic, minimal

nuances of the notion (which can be disclosed by means of conceptual analysis or,

as Ryle would put it, conceptual geography) are a touchstone for the application of

these desiderata; they are a fundamental set of parameters for a definition of

behavior. (Hence, if I am right, there are some important parameters for a

definition of behavior that are quite independent of the commitments of particular

behavior research programs). When we say, for example, that a definition of

behavior implying that an organism accidentally stumbling counts as behavior is

too large, we are detecting an inconsistency with basic nuances of the concept; to

wit, an inconsistency with its teleological nuances. Similarly, when we say that a

definition of behavior that leaves out instances of (what we scientifically know as)

10 The circularity is not vicious, according to some authors, when it ends up being rather

informative; see Burgess (2008).

11 Tinbergen (1951) defines behavior as “the total of movements made by the intact

animal” (p. 2).

ON DEFINING BEHAVIOR

modal action patterns from its extension is too narrow, we mean that its basic

nuances are actually satisfied by such entities.

Desideratum (e), notwithstanding, does not rule out the legitimacy of

conceptual revisions. One or more nuances of the notion of behavior can in

principle be legitimately challenged. However, not every conceptual revision is

justified, on pain of losing sight of the definiendum. So, for example, if someone

implies that an organism accidentally falling down or happening to call attention of

a predator is behavior, he/she is rejecting the specificities of the definiendum and,

thereby, in practice, equating it with the concept of behavior in the sense of (iv). In

line with ordinary language philosophers such as Ryle and Wittgenstein, I believe

that authors often (of course, not always) make conceptual revisions owing to

neglect of basic nuances of the notion, instead of out of a real willingness to

substantially modify it.

The list of desiderata here suggested does not aim to be complete. A

definition of behavior for empirical science, in particular, should probably be

somewhat economical or succinct, so as to avoid encumbering usage of the

concept, as Levitis et al. (2009, p. 104) point out. Those more interested in a

definition of behavior for empirical science may want to add a desideratum of

economy or succinctness to the list. However, I submit that such desideratum

should not supersede (a)-(e) if we are to have a sufficiently accurate definition.

Problems with some Definitions of Behavior: Further Illustrations

Here are some further illustrations of how we can apply the desiderata

previously suggested. Let us first consider Watson's (1919) definition of behavior.

According to this definition, behavior is “the total of striped and unstriped

muscular and glandular changes which follow upon a given stimulus” (p. 14). By

stimulus, Watson means an environmental change that “calls out” the behavior, be

it a change in the external environment, or a change provided by one's own

muscles and gland secretions. Complex (or molar) behaviors and stimuli are taken

by him as sets of behaviors and stimuli understood in these (molecular) terms (cf.

Watson, 1919, p. 9-14). This definition of behavior is limited to things that have

muscles and glands, thereby apparently implying that (inter alia) plants do not

behave. However, plants do behave. Well-known examples of plant behavior

include those of the sunflower turning toward the sun (in order to achieve

sunlight), of the Mimosa pudica closing its leaves given stimuli such as touch and

blowing, and of the carnivorous plant catching an insect. They are not behaviors in

the sense of (iv), since they exhibit teleological features of the typical animal

behavior. Hence, Watson's definition fails to fulfill desideratum (b). This problem

can be easily overcome by taking into account other sorts of structures in the

definiens. Nevertheless, this definition runs into a more serious problem, since it is

not able to preserve the teleological features of behavior, thereby encompassing in

LAZZERI

the extension of the definiendum items that count as behavior only in the sense of

(iv). This is so because the total of muscular and glandular changes that follow a

given stimulus can be individuated in many ways. For instance, it can correspond

to the muscular and glandular changes comprised when an organism falls down,

stumbles or slips. Therefore, this definition fails to satisfy desideratum (a) as well.

Similarly, the definition of behavior as “anything an organism does” (or

“what the organism does”), which enjoys large popularity, fails to fulfill

desideratum (a). It is able to rule out from the extension of the definiendum things

like the fall of a wisp of hair caused by the friction of the comb and the suffering

of a flesh wound, since these are not things an organisms does. Nonetheless, it

encompasses in the extension of the definiendum some other things that happen to

the organism simply because of forces exerted by the immediate external

environment, in addition to things that consist in the bringing about of incidental

happenings. As Millikan (1993, p.144) points out, active verbs often designate

things an organism does. To cast shadows, to attract the attention of a predator, to

slip, to trip, and so forth, are all things an organism does. Nonetheless, such

happenings typically do not consist of behaviors. It does not make sense to say, for

example, of a stumble, that it is something emitted, or performed by the organism,

unless it is not an accidental stumble (as when an actor does it in the context of a

play). In other words, in the typical cases, they do not have functions or purposes.

According to a particular version of this definition (e.g., Chance, 2003, p. 37,

p. 448; Pierce & Cheney, 2004, p. 1; Watson, 1930, p. 6-7) (Watson later came to

embrace it; see Watson [1930, p. 6-7]). whatever an organism does which can be

measured counts as behavior, no matter whether overtly or “under the skin”. This

formulation is motivated by the intent to encompass in the extension of the

definiendum a variety of psychological or mental phenomena, sometimes including

phenomena that have the character of states, such as moods and expectations.

However, as I have already remarked, behaviors contrast with states, for states are

not the sort of thing an organism emits or performs. (Moreover, it does not make

sense even to say that states are things an organism does!) It may be true that

certain mental phenomena are behaviors (in the relevant sense here), but it is

conceptually confused to say that those which have the character of states are

behaviors (even though perhaps they may be otherwise behavioral; e.g., fractions

of behavior patterns). So, this version of the definition transgresses the rules

underlying the notion with heavier damage to desideratum (a).

Marken (1982) suggests that “behavior can be objectively defined as

controlled results of an organism's action” (p. 650). By controlled result, Marken

means “a result which is kept matching a reference inside the organism for the

state of that result. The internal reference corresponds to an intention and is the

cause of the intended result” (p. 648). That is, according to Marken, behavior

consists in any result caused by an intention, by its time taken (mentalistically) as

something inherently inner (and non-behavioral) with the relevant causal powers.

The author has as explicit motivation for this definition to prevent accidental side

ON DEFINING BEHAVIOR

effects from counting as behaviors. Indeed, this definition is able to rule out from

the extension of the concept things like an animal's incidental production of air

displacement while foraging. It proves to be immune, besides, to the other

counterexamples concerning (a) that beset the definitions examined above. Things

that happen simply by force of immediate external objects or events (e.g., an

accidental slippage) are not caused by (the conceived) inner intentions.

Nonetheless, these definitions run into other problems. One of these problems, as

previously pointed out, is that of excluding from the extension of the concept

relatively automatized behaviors (such as instances of reflex patterns). It is also

fraught with the problem of considering behaviors as results of actions, when

actually, first of all, behaviors bring about results; and, secondly, the results of

behaviors are often ‒ even when intended ‒ not behaviors. For example, the result

of carefully brushing the teeth is typically getting the teeth clean, but to have the

teeth clean is no behavior. Thus, Marken's definition ends up fulfilling neither (a)

nor (b). Moreover, since it includes the term 'action' in the definiens, it may be

accused of circularity as well; that is, of contravening (c)

One of the most recent attempts at defining behavior was made by Bergner

(2011). His proposal runs as follows:

Any behavior […] is a complex state of affairs that includes as component states

of affairs a speciﬁc person’s acting to accomplish purposes W1...Wn, acting on

discriminations K1...Kn, exercising competencies K-H1...K-Hn, engaging in

physical processes or performances P1...Pn, achieving outcomes A1...An,

expressing personal characteristics PC1...PCn, and engaging in actions having

significances S1...Sn. (Bergner, 2011, p. 148-149)

This definition is restricted to persons, thereby failing to fulfill (b). The

problem can be somewhat overcome by replacing the word 'persons' by 'organisms'

in the definiens, but even so this definition turns out not to fulfill (b), because it

rules out from the extension of the definiendum at least some instances of innate

behavior patterns and of other relatively automatized behavior patterns. It implies

that every behavior expresses one or more personal characteristics, but instances of

such behavior patterns, at least very often, do not express personal characteristics.

One could hardly find the expression of a personal characteristic, for example, in a

bee dance indicating direction and distance of nectar. Bergner acknowledges that

he leaves out from the extension of the definiendum this sort of phenomena, under

12 To my view, some of Marken's assumptions about the concept of intention are beset

with conceptual difficulties too. I do not think mentalism (even if couched in physicalistic

terms) to be the more conceptually coherent and promising way of modeling intentions.

However, for the purposes of this article, I can remain largely neutral as regards this

particular issue.

LAZZERI

the explicit assumption that they are simply bodily movements (see Bergner, 2011,

p. 151); but, as I argued before, this is mistaken.

I would like to give one last illustration to conclude this section. Some authors

(e.g., Jessor, 1958, p. 172-173; Maturana, 1995, p. 151-152) conceive of behavior

as a relation between an organism and the environment. In this definition, behavior

is not understood as an element of a relation between an organism and the

environment, but rather as the relation itself. However, this goes straight against

(e), for, as pointed out by Todorov (2012), it does not make sense to say that an

organism emits or performs a relation. Behavior supervenes on environmental

properties to which the organism bears some relations, since it is not reducible to

changes and movements of the organism; but this does not mean that behavior

itself is a relation.

Concluding Remarks

Summing up, behavior is said in at least four ways: (i) as the occurrence of an

organism's action or reaction; (ii) as a class or pattern; (iii) as group behavior; and

(iv) as a change or movement of an object. The definiendum of the definitions

focused upon in this work is (with few exceptions) only behavior in the sense of

(i). The types of definition that can in principle be suitable for this definiendum and

for the context here relevant are chiefly, as to the purposes, theoretical definitions;

and, as to the underlying technique, definitions by genus and specific difference,

operational definitions and disjunctive definitions consistent with the inclusion of

some necessary condition in the definiens. A good definition thereof couched in

any of these types should: (a) not be too large; (b) not be too narrow; (c) not be

circular; (d) be informative; and, in general, (e) grasp the basic, minimal nuances

of the definiendum. Desideratum (e) is a touchstone for the application of the other

desiderata, especially (a) and (b). This list of desiderata, as I illustrated, if properly

applied, help us detect conceptual difficulties in definitions of behavior found in

the literature. It can be helpful also for avoiding conceptual confusions when we

employ the notion in philosophical and scientific practices.

Finally, although it was not a goal of this paper to support any particular

definition of behavior, I would like to mention that Millikan's (1993, p. 137-138)

and Moore's (2008, p. 66-68)

are two definitions I find highly plausible once

13 According to Millikan (1993), “A behavior is […] at least the following:

1. It is an external change or activity exhibited by an organism or external part of an

organism.

2. It has a function in the biological sense.

3. This function is or would be normally fulfilled via mediation of the environment

or via resulting alterations in the organism's relation to the environment.” (p. 137)

14 According to Moore, behavior is an event in which a functional relation exists (in the

sense of a probabilistic correlation we can establish) between the environment and one or

more neural or muscular systems of the organism responsible for movement or posture; and

ON DEFINING BEHAVIOR

slightly modified. Moore's can, roughly speaking, be interpreted (mutatis

mutandis) as a way of putting the core of Millikan's teleofunctional proposal in

operational terms. I think Millikan’s fails to fulfill (b) by requiring for something

to count as behavior that it is an external change exhibited by an organism or part

of an organism. Like Moore (and Skinner), I think it is plausible to say that certain

phenomena not apparent in the outside body are behaviors; for example, an

increase of heartbeat given the presence of predator as an instance of a conditioned

reflex. Differently from Moore, I would not exclude organisms that do not have

neural or muscular systems (such as plants, I suppose), because this makes the

definition too restrictive. Besides, since behavior, in this view, has fundamental

historical etiologies, certain counterexamples arise, arguably, if we get too much

attached to operational strictures. I believe Moore's definition is more plausible

when couched in more ontological terms so as to more accurately take into account

distant historical process. However, I leave the task of arguing more thoroughly in

favor of such suggestions to another work (see Lazzeri, forthcoming).

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AUTHOR'S NOTE: The author would especially like to thank Caetano E.

Plastino, Maria Helena L. Hunziker, Osvaldo Pessoa Jr. and two anonymous

reviewers for their helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. Work

supported by São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP), Brazil. The content,

however, is solely the responsibility of the author. A version of this work with further

developments will appear in Portuguese as Lazzeri (forthcoming). Please address

correspondence to Filipe Lazzeri, Departamento de Filosofia/Faculdade de Filosofia,

Letras e Ciências Humanas, Universidade de São Paulo, Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto,

315 (Cidade Universitária), Zip: 05508-900, São Paulo, SP, Brazil. Email:

[email protected]