scheme conditions) as within the Special Scheme. This
would be of great importance in the DMC, TMC and
MICE sectors. Whilst such an approach would at least
remove some of the uncertainties faced by many at the
moment, and help to equalise treatment in this area, it
would perpetuate the inability to deduct input tax on
business travel expenditure which, whilst an inherent
aspect of the Special Scheme, is the cause of many of
the current problems we have identified. It would also
make travel and tourism within the EU, for both EU and
third country citizens, more expensive. This is
illustrated by the examples set out in Annex 3 and
which we discuss in detail below.
The objective of a harmonised application of VAT to
travel agents would be partly achieved. Adoption of
CJEU judgments would mean far greater consistency
for travel agents established in the EU but there would
still be variable approaches on the meaning of “travel
facilities” and certain other aspects of the operation of
the scheme so the harmonisation objective could not
be said to be fully achieved by just enforcing
established case law.
Furthermore, there would be no greater equalisation of
the obligations of EU and third country travel agents
and there would be no progress towards the adoption
of the destination principle. Therefore, this measure
would reduce the distortion of competition in the B2B
sector amongst EU travel agents but would permit the
continuation of a different treatment of third country
travel agents competing with EU agents in the B2B
area. Even if third country travel agents were thought
to be taxable under current rules, they would be taxed
on a different basis to EU agents so there would be no
equality. From a practical perspective, we are not
aware of the payment of such VAT by third country
travel agents regularly taking place.
Finally, the enforcement of a sale by sale basis to the
calculation would perpetuate the existing material issue
we have identified in this area.
Therefore, we believe that continuation of the current
rules as interpreted by the CJEU would see the
continuation of many of the existing problems
associated with the scheme and a failure to satisfy the
objectives of reform. Furthermore, as this approach
would increase the application of VAT to the B2B
sectors in many Member States the drawback we
believe to arise from the non-deductibility of input tax
on business travel costs would be increased.
Accordingly, we do not believe that this option should
be pursued.
We have, however, considered the effect in the DMC
sector. This is perhaps the sector most affected. We
have established that some Member States require
wholesale suppliers of travel facilities to include the
supplies within the Special Scheme whilst other
Member States expect normal VAT to be applied. If the
Special Scheme was adopted by all Member States as
interpreted by the CJEU, all wholesale supplies made
by EU established travel agents would fall within the
scheme. Clearly, for those travel agents established in
a Member State which already requires the Special
Scheme to be used, there would be no change (in this
this aspect of the scheme) but travel agents
established in a Member State which does not require
the use of the scheme would need to change the basis
of VAT accounting and the quantum of VAT payable
would change. However, we do not believe that the
effect on VAT liabilities would be uniform and we
illustrate the possible effects in Annex 3.
These illustrations use two Member States to
demonstrate what we consider to be likely outcomes.
Data to perform precise calculations in this area is not
available so we have necessarily had to rely on our
experience of the sector. The basis of our model and
the assumptions we have made are set out in Annex 3.
The purpose of the illustrations is to show the effect of
the adoption of the Special Scheme on VAT revenue
generated. Our analysis aims to show possible effects
on the payments of VAT due from the suppliers of the
wholesale services and takes no account of the VAT
due from the primary suppliers (i.e. the hotels,
restaurants etc) or from any re-supplier of the travel
facilities (e.g. a B2C supplier such as a tour operator).
We have the used the UK and one other member State
(“MS2”) to illustrate the effects. MS2 is intended to
represent generally those Member States which do not
include wholesale supplies in the Special Scheme. The
UK, which also does not require the use of the Special
Scheme, is considered to be in a different situation to
many in terms of the revenue effects due to the high
use of the standard rate in the UK on travel and
tourism services when supplied under the normal rules.
The purpose of the illustrations is therefore to show
how the revenue effect of the application of the Special
Scheme by all Member States would not be uniform.
In the model we have adopted, application of the
Special Scheme in MS2 would see VAT payable by
DMCs on inbound travel to that Member State increase
by nearly 49%. In contrast, the same change in the UK
would see revenue fall by a little over 1%.
In many Member States (as represented by MS2 in the
illustrations), many of the services which are
purchased and supplied by a DMC are eligible for a
reduced rate. Where the Special Scheme applies, the
margin is taxed at the standard rate and therefore
taxation of the value added, or margin, is at a higher
rate under the Special Scheme than is due when
applying the normal rules. The Special Scheme also
allows a deduction in calculating the margin for costs
which are not subject to VAT, i.e. costs on which input
tax deduction is not possible under the normal rules. In
itself, this feature reduces the VAT payable under the
Special Scheme but in the MS2 model this effect is
outweighed by the rate differential and hence the
increase in revenue when the Special Scheme is
adopted.
In the UK, however, the same rate (20%) is applied to
the margin and the majority of the component parts of
the services provided and therefore the effect of the
application of the Special Scheme is less pronounced.
There is an increase in VAT payable on those services
subject to VAT at a rate lower than the standard rate
but this accounts for a relatively small part of the
services modelled. There is also the effect of the
inclusion of costs in calculating the margin on which no
input tax is incurred. The effect of this in the UK
illustration is largely to counter the effect of the
application of the standard rate to the full margin and