Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and European Union Aviation Safety Agency.

Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol.

2 December 2020. ECDC: Stockholm; 2020/EASA: Cologne; 2020.

Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged.

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

Contents

Definitions ...................................................................................................................................... 2

Executive summary ......................................................................................................................... 3

1. Context ....................................................................................................................................... 4

2. Risk assessment and scientific evidence ........................................................................................ 5

2.1 Travel-related risks in the COVID-19 pandemic ..............................................................................5

2.2 Testing and quarantine measures for air travel ..............................................................................7

2.2.1 Testing of air travellers .......................................................................................................... 7

2.2.2 Quarantine of air travellers ..................................................................................................10

2.2.3 Combination of testing and quarantine for air travellers .....................................................10

3. Operational recommendations .................................................................................................... 11

References .................................................................................................................................... 14

Annex 1. Overview of travel-related measures (air travel) with advantages and disadvantages .......... 17

Annex 2. Guidelines for travel-related measures  air travel

............................................................ 19

Annex 3. Overview of quarantine, testing combinations and effectiveness in preventing local transmission .... 20

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

Definitions

 Asymptomatic: refers to people who are infected but do not exhibit symptoms of COVID-19.

 Contacts of confirmed cases: refers to any person who has had exposure to a confirmed COVID-19 case

within a timeframe ranging from two days before to 10 days after the onset of symptoms. If the case has had

no symptoms, further assessment should be made, as outlined in ‘Contact tracing: public health management

of persons, including healthcare workers, who have had contact with COVID-19 cases in the European Union

– third update’ [1].

 COVID-19: refers to corona virus disease 2019 – a potentially severe illness caused by a SARS-CoV-2 most

frequently characterised by fever, coughing, and shortness of breath. Other organs may be affected, resulting

in specific symptomatology.

 Epidemiology: refers to the branch of medicine that deals with the study of the incidence, distribution and

determinants of disease and the analysis of these measures in order to control the spread of diseases and

improve other factors related to health.

 False negative: refers to a test result indicating that the disease is not present when the person actually does

have the disease.

 False positive: refers to a test result indicating that the disease is present when the person actually does not

have the disease.

 IHR: international health regulations, refers to an overarching legal framework that defines countries’ rights

and obligations in handling public health events and emergencies that have the potential to cross borders.

 Incidence: refers to the number of new cases of a disease over occurrence, rate or frequency of a disease - in

this context the number of new cases during a specified period.

 Positive predictive value (PPV): refers to the likelihood of a positive test being true positive.

 PoE: Point of Entry

 Prevalence: the proportion of the population with a disease at a specific point or period in relation to disease

burden expressed as a percentage or rate with the total population as the denominator.

 RADT: rapid antigen detection test, is a testing method for SARS-CoV-2 that can rapidly (usually in <30

minutes) detect viral components present during the infection in samples such as nasopharyngeal secretions.

 RT-PCR: reverse transcription polymerase reaction - a very sensitive testing method for detecting different

pathogens based on their genetic material. It is considered to be the gold standard for the detection of SARS-

CoV-2 RNA.

 Non-symptomatic: refers to persons who may or may not be infected and do not exhibit COVID-19

symptoms.

 Negative predictive value (NPV): refers to the likelihood of a negative test being true negative.

 Quarantine of contacts of cases: refers to the need for those exposed to a confirmed COVID-19 case to

remain at home or in a designated safe setting for a defined period after the last exposure, with the aim of

reducing virus transmission [1]. This can be voluntary, or mandatory, if implemented by local authorities.

 Quarantine of travellers: refers to travellers being required to remain at home or in a designated safe setting

for a defined period after entering a region or country. This can be voluntary or mandatory, if implemented

by local authorities.

 SARS-CoV-2: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, the causative agent of COVID-19.

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

Executive summary

This document aims to support Member States in determining a coordinated approach to reduce the risks related

to the movement of people within and between the EU/EEA countries and the UK in the context of the COVID-19

pandemic. It is intended for use by decision-makers in the Member States, including public health authorities and

civil aviation authorities, as well as aviation stakeholders. The recommendations outlined in this document may

also be taken into account by Member States when considering temporary restrictions on non-essential travel to

the EU in relation to residents of third countries

The document provides information on effective and differentiated strategies to enable the health authorities to

evaluate scenarios and make informed decisions on the best possible measures.

Scientific evidence and information, presented and analysed in this document, give rise to the following key

considerations:

 In the current epidemiological situation, where SARS-CoV-2 is established in all EU/EEA countries and the UK,

imported cases account for a very small proportion of all detected cases and are unlikely to significantly

increase the rate of transmission.

 The prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 in travellers is estimated likely to be lower than the prevalence in the general

population or among contacts of confirmed cases.

 Travellers should not be considered as a high-risk population, nor treated as contacts of COVID-19 cases,

unless they had been in known contact with a confirmed positive case.

 Travellers should be subject to the same regulations or recommendations as applied to the local population.

 Member States should always admit their own nationals and EU citizens and their family members resident in

their territory, and should facilitate swift transit through their territories.

Decision makers are invited to consider the detailed epidemiological evidence that supports the options presented

in this document acknowledging that:

 In the current epidemiological situation

, quarantine or systematic testing for SARS-CoV-2 of air travellers is

not recommended.

 Harmonisation among Member States is recommended based on the specific measures presented in this

document.

Chapter 3 outlines the main risk assessment criteria and the available evidence and information on the use of

testing and quarantine for travellers. Where scientific evidence is insufficient, the document takes into

consideration modelling studies and expert opinions from the relevant experts at the European Centre for Disease

Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).

In Chapter 4, the document presents specific operational recommendations for the management of these travel-

related measures by the Member States.

The document, its observations, recommendations and conclusions are based on the evidence and best knowledge

available at the time of writing, as compiled and analysed by experts at ECDC and EASA. Depending on the

evolution of the pandemic and future evidence and developments, in terms of risk assessment criteria, testing

technologies or the introduction of vaccines, this document may require updating which may prompt further

assessment by the Member States in their implementation efforts.

In accordance with Council Recommendation (EU) 2020/912 of 30 June 2020 on the temporary restriction on non-essential

travel into the EU and the possible lifting of such restriction; OJ L 208I 1.7.2020, p.1. Available at: https://eur-

lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02020H0912-20201026&qid=1606575297003

At the time of writing, community transmission is occurring in all EU/EEA Member States and the UK.

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

1. Context

Within the EU/EEA and the UK, cross-border travel can refer to travel within the EU/EEA and the UK and travel

from third countries outside the EU/EEA and the UK. Travellers within the EU/EEA and the UK include not only

tourists, but also transport workers, commuters, students, military and diplomatic personnel, business travellers

and seasonal workers. Free movement within the EU is one of the fundamental principles of the Treaty on the

Functioning of the European Union [2].

In response to the first wave of COVID-19 in spring 2020, the EU/EEA countries and the UK implemented various

public health measures to minimise the likelihood of COVID-19 transmission on-board various conveyances

including aircraft, as well as other measures to limit the importation of COVID-19 by cross-border travel. To

support the Member States, EASA and ECDC jointly developed the COVID-19 Aviation Health Safety Protocol

(AHSP) [3], which provides recommendations on measures for every stage of the end-to-end traveller journey [3].

The COVID-19 AHSP also provides recommendations regarding pre- and post-flight health screening and

supportive arguments for the collection and sharing of passenger locator data.

The travel-related measures adopted by the EU/EEA countries and the UK in the context of the COVID-19

pandemic have varied significantly and some of them have had an impact on citizens’ rights to free movement and

the functioning of the internal market. Most of the EU/EEA countries and the UK have developed national criteria to

determine the potential need for testing and/or voluntary or mandatory quarantine of incoming travellers. Due to

the rapidly-evolving epidemiological situation the measures have changed on average every 714 days. Despite

initiatives such as the European Commission’s Re-Open EU website [4] and the EU health preparedness

recommendations for a common EU testing approach to COVID-19, agreed by the Health Security Committee

(HSC) [5], the different measures have resulted in significant confusion for travellers. This is continuing to have a

significant negative impact on travel and tourism.

On 13 October 2020, the Council of the European Union adopted Recommendation 2020/1475 on a coordinated

approach to the restriction of free movement in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, aiming to avoid

fragmentation and disruption, and to increase harmonisation, transparency and predictability for citizens and

businesses [6].

On 28 October 2020, the European Commission issued a Communication on additional COVID-19 response

measures [7], mandating EASA and ECDC to work on guidelines on testing in air travel which could be used by

public health authorities, airlines and airports to help the safe arrival of passengers, along with a Commission

Recommendation on COVID-19 testing strategies, including the use of rapid antigen tests [8].

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

2. Risk assessment and scientific evidence

2.1 Travel-related risks in the COVID-19 pandemic

Travel and population movements contribute to the spread of pathogens and/or their introduction into areas where

they were not previously circulating [9]. Historically, governments intuitively turn to travel-related measures and

restrictions, which potentially help build public trust, particularly for new emerging threats to health [10]. Advice

against non-essential travel during an epidemic is designed to reduce the number of people who may be exposed

while visiting areas or countries where community transmission is ongoing and, consequently, to reduce the risk of

importation and transmission among travellers during transportation.

The first cases of COVID-19 in Europe were imported from Hubei, China. However, it is difficult to identify the first

actual importation and it is postulated that the pathogen was silently circulating for weeks before its detection.

Travel-related virus introduction and tourism-related spread within the EU/EEA and the UK contributed

substantially to the transmission across and within countries during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic

[11-17].

Moreover, models consistently indicate that neither temperature screening, nor surveillance of passengers at

airports to identify those exhibiting COVID-19 relevant symptoms would have a major impact on the detection of

imported COVID-19 cases [18,19]. A modelling study (in preprint) estimates that imported COVID-19 cases, using

the May 2019 travel volumes, would have accounted for less than 1% of the total of cases in 48 countries and less

than 10% in 142 countries around the world in May 2020 [20]. Therefore, in most countries, imported cases are

likely to contribute little to the ongoing spread of SARS-CoV-2, once the virus has been introduced in the

community.

With an effective reproduction number of COVID-19 between 24 (high) [21] and a long incubation period (114

days; median 57 days) [22], models estimated that a 90% reduction of the number of passengers would only

delay the arrival of the outbreak in a country by approximately 10 days [23].

Based on evidence from past outbreaks of new emerging pathogens, as well as the above mentioned models

[10,24,25], it is assessed that entry screening for COVID-19, quarantine and border closure for incoming travellers

are unlikely to prevent the introduction of SARS-CoV-2 in a community but may delay it for a short period of time.

However, public health capacity should be in place to promptly recognise new cases through comprehensive

surveillance; undertake prompt testing and isolation of cases and carry out contact tracing for incoming travellers

and quarantining of exposed contacts.

As regards air travel, documented cases of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in aircraft mainly occurred before the

implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) [26,27]. To minimise the risk of transmission of SARS-

CoV-2 during air travel, EASA and ECDC developed a dedicated COVID-19 Aviation Health Safety Protocol (AHSP)

addressing all stages of travel and describing all the measures including communication, administrative controls,

physical distancing measures at airports and on-board aircraft, enhanced hygiene and cleaning [3].

In most countries, once the virus has been introduced into the community, imported cases are likely to

contribute little to the ongoing spread of SARS-CoV-2.

Air travellers should be considered as a mostly non-symptomatic subpopulation with a low probability of being

infected with COVID-19, comparable to the general population of the country of origin.

Competent authorities and the relevant stakeholders should ensure that the non-pharmaceutical interventions

(NPI) outlined in the COVID-19 Aviation Health Safety Protocol are implemented and that passenger locator

forms (PLF) are completed and collected in order to enable efficient contact tracing.

Air travellers should be duly informed of all the measures in place.

Entry screening, quarantine and border closures for incoming travellers are unlikely to prevent the introduction

of SARS-CoV-2 into a community, although they might delay it for a short period of time. However, public

health capacity must be in place to mitigate the risk of the introduction of SARS-CoV-2 and prevent further

transmission.

Implementing systematic testing for SARS-CoV-2 of air travellers is not recommended, except in specific

epidemiological scenarios (see below), as it may detract public health resources and laboratory capacity from

essential public health activities, such as timely testing of possible cases in the community and high-risk

settings, contact tracing, and cluster investigations.

Decision-makers in the Member States need to ensure that they have sufficient capacity in place for contact-

tracing and all other similar measures.

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

According to the available evidence to date, the spread of SARS-CoV-2 is mostly facilitated by human interactions

in the absence of NPIs such as physical distancing, hand and respiratory hygiene and the use of face masks, with

the majority of the clusters occurring in crowded indoor settings. As regards travellers, it is important to

differentiate them from high-risk close contacts of a confirmed COVID-19 case. Studies have shown that the

prevalence of COVID-19 in household contacts ranges from 4.649.5% [28], while data from contact tracing

activities in Ireland show an overall positivity rate of 15% [95% Confidence Interval (CI) 11% to 20%] [29]. In

contrast, prevalence in travellers is estimated by modelling studies to be much lower, closer to the estimated

prevalence of COVID-19 in the general population at less than 1% [30,31]. The current average estimated point

prevalence of COVID-19 in general populations in the EU/EEA countries and the UK is thought to be less than

2.5%

. As these estimates are based on reported cases and general population point prevalence studies, and as

travellers with symptoms are discouraged from travelling, ECDC estimates that the current prevalence of COVID-19

among travellers in the EU/EEA is approximately 1%, although in areas of intense widespread transmission of

SARS-CoV-2, the prevalence among travellers could be higher.

Based on the data on COVID-19 cases reported by EU/EEA countries and the UK to TESSy, we compared the number

of imported cases as specified by the reporting Member State with that of locally-acquired cases from week 23/2020

to week 45/2020.

Figure 1. Locally acquired and imported cases of COVID-19, as reported by the destination country for

eight EU/EEA countries*, weeks 23–45/2020

*Source: TESSy, ECDC.

Country reports from Czechia, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Norway, and Slovakia. Data were included from countries

that had a) ≥70% completeness of TESSy data, when compared with data retrieved by ECDC epidemic intelligence for the same

period (weeks 23 to 45), and b) maximum 35% of missing data in relation to imported cases.

Figure 1 shows that an increase of imported cases in the EU/EEA and the UK was observed during weeks 3134,

representing a relatively important proportion of imported cases during the summer holidays when the total

number of cases was low. However, as testing policies focused on testing travellers during the beginning of the

pandemic and the summer holidays, this proportion is likely to be biased. The proportion of imported cases

decreased in subsequent weeks and in week 45 (last week with available data), imported cases only accounted for

less than 1% of the total number of cases, with the vast majority of cases being locally acquired, which is

consistent with the current community transmission of COVID-19 in Europe.

Based on the highest 14-day notification rate of 1.9% during week 47 and general population PCR point-prevalence estimates

of less than 2%.

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

2.2 Testing and quarantine measures for air travel

Travel restrictions are regulated under the International Health Regulations (IHR) and EU law. In both cases, public

safety and health threats related to infectious disease outbreaks are considered reasonable grounds for Member

States to restrict free movement across borders.

Travel-related measures refer to a variety of measures at Points of Entry (PoE) in response to the COVID-19

outbreak, with the aim of controlling the spread of the disease. Providing information to travellers about the

disease, the epidemiological situation in the destination country and the measures in place is very important and

should be part of the risk communication strategy. In addition, Passenger Locator Forms (PLF) are recommended

as an important tool to facilitate prompt contact tracing in the destination country. The effectiveness of other entry

screening methods, such as temperature screening and health questionnaires, is not supported by evidence [32].

ECDC and EASA strongly recommend the advance provision of information to travellers, a simplified procedure for

obtaining PLFs, preferably in digital format, and the implementation of a combination of NPIs [33] in the

communities, including at airports and on-board airplanes, as set out in the COVID-19 Aviation Health Safety

Protocol.

An overview of travel-related measures for air travel with their advantages and disadvantages is provided in Annex

1. This document focuses on the following travel-related measures: testing of air travellers for SARS-CoV-2 and

quarantine of air travellers.

2.2.1 Testing of air travellers

Testing methods used for the diagnosis of COVID-19 include molecular (RT-PCR or RT-LAMP) and rapid antigen

detection tests (RADTs). RADTs aim to detect active infections (i.e. infectious individuals at the time of testing.)

RT-PCR may also detect non-infectious cases due to the prolonged existence of viral ribonucleic acid (RNA).

No diagnostic test provides 100% sensitivity and specificity; test performance depends on factors such as technical

characteristics of the test, the prevalence of the infection in the target population, the timing of testing, the quality

of the sample, the person’s infection and immune status and the transport of specimens [34]. Proper interpretation

of test results is important for accurate case management. Taking into consideration the measures already

implemented (information to passengers and AHSP guidelines), air travellers are a mostly non-symptomatic

subpopulation, with variable but decreased probability of COVID-19 compared to the general population (estimated

prevalence of COVID-19 in travellers is approximately 1%) [35]. Test performance characteristics

(sensitivity/specificity) and the prevalence of the disease in the target population play a pivotal role in determining

the validity (i.e. ability to detect true positives and true negatives) of the test results. This document is, however,

based on current evidence regarding the existing tests, and further technological developments may require it to

be updated accordingly.

In order to ensure the expected quality of the test and for safety reasons, testing should always be conducted in

accordance with manufacturer’s instructions. Professional sampling is particularly important in the context of testing

Testing and quarantine of travellers are appropriate measures to delay the importation in an area where

SARS-CoV-2 is not yet circulating, or once a country or a region has managed to decrease COVID-19 levels to

almost zero.

Every testing and/or quarantine strategy leaves some residual risk of importation of COVID-19. Member States

should assess what residual risk they are prepared to accept, then manage potential imported cases at

national level through public health infrastructure (e.g. testing of suspected cases, contact tracing and

isolation and provision of healthcare services.)

All available testing methods for COVID-19 have limitations and their performance depends on multiple

factors, including the prevalence of the infection in the target population.

Tests will not detect individuals that are incubating the disease at the time of testing or have viral loads below

the level of detection of the testing method used.

If screening of travellers is being considered, Member States should aim for the use of RT-PCR tests or other

tests with performance close to RT-PCR.

RADTs perform best in cases with high viral load, in early symptomatic cases up to five days from symptom

onset.

Where a country or an area has achieved consistent sustained control of SARS-CoV-2, with a 14-day incidence

close to zero, RADTs are not suitable for screening incoming travellers to prevent virus introduction or re-

introduction. In these situations, only RT-PCR should be used to reduce the risk of false negative results.

According to modelling studies, testing can help shorten the duration of quarantine.

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

with rapid antigen tests as the test lacks a control showing successful sampling. When testing at the PoE, trained

healthcare or laboratory staff, or trained operators are needed to carry out sampling, testing, test analysis and

reporting of test results to clinical staff and public health authorities at local, regional, national and international level.

Self-testing may be an option if included in the manufacturer’s instructions, provided that time and appropriate facilities

are planned. When considering testing of travellers, Member States should give proper consideration to availability and

prioritisation of all prerequisite resources, including appropriate human resources. The use of any diagnostic test for

screening purposes, including RT-PCR and RADT, in a low prevalence population can lead to a number of false negative

and false positive results, which would be higher for the RADT method. False negative cases pose a risk of importation

and transmission during travel, while the false positives would require proper management until the result of the

confirmation test is received. The management of the positive cases is expected to have an impact on the public health

capacity as well as on aircraft and aerodrome operators, if testing is organised at airport premises.

Table 1 shows the true and false positive results expected if testing is implemented in air traveller population. As

illustrated, the use of a low-performance test (with a sensitivity of 80% and specificity of 97%) would lead to more

false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) results when compared to a high-performance test (with sensitivity of 95%

and specificity of 98%). False positive cases are indistinguishable from true positives, unless a more specific test or

repeat testing is performed for confirmation. Both false positive and false negative cases have public health

implications. In the case of false positives, these individuals will have to be isolated and they will trigger contact

tracing activities and further testing (i.e. requiring additional public health resources.) False negative cases, on the

other hand, will give a false sense of security while triggering chains of community transmission. Therefore, the

inherent risk of missing positive cases and the need to mobilise public health resources for false positive cases needs

to be carefully considered when contemplating systematic testing. If systematic testing of air travellers is

implemented then, as illustrated in these examples, it is critical to use clinically validated tests with high performance,

which is as close as possible to RT-PCR performed in laboratories, and to ensure a rapid turnaround of test results.

Table 1. Test results when using high and low performing tests in air traveller population [35,36]

Examples of

COVID-19

prevalence

in the

travellers

Aviation related

target group tested

Test

characteristics

(High†/Low‡

performing test)

Test results*

True

positive

(TP)

False

positive

(FP)

True

negative

(TN)

False

negative

(FN)

0.5%

Average intra-EU flight:

180 travellers

176

174

Passenger volume per

day at an EU airport:

20 000 travellers

398

19 502

597

19 303

Passenger volume per

day at an EU airport:

5 000 travellers

100

4 876

149

4 826

1.5%

Average intra-EU flight:

180 travellers

174

172

Passenger volume per

day at an EU airport:

20 000 travellers

285

394

19 306

240

591

19 109

Passenger volume per

day at an EU airport:

5 000 travellers

4 827

148

4 777

3.0%

Average intra-EU flight:

180 travellers

171

169

Passenger volume per

day at an EU airport:

20 000 travellers

570

388

19 012

480

582

18 818

120

Passenger volume per

day at an EU airport:

5 000 travellers

143

4 753

120

146

4 705

*Results are rounded to the nearest whole number as they refer to persons, consequently the sum of the columns approximates

the total number of passengers; †High- performance test: 95% sensitivity, 98% specificity; ‡Low-performance test: 80% sensitivity,

97% specificity, TP: true positive, FP: false positive, TN: true negative, FN: false negative.

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

Molecular tests for screening air travellers

Reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) has until now been the mainstay and the gold standard in

terms of SARS-CoV-2 testing.

RT-PCR has the characteristics set out below:

 It detects the genetic material of the SARS-CoV-2 virus.

 It is a diagnostic test with high sensitivity, usually higher than 95%, and very high specificity 99100%.

 A SARS-CoV-2 positive RT-PCR test does not necessarily mean that the tested person is infectious since

recovering cases can remain RT-PCR positive for weeks.

 Although RT-PCR will very seldom miss a positive case, some false negative results can occur in cases with

low viral load or improper pre-analytical conditions (e.g. sampling technique or poor swab quality).

 False positive results are rare but can occur in very low prevalence settings or in any setting in the event of

contamination issues.

Reverse transcription loop-mediated isothermal amplification (RT-LAMP) technique has emerged as an alternative

molecular detection method for the detection of SARS-CoV-2. RT-LAMP technique has some advantages such as

fast test results and need of fewer resources, while maintaining high sensitivity and specificity [37]. Proper clinical

validation studies are needed to evaluate this new technique and assess the potential role it could play in the travel

setting.

Rapid Antigen Detection Tests (RADTs) for screening air travellers

RADTs have the following characteristics:

 Rapid antigen tests perform best in cases with high viral load, in pre-symptomatic and early symptomatic

cases up to five days from symptom onset [38].

 The use of rapid antigen tests can be recommended for testing individuals irrespective of symptoms in

settings where the proportion of test positivity is expected to be equal to or higher than 10% [38].

 Rapid Antigen Detection Tests (RADTs) can provide a result within 1030 minutes, allowing rapid turnaround

of results and shortening the time before further contact tracing and self-isolation can begin.

 Some rapid antigen tests require a laboratory instrument for the analysis, but others do not as the analysis is

performed on a handheld cartridge with visual readout.

 RADTs have by nature of their technology a lower sensitivity than RT-PCR test for detecting SARS-CoV-2 and

therefore a lower positive predictive value. In a low prevalence population, such as travellers, screening of

asymptomatic persons by RADTs is not recommended and therefore, if such screening is to be attempted by

Member States, RT-PCR tests should be used instead [38].

Validation studies for RADTs are ongoing, while a number of EU/EEA countries are piloting these tests in various

settings, including at airports and PoE [38,39]. Several key principles should be taken into consideration before

deploying RADTs for public health purposes [40,41].

 When using RADTs, appropriate biosafety measures must be in place, and a risk assessment performed when

sampling, handling and processing specimens and tests.

 Manufacturer instructions for sample collection, specimen type, safe handling, proper waste management and

intended use need to be followed precisely at all times.

 The current recommended use is for individuals with high viral loads. RADTs may miss individuals with low

viral loads, for example during the pre-symptomatic phase and/or towards the end of the active infection.

 Test performance data play a significant role in test selection; ideally the test used should have undergone

independent clinical evaluation (e.g. by the FIND foundation) [35].

 The sensitivities and specificities of RADTs currently range from 29% to 93.9% for test sensitivity and from

80.2% to 100% for test specificity, depending on the time of sampling [38].

 RADTs should be able to rule out most infectious cases. In a low-prevalence population, such as travellers,

and if tested by RADTs, a positive test will need confirmation by RT-PCR.

 A negative result from an RADT should not be used to inform decisions on discontinuation of quarantine,

which is based on the duration of the incubation period.

 RADTs may be useful for diagnosing suspected cases (e.g. travellers who suddenly develop COVID-19

compatible symptoms.)

 RADTs are not suitable for screening incoming travellers to prevent virus (re-)introduction in

regions/countries that have achieved zero or very low levels of transmission. In these situations (i.e. in a low

prevalence population), only RT-PCR should be used to reduce the risk of false negative results.

A number of the EU/EEA countries have implemented requirements for a recent negative COVID-19 RT-PCR test

result in order to allow entry into their territory. According to modelling studies, performing a single RT-PCR test

immediately upon arrival would prevent only 40% to 50% of local transmission from imported cases [30,42,43].

Furthermore, modelling studies have shown that pre-flight testing is less effective in preventing the importation of

the virus than a similar test performed upon arrival. The longer the time between the sample collection from a

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

person without symptoms for a pre-flight test and the scheduled time of departure, the less effective the test will

be. If a pre-departure negative test is requested, the sample should ideally be collected within 48 hours before

departure [34]. Pre-departure testing reflects the situation of the tested individuals on the day the test is

performed and cannot guarantee that they will not become positive in the immediate future. However, pre-

departure testing may reduce the chances of transmission during travel, especially from areas with very high

transmission levels. If a Member State is considering the introduction of pre-departure testing, it should also

provide travellers with the possibility to undertake a test upon arrival [6].

Finally, implementing a testing procedure at airports may increase crowding, thus creating opportunities for SARS-

CoV-2 transmission. Therefore if such testing is attempted by a Member State, it is recommended that the logistics

for testing at PoE be carefully organised to ensure physical distancing and the protection of staff at all times.

2.2.2 Quarantine of air travellers

Many EU/EEA countries and the UK have adopted quarantine as a measure for incoming travellers, assuming that

some of these travellers may be incubating the disease or have the disease but are asymptomatic. Some of the EU

countries are making exceptions for short-term travellers (i.e. expected return within 72 hours). Quarantine for

travellers will probably have an impact on their ability to work and provide for their family and it may affect their

mental health. In addition, and according to the experience until now, these factors vary significantly depending on

socio-economic status and age.

Travellers should be treated as local residents of the destination country and the same recommendations on how

to prevent spread should apply to them, in accordance with local public health guidance.

The requirement for incoming travellers to quarantine, as a separate measure from quarantine of contacts, should

be communicated to travellers by the country of destination well before their travel date, so that they have the

opportunity to prepare. When implementing quarantine on entry, the country should provide adequately equipped

quarantine facilities for travellers that have no possibility of home quarantine. Countries should also explore options

for quarantine monitoring measures, such as daily health checks, or follow-up calls, according to their national

capacities.

Data on compliance with quarantine rules are not readily available for the EU/EEA countries and the UK.

Decreasing the duration of quarantine could, in theory, facilitate compliance. Moreover, there are currently no

empirical data available on the effectiveness of shortened quarantine duration. At this point, only modelling studies

(still in pre-print) provide information on the effectiveness of different durations of quarantine, alone or in

combination with testing, to prevent the importation of COVID-19 cases [30,42,43]. An overview of these

modelling studies is provided in Annex 3.

Quarantine of travellers may be an effective public health measure to delay the importation and/or limit

reintroduction of SARS-CoV-2, if implemented comprehensively and very early in the evolution of the epidemic

situation or when a country has reduced transmission levels to close to zero. Examples of the implementation of

this approach are countries such as Taiwan and New Zealand [44,45]. In the current epidemiological situation,

where SARS-CoV-2 is established in the communities of all EU/EEA countries and the UK, imported cases account

for a very small proportion of all detected cases and are unlikely to contribute significantly to increased

transmission (Figure 1).

2.2.3 Combination of testing and quarantine for air travellers

An approach used by several countries is to combine quarantine with the testing of incoming travellers in order to

reduce quarantine duration.

According to data provided by 30 countries in the EU/EEA and the UK until 16 October 2020, 12 countries (40%)

require 14-day quarantine or a combination with testing at one, five or seven days after arrival for travellers from

certain countries. Five out of 30 countries require 10 days quarantine and/or testing after arrival; one Member

State recommends a seven-day quarantine and testing before release and one requires two tests 48 hours apart.

Lack of harmonisation and frequent, sometimes sudden, changes in national policies are causing confusion and

having a deterrent effect on travel.

When assessing an appropriate quarantine duration, it is important to differentiate between contacts of a

confirmed case and travellers [29,46]. Travellers, as mentioned above, represent a specific population, who are not

by definition contacts of a COVID-19 confirmed case, unless they had been in contact. Risk communication is

ongoing by public health authorities and aviation stakeholders to emphasise the importance of not travelling with

COVID-19-compatible symptoms or, if identified as high-risk contact of a confirmed case. This remains one of the

most effective ways to reduce the risk of transmission during travel and upon arrival. Available evidence does not

support quarantine and testing of travellers as an effective public health measure which will substantially reduce

overall transmission in the general population (other than in the exceptional situation described above, when a

country has reduced transmission levels to close to zero).

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

Modelling studies (still in pre-print) [30,42,43] have explored different aspects of the effectiveness of various

combination strategies in detecting imported cases of COVID-19, as outlined in Annex 3. Based on these studies, a

14-day quarantine period appears to be most effective in reducing the risk of transmission from travellers,

although this creates logistical and financial challenges. A 10-day quarantine (without testing at day 10) seems to

be the next most effective alternative, particularly if used in combination with other non-pharmaceutical

interventions or where countries do not have enough testing capacity.

Alternatives involving shortened quarantine or combinations of quarantine and testing have been also explored,

and it is expected that these will have less negative social impact. If a Member State implements quarantine of

travellers, testing could help shorten the quarantine period. A single test upon arrival is considered to be about 40

to 50% effective in preventing the importation of the virus. Given the likely low prevalence of infection among

travellers, and assuming that contact information is collected for travellers to enable follow-up if required, the

combination of quarantine and a single test at around day 7 after arrival appears to offer a reasonable balance of

risks and benefits as an alternative to longer quarantine without testing. However, this requires sufficient testing

capacity. Testing twice (upon arrival and after a few days to release from quarantine) does not seem to

significantly increase effectiveness - compared to testing only once to release from quarantine - and it is logistically

challenging and more resource intensive.

Further details regarding the expected residual risk for various combinations are set out in Annex 3.

3. Operational recommendations

Importation of COVID-19 can occur from any point of origin where there is ongoing transmission, including another

area in the same country. The majority of EU/EEA countries and the UK are currently experiencing widespread

transmission of COVID-19 [47]. Therefore, the relative significance of the virus being introduced by cross-border

travellers is minimal compared to ongoing community transmission and transmission related to national/non-cross-

border travel.

Calculations from modelling studies show that all possible combinations of quarantine duration, including for 14

days, with and without testing, still involve a residual risk of cases being imported. This residual risk - which also

depends on the volume of travellers and the prevalence of the disease in their place of origin - should be

addressed by ensuring that public health measures are in place in the community to reduce opportunities for

transmission at all times. These include NPIs, as recommended for air travel in the COVID-19 AHSP, and solid

public health infrastructure, such as sufficient testing capacity for suspected cases and rapid turnaround of results,

contact tracing and isolation/quarantine capacities. Given the estimated low prevalence of COVID-19 among

travellers and the limited public health impact of detecting a few cases among travellers, performing systematic

testing of travellers to reduce the risk of importation may not be the most effective use of public health resources.

When assessed according to the criteria set out in the Council Recommendation (EU) 2020/1475, most of the areas

in the EU/EEA countries and the UK are currently classified as red

. At this stage, efforts should be focused on

effective data collection via passenger locator forms (PLF) - where possible digitalised - to support contact tracing

capacities in the community, increased testing for suspected cases and the coordination of communication between

aviation stakeholders and public health authorities.

The adopted thresholds indicate that areas in EU/EEA countries and the UK are marked in the following colours:

 Green, if the 14-day notification rate is lower than 25 cases per 100 000 and the test positivity rate below 4%.

 Orange, if the 14-day notification rate is lower than 50 cases per 100 000 but the test positivity rate is 4% or higher or, if

the 14-day notification rate is between 25 and 150 cases per 100 000 and the test positivity rate is below 4%.

 Red, if the 14-day notification rate is 50 cases per 100 000 or higher and the test positivity rate is 4% or higher or if the

14-day notification rate is higher than 150 cases per 100 000.

 Grey, if there is insufficient information or if the testing rate is lower than 300 cases per 100 000.

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

This refers to the situation at the time of publication. Depending on the evolution of the pandemic and future evidence,

including risk assessment criteria, this document will be updated accordingly.

At the time of writing, community transmission is occurring in all EU/EEA MS and the UK; once countries have reduced

transmission levels to close to zero this may need to be reconsidered.

Based on existing evidence and information available, as presented in this document,

ECDC and EASA offer the following recommendations

1. Available evidence does not support quarantine and testing of travellers as an effective public health measure to substantially

reduce overall transmission in the general population, except when a country has reduced transmission levels to almost zero.

Particularly in the current epidemiological situation

, systematic testing for SARS-CoV-2 and/or quarantine of air travellers is

not recommended [25]. A pre-flight test could reduce the possibility of transmission during travel, especially when departure

is from a country or an area with very high incidence rates. Once the epidemiological situation has improved, if countries are

considering the adoption of screening or quarantine of incoming travellers, the following possible approaches – schematically

summarised in Annex 2 – should be taken into account.

 When travel is taking place from a lower-risk to a higher-risk area or between areas of similar risk, there is no

public health benefit in testing for SARS-CoV-2 and/or quarantine of travellers before departure or upon arrival in

the destination country.

 Exceptionally, for travel between two high-risk areas, when travel begins from a very high-incidence area, a

combination of testing and shortened quarantine could be considered, although this requires sufficient testing capacity.

 When travel is from an area of high or unknown risk to a lower-risk area, based on modelling studies, a combination of

testing and shortened quarantine could be considered, if sufficient testing capacity is available.

2. Where a country or an area has achieved consistent sustained control of the virus, having a 14-day incidence close to zero, all

incoming individuals from regions with community transmission should be tested before entering the COVID-19-free areas.

Given the 14-day incubation period and the possibility of asymptomatic disease, these travellers should undergo quarantine

(voluntary or mandatory) and be tested rapidly if they develop COVID-19 compatible symptoms. In the absence of symptoms,

they should be tested again at the end of the quarantine period [48].

When implementing the above recommendations, Member States should also give proper consideration to the principles below:

 Persons with COVID-19 compatible symptoms - or contacts of a confirmed or probable case [1] – should be

discouraged from travelling by means of appropriate measures, including health safety promotion and risk

communication.

 In view of the current epidemiological situation in the EU/EEA countries and the UK

, considering the potentially

reduced opportunity for infection for people travelling for short periods (i.e. expected return within 72 hours) and where

contacts with local population are limited, countries may consider exemptions from quarantine and/or SARS-CoV-2

testing for such travellers, unless they exhibit COVID-19-compatible symptoms.

 Transiting passengers should not be tested in the country of transfer, with the exception of cases developing COVID-

19-compatible symptoms during travel. If countries require information on the test results for transiting passengers,

they should accept that testing can be done either before departure from the country of origin or upon arrival at the

final destination, in which case information on positive cases can be exchanged via the PLF system.

 Tests with high-performance characteristics should be preferred. Optimally, Member States should aim for the use of RT-

PCR tests or other tests with performance close to RT-PCR, as prevalence of COVID-19 is expected to be low among air

travellers, and using lower performance tests would result in a significant number of false (positive and negative) results.

 Tests used should be validated and performed by appropriately trained personnel to maintain quality and testing

standards.

 Children under two years of age should be exempt from testing. For children above the age of two, Member States may

consider alternative validated sample collection methods.

 Testing at Points of Entry should not be prioritised over community and healthcare needs.

 Test results should preferably be delivered in a reliable electronic format, which enables easy reading of the result and

prevents fraud attempts.

 Testing requirements for travellers implemented by Member States should be notified to the European Commission and

the other Member States in order to facilitate mutual recognition in accordance with the Council Recommendation (EU)

2020/1475.

If testing at airport premises is implemented, the competent national or local authorities and the relevant stakeholders should

also make arrangements, as described below.

 Organise testing facilities at PoE in terms of logistics to ensure physical distancing and the protection of staff and

travellers at all times.

 Develop appropriate policies for the management of positive cases describing the processes for a confirmation test,

quarantine and transport to the quarantine location.

 Develop, in coordination with the aircraft and aerodrome operators, policies and procedures relating to the denial of

boarding for travellers who test positive in accordance with the relevant EU requirements. Furthermore, aircraft

operators should enable refund or free rebooking for those travellers who have tested positive (and their close

contacts/travel companions.)

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

In line with the guidance set out in the Council Recommendation (EU) 2020/1475 [6], any travel-related measures

put in place should be proportionate and non-discriminatory, focusing on what is necessary for the protection of

public health. The Member States should always admit their own nationals and Union citizens and their family

members resident in their territory and facilitate swift transit through their territories. Finally, the Member States

should ensure that their travel-related measures are well communicated and coordinated to facilitate compliance

by the travellers.

Contributing ECDC experts (in alphabetical order)

Agoritsa Baka, Eeva Broberg, Orlando Cenciarelli, Bruno Ciancio, Margot Einöder-Moreno, Francesco Innocenti,

Csaba Ködmön, Annette Kraus, Katrin Leitmeyer, Angeliki Melidou, Dominique Monnet, Lina Nerlander, Diamantis

Plachouras, Emmanuel Robesyn, Gianfranco Spiteri, Carl Suetens.

Contributing EASA experts (in alphabetical order)

Ana Dedijer, Cristian Ionut Panait.

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

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ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers.– Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

Annex 1. Overview of travel-related measures (air travel) with

advantages and disadvantages

Measure

Aim and description

Advantages and evidence

Disadvantages and evidence

RT-PCR testing

before departure or

after arrival at

destination

 Aim: To detect confirmed cases

among cross-border travellers.

 Passenger is required to undergo an

RT-PCR test within a prescribed time

pre-departure and present a negative

result upon arrival

 Passenger is required to undergo an

RT-PCR test upon arrival at Point of

Entry (PoE) or within a prescribed time

after arrival at destination.

 Very accurate diagnostic test

(sensitivity: 99–100%; specificity: 99-

100%)

 Results usually available within 1224

hours. Shorter turnaround times are

possible, but at increased cost.

 Pooled testing can decrease laboratory

burden.

 Provides a snapshot on the day of testing;

cannot exclude that the traveller becomes

positive on one of day(s) following the test, or is

exposed to the virus after the test was

performed.

 Cannot differentiate infectious from non-

infectious COVID-19 cases.

 Use of RT-PCR as a screening test: estimated

effectiveness 39.6% (95% CI 35.2-43.7), or

detection of roughly two out of five infectious

passengers [43].

 Relatively high cost, which usually must be paid

by the passenger.

 In some EU/EEA countries, travelling may not be

a valid reason for obtaining a RT-PCR test.

 The use of fake negative-result certificates has

been reported

Rapid Antigen

Detection Test

(RADT) before

departure or after

arrival at destination

 Aim: same as above with a shorter

turnaround time for results.

Passenger is required to undergo an

antigen test, usually upon arrival at

PoE (currently under study as an

option).

 Rapid test: results available in 1030

minutes.

 RADTs require less or no laboratory

equipment.

 The RADTs should be performed by

trained operators.

 The test can be performed on-site (at

airport or other holding facility)

 Lower cost than RT-PCR.

 RADTs are not recommended for screening

asymptomatic persons.

 Currently available antigen tests generally have

lower sensitivity (6080%) but similar specificity

(98100 %) to RT-PCR.

 Depending on the prevalence of the disease in

the target population, RADTs may give rise to

many false positives and false negatives.

 Significant problems for passengers who will

need to undergo RT-PCR for verification.

Quarantine of

incoming travellers

 Aim: To prevent transmission of the

virus from undetected cases among

cross-border travellers.

 All travellers required to quarantine for

14 days.

 If implemented comprehensively at all

PoEs and for all persons entering a

country, it can delay introduction.

 Effective if the destination area/country

has achieved very low or zero

transmission.

 A supervisory/follow up mechanism is needed.

 Logistics and financial implications for countries

and travellers.

 Significant barrier for cross-border travellers

 The effectiveness of quarantine is estimated as:

- 7 days: 51.3% (95% CI: 47.2-55.7)

- 10 days: 68.8% (95% CI: 65.1-72.9)

- 14 days: 78.0% (95% CI: 74.4-81.6) [43].

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

Measure

Aim and description

Advantages and evidence

Disadvantages and evidence

Combination of

testing and

quarantine

 Aim: to prevent introduction of, and

transmission of the virus from, cases

among cross-border travellers.

 Passenger may be required to undergo

testing on arrival and/or self-

quarantine for 1, 5, 7 or 10 days and

undergo a second RT-PCR test to be

released.

 Shortened quarantine period for

travellers can potentially increase

compliance and facilitate travelling.

 Decreases cost.

 Residual risk of importation with all

combinations modelled in the literature:

- Testing at airport, quarantine for four days and

test on day 4 after arrival is estimated to be

68.9% effective [43].

- Quarantine for seven days and testing on day

7 is estimated to be 74% effective [43].

- Testing at the airport, quarantine for seven

days and test on day 7 after arrival is estimated

to be 76% effective [43].

- Quarantine of seven days with a test on day 7

and release from quarantine on day 8 after arrival

is estimated to detect 94% of infected travellers

[30].

Entry ban / border

closure

 Aim: To prevent entry of cases among

cross-border travellers.

 All non-citizen or non-resident

travellers are prevented from entering,

at any PoE in the country.

 If implemented comprehensively at all

PoEs and for all persons entering a

country, and if also including blanket

quarantine for all nationals/residents

entering/returning to a country.

 Can have a true delay effect; proven in

small island states with a limited number

or well-controlled PoEs [44,45].

 Comprehensive implementation is challenging in

a globalised economy as it has implications for

the economic sustainability of the countries.

 May have devastating financial effects on

various sectors and the country as a whole.

 Logistical barriers to trade and transport of

merchandise including foodstuffs, medicines,

PPE and equipment for the management of the

public health crisis.

 Questions of legality when applied to travel

within the EU.

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

Annex 2. Guidelines for travel-related measures  air travel

Based on the classification of the countries of departure and arrival, according to the criteria in Council Recommendation 2020/1475

Pre-departure testing for travellers from very high incidence regions/countries could be considered mostly to further reduce the possibility of having a positive case on board

Where a country or an area has achieved consistent sustained control of the virus having a 14-day rolling incidence close to zero, all incoming travellers should be tested and follow 14-day quarantine.

Based on modelling studies, the combination of quarantine and a single test once at around day 7 after arrival appears to offer a reasonable alternative, although it requires sufficient testing capacity.

see footnote 5 above (p.12).

Country or area of departure

Country or area of arrival

Travel-related measures by the country or area of arrival

High risk or unknown risk

Low risk

None

Combinations

of testing and shortened quarantine periods could

be considered

Medium risk

None

Combinations* of testing and shortened quarantine periods could

be considered

High risk or unknown risk

None

where travel is initiated from very high incidence areas,

combinations* of testing and shortened quarantine periods could

be considered.

Medium risk

Low risk

None

Medium risk

None

High risk or unknown risk

None



Low risk

None

Medium risk

None

High risk or unknown risk

None

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

Annex 3. Overview of quarantine, testing combinations and

effectiveness in preventing local transmission

Strategies of

quarantine and

testing for travellers

Estimates of residual risk of importation of COVID-19

Advantages

Disadvantages

Combinations of

quarantine and testing

for travellers

Estimated effectiveness

of symptom and risk

screening

Costic et al.

Estimates of COVID-19

infectious travellers per

10.000 travellers entering

the country

Clifford et al. (in

preprint)

Using UK data from July

2020

Effectiveness (%) in

preventing imported COVID-

19 cases

Taylor R et al. (in

preprint)

Using UK data from August

2020

Quantification of local transmission

associated with travel prevented by

quarantine (%)

Ashcroft et al. (in preprint)

NO TESTING

Risk communication to

travellers and admin

measures by aviation

≈30% of

symptomatic

travellers are likely to

fly

1-52 infectious travellers

enter the community

- COVID-19 is estimated to have

asymptomatic course in 1830%

of individuals

- Pre-symptomatic transmission is

well established at two days

before symptom onset.

QUARANTINE ALONE

14-day quarantine,

release without any

testing

0-1% residual risk

(0-2 infectious travellers

enter the community)

21% residual risk

(assuming 80% compliance)

0-1% residual risk

- Difficulty in monitoring

quarantine compliance for

countries.

- Compliance may be lower than

80%.

10-day quarantine,

release without any

testing

31% residual risk

(assuming 80% compliance)

1% residual risk

(assumes also 50% reduction of

transmission due to implemented

NPI measures).

Option for countries that

cannot devote testing capacity

to travellers, if good

compliance can be monitored.

7-day

quarantine, release

without any testing

Up to 20% residual risk

0-13 infectious travellers

enter the community

49% residual risk

(assuming 80% compliance)

It is plausible (although not

supported by evidence) that a

reduction in quarantine

increases compliance.

5-day

quarantine, release

without any testing

Up to 34% residual risk

0-22 infectious travellers

enter the community

3-day quarantine,

release without any

testing

Up to 50% residual risk

1-33 infectious travellers

enter the community

ECDC EASA Guidelines for COVID-19 testing and quarantine of air travellers – Addendum to the Aviation Health Safety Protocol

TESTING UPON ARRIVAL

Single RT-PCR test

upon arrival +

quarantine until

receiving the test result

(12 days)

Up to 52% residual risk

1-21 infectious travellers

enter the community

60% residual risk

46% residual risk (assumes also

50% reduction of transmission due

to implemented NPI measures)

†

Significant residual risk, but

countries may accept that some

reduction is better than nothing..

QUARANTINE AND SINGLE TEST

Quarantine + RT-PCR

test on day 7+ release

on day 8 or 9

Up to 16% residual risk

0-6 infectious travellers

enter the community

26% residual risk

Options for countries that wish

to test travellers and can

effectively monitor 7-day

quarantine.

- Challenge for countries to

monitor quarantine compliance.

Quarantine + RT-PCR

test on day 5+ release

on day 6 or 7

Up to 20% residual risk

0-8 infectious travellers

enter the community

Up to 1.5% residual risk

(assumes also 50% reduction of

transmission due to implemented

NPI measures)

Quarantine + RT-PCR

test on day 4 + release

on day 6

36% residual risk

Quarantine + RT-PCR

test on day 3 + release

on day 4

Up to 42% residual risk

0-15 infectious travellers

enter the community

QUARANTINE AND DOUBLE TEST

RT-PCR Test upon

arrival + quarantine +

RT-PCR test on day 7 +

release on day 8

24% residual risk

Options for countries, with

relatively little additional

estimated efficiency, if

compared to single test to

release.

Double testing presents logistics

and resource challenges.

RT-PCR Test upon

arrival + quarantine +

RT-PCR test on day 6 +

release on day 7

<16% residual risk

0-5 infectious travellers

enter the community

RT-PCR Test upon

arrival + quarantine +

RT-PCR test on day 4 +

release on day 5 or 6

Up to 20% residual risk

0-9 infectious travellers

enter the community

31% residual risk

† NPI – non pharmaceutical interventions

- Models use different assumptions and data sets, which may not be generalisable. Please note uncertainty/confidence intervals. Please check the individual publications for the model assumptions.

- Prevalence of COVID-19 in the country of origin plays a significant role.

- Individual burden of quarantine can be psychological and financial. Quarantine has shown to be associated with symptoms of anxiety and post-traumatic stress, longer durations of quarantine were associated with poorer mental

health. (Brooks, The Lancet). Quarantine impact can also be financial and can have lasting impact including on mental health (Brooks, The Lancet). People who work in less secure jobs are particularly vulnerable. Some countries

provide financial aid to people in quarantine.

- Rapid tests (RDTs) are currently not recommended by ECDC for use when releasing asymptomatic people from quarantine.

- Testing used to end quarantine earlier should not compromise access/speed of testing relevant for control, such as testing of symptomatic people or testing of contacts when tracing.