EN Official Journal of the European Communities 8. 1. 2000L 5/66
(76) The relevant markets as referred to in this Decision
explicitly recognise the different characteristics of Pass
France 98 vis-à-vis individual tickets. Nevertheless, the
CFO's argument that blind sales of individual entry
tickets by the CFO in 1997 are substitutable for sales by
the CFO and other outlets at a later date is not accepted.
The objective of defining relevant product markets is to
identify the actual competitors of an undertaking that
are capable of constraining the behaviour of that under-
taking and of preventing it from behaving independently
of effective competitive pressure. An analysis of the
conditions under which sales took place of individual
entry tickets relating to second-phase matches in 1997
by the CFO confirms that the CFO was able at that time
to act in an environment free from any such competitive
pressure. Those tickets related to prestigious matches for
which the number of applications from consumers able
to provide an address in France exceeded almost six
times the available supply, notwithstanding the fact that
the identities of participating teams were unknown at
the time of sale (
28
). In view of such demand levels, and
because consumers are unlikely in 1997 to have consid-
ered national football federations and European tour
operators as realistic alternative sources of supply, the
CFO was clearly able to operate, in relation to its sale of
such tickets, as a de facto monopolist free from any
competitive pressure from other undertakings.
D. RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC MARKET
(77)
In view of the widespread demand for tickets
throughout the EEA (
29
), the geographic market relating
to the sale by the CFO to the general public of Pass
France 98 and individual entry tickets in 1996 and 1997
comprises at least all countries within the EEA. Notwith-
standing the widespread demand for those tickets, the
CFO's conditions of sale artificially limited sales to
members of the general public either resident or able to
provide an address in France.
Arguments of the CFO relating to the scope of sales of
Pass France 98
(78) In its response to the Commission's Statement of Objec-
tions and during the oral hearing, the CFO argued that,
in relation to sales in 1996 and 1997 of Pass France 98,
the requirement to provide a postal address in France
had no effect on consumers outside France and that the
geographic market did not, therefore, extend beyond
France. According to the CFO, only the general public
living close to World Cup stadiums would have wished
to purchase Pass France 98, given the unknown identity
of teams participating in matches to which those tickets
gave entry as well as the constraints imposed by such a
product on the purchaser (notably the requirement
either to secure accommodation near a stadium for a
significant period of time or to make as many return
trips as were necessary between one's place of residence
and the stadium in order to attend all matches).
(79) In support of this argument, the CFO referred the
Commission to evidence suggesting that between 71 %
and 91 % of Pass France 98 were bought either by the
general public living in the Département in which a host
stadium was located or in the immediately surrounding
Départements. The CFO also referred the Commission to
the decision by European tour operators not to offer
Pass France 98 to the general public, as well as those of
national football federations not to package the sale of
tickets into Pass France 98 type products, as evidence
that demand outside France for Pass France 98 was
non-existent and that the geographic market was there-
fore limited to residents local to World Cup stadiums in
France.
(80) The Commission rejects these arguments. In relation to
sales of Pass France 98, it cannot be ruled out that a
significant number of consumers outside France would
have wished to purchase such tickets, given the
Europe-wide interest that the finals competition
generated. This is supported in part by an assessment of
the purchasing habits of consumers outside France in
relation to individual ticket sales for first phase and
round of 16 matches by the CFO from 22 April 1998,
which demonstrates that consumers outside France were
not exclusively interested in watching matches involving
the participation of their national team (
30
).
(81) Had consumers outside France been given the oppor-
tunity to purchase Pass France 98 from the CFO, it is
quite probable that a significant number would have
chosen to make as many return trips as were necessary
to allow them to watch all the matches to which Pass
France 98 allowed access. While this applies notably to
Pass France 98 sold for matches taking place in Lens, in
view of its proximity to the Belgian border, it is reason-
able to assume also that consumers in other countries
would have been prepared to travel to other venues
given the ease with which those venues could be
accessed (stadiums located in Bordeaux and Toulouse,
for example, were easily accessible to consumers from
Spain while the stadium in Marseille was accessible to
consumers from Italy).
(
30
) See recitals 25 and 26, while some 38 % of individual entry tickets
sold by the CFO after 22 April 1998 were purchased by the
general public providing addresses outside France but in countries
whose teams had qualified for the finals competition, only 10 % of
entry tickets sold after this date could be purchased by supporters
of teams participating in any given match. As such, a significant
proportion of the general public outside France were interested to
attend matches not involving the participation of their national
team.
(
28
) Blind sales of such tickets can be contrasted with those of tickets
relating to first-phase matches which, in order to maximise the
participation of supporters, were packaged as Pass France 98.
(
29
) Evidenced by the outcome of CFO sales to EEA countries from 22
April 1998 when 45 % of tickets were sold to consumers outside
France.