Security Challenges in Guyana and the Government Response

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION 205

Security Challenges in Guyana

and the Government Response

R. Evan Ellis

, PhD

n December 23, 2018, a Venezuelan navy ship and its embarked helicopter

attempted to intercept the Bahamian-agged seismic survey ship Ramform

Tethys, which was conducting oil exploration activities for Exxon Mobil in

Guyanese waters. is action forced a temporary suspension in some of Exxon’s o-

shore operations and highlights one of many challenges to Guyana’s national security.

For those with only a supercial knowledge of the often overlooked, sparsely-popu-

lated nation on the northeast coast of South America, Guyana is a land of contradic-

tions. It has cultural diversity and a wealth of natural resources that coexists with poverty

and isolation, all of which will likely change in unpredictable ways as the country’s rst

signicant oil income begins to pour in, in 2020. As suggested by the Ramform Tethys

incident, the exploitation of the estimated 30 billion barrels of recoverable oil oshore

of Guyana will not only bring signicant new wealth, but will give rise to new ows of

goods, people, and nancial connections for the nation. Such new wealth, ows, and

connections will magnify and transform the host of security challenges the nation now

faces in the context of a government both paralyzed by political crisis

and struggling

to prepare itself for the task.

In the context of the transformation of Guyana through its potential oil wealth

and the strategic importance those resources imply, this work examines the current

and emerging security challenges to the nation, and the work of its government to

manage them.

The Political crisis

Guyana’s security challenges are compounded by a domestic political crisis

which has not only impeded the government’s ability to respond, but also has the

potential to generate signicant internal unrest and invite opportunistic chal-

lenges to Guyana’s sovereignty by neighboring Venezuela and Suriname.

*e opinions expressed here are strictly the author's, who thanks Guyanese Vice President Carl Greenidge,

Ambassador Riyad Insanally, Ambassador Ronald Sanders, former Presidents Bharat Jagdeo and Donald

Ramotar, Ralph Ramkarran, Anil Nandllal, Brigadier Mark Phillips, Hugh Todd, Dr. Ivelaw Grith, Dr.

Fitzgerald Yaw, Coronel Trevor Bowman, Captain John Flores, John Chester-Iniss, Russell Combe, Brian

Chinn, Raymond Hall, Wallace Ng-see-Quan, Jerry Guevarra, Mark Wilson, William Walker, and David

Lewis, among others, for their contributions to this article.

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Ellis

On December 21,

2018, Guyana’s principal political opposition, the People’s

Progressive Party (PPP) successfully passed a no-condence motion against the

governing coalition formed by A Party for National Unity (APNU) and the Alli-

ance for Change (AFC), enabled by the surprise defection of AFC-member

Charrandas Persaud.

With substantial oil revenue to begin owing into Guyana

in 2020,

the vote and events following it have polarized all sides in the country,

whose politics have long been divided on ethnic lines between those of Indian

descent (who disproportionally have favored the PPP), and those of African de-

scent (disproportionately favoring APNU and its core party, the People’s National

Congress (PNC)).

In the current crisis, APNU-AFC supporters see the Persaud defection as a

dirty trick, attempting to exploit the government’s near-term problems (including

the shutdown of many government-operated sugar production facilities

) and seize

control of government before oil revenues begin owing in. e PPP views the

government’s eorts to delay elections through a combination of legal challenges

and obstacles generated by what they view as a purely partisan electoral commis-

sion (GECOM) as an attempt to short-circuit the nation’s democratic process and

the will of the majority, as they contend the PNC did repeatedly in the past.

Whatever the outcome, a signicant number of Guyanese will be highly dis-

satised with the outcome and convinced that their interests can no longer be

protected through traditional democratic mechanisms, raising the prospect for

violence. Moreover, as the conict escalates, neighboring Venezuela could take

advantage of internal disorder to pursue its territorial claim, as many Guyanese

perceive it tried to do in December 2018 with the attempted intercept of the

Ramform Tethys.

Guyana’s Security Challenges

Guyana’s security challenges include both external threats to its sovereignty and a

range of non-traditional challenges.

Externally, two of Guyana’s three neighbors continue to pursue signicant

claims on the territory of the nation (only Brazil does not). Guyana is attractive

for its natural resources (which includes not only the previously mentioned petro-

leum, but also gold, timber, and productive agricultural land) and oers a conve-

nient target for aggression because it is sparsely populated and weakly defended.

Venezuelan Territorial Claims

Venezuela claims 2/3 of Guyana’s territory, to the Essequibo River in the East of

the country, a claim pressed both by the populist socialist regime of Nicholas

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JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION 207

Maduro and its opposition. During a political rally near Cucuta, Colombia, the

head of that opposition, constitutionally legitimate interim president Juan Guaido,

showed a map of Venezuela with Guyana’s territory appended to it. Beyond Es-

sequibo, Venezuela also makes two claims on Guyana’s oshore Exclusive Eco-

nomic Zone, the source of its newfound oil wealth: a maritime border based on a

projection into the sea derived from the aforementioned territorial claim, and an

alternate projection from the current de facto border at the mouth of the Orinoco

River, at Puerto Playa, but using a line projecting into the Atlantic from that point

that point on a 70-degree angle. Although the later lacks substantial basis in in-

ternational law, Venezuela has used that unusual projection to claim part of Guy-

ana’s (and Suriname’s) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Based on the combination of such claims, in 1966, Venezuelan forces seized

control of Ankoko island in the Cuyuni River in Guyana’s interior, which they

turned into a military outpost and continue to occupy.

In 2000, Venezuela blocked

a Texas-based company, Beal Aerospace, from building a facility in the disputed

territory.

e Venezuelan Navy has also interfered with oil industry vessels con-

ducting work authorized by the Guyanese government in the area. Such actions

include an incident in October 2013, when the Venezuelan navy ship Yekuana

intercepted a petroleum exploration vessel owned by Anadarko petroleum, escort-

ing it to Venezuela and arresting its crew, including ve Americans,

as well as the

previously mentioned harassment of the Ramform Tethys in December 2018. In

addition, in June 2015, the Venezuelan Navy declared an “integral defense zone”

encompassing the area.

Surinamese Territorial Claims

To Guyana’s east, its neighbor Suriname claims a remote, sparsely-populated, but

large wedge of land in the interior of the country dubbed the “New River Trian-

gle.” In December 1967, shortly after Guyana’s independence, through Operation

Kingsher, the Guyana Police Force successfully expelled Surinamese from the

region, who were there as part of their government’s own claim to the area due to

its hydropower potential.

In August 1969, the GDF successfully conducted its

own operation there to clear Surinamese “encroachers.”

e Guyanese govern-

ment subsequently established a small base in the area to serve as a tripwire against

any Surinamese attempts to usurp the territory. Nonetheless, in October 2015,

Surinamese President Desi Bouterse announced that he was placing the conict

over the disputed region once again on his country’s agenda.

Beyond the New River Triangle, Suriname previously disputed control of the

Corentyne River with Guyana. In 2000, it interfered with an oil platform oper-

ated by CGX performing work in that area licensed by the Guyanese government.

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e dispute was eventually settled in 2007 through a United Nations tribunal,

based on the Law of the Sea convention (UNCLOS).

Guyana solved the dis-

pute by ceding the entire river to the low-tide point on the Guyanese side to

Suriname. is generated new problems because of the people inhabiting the is-

lands in the Correntine River delta (many of whom are engaged in narcotrack-

ing and other criminal activities), and the failure of Suriname to adequately con-

trol the area, resulting in the robbery, killing, and harassment of Guyanese

shermen operating in the area.

e worst incident to date occurred in May

2018, when sixteen Guyanese shermen were murdered by those believed to be

Surinamese pirates,

in what may have been a reprisal for the prior killing of a

Surinamese drug boss.

Non-State Challenges

With respect to non-traditional security issues, Guyana is principally challenged

by issues arising from criminal activities conducted in the sparsely inhabited inte-

rior of the country. A combination of dicult terrain, a lack of transportation

infrastructure, and limited capabilities of its police and security forces there make

that part of the country dicult to control. e principal threats currently include

illegal mining, some illegal timber extraction, some narcotracking, and the in-

cursion of Venezuelan refugees into the national territory.

Mining-Related Criminal Activity

A range of informal, generally unlicensed mining for gold occurs in the interior of

Guyana, particularly in the basins of the Cuyuni and Mazaruni River basins west

of Bartica. Such mining activities cause severe environmental damage, poisoning

the water supplies of the indigenous and other communities living in the areas

through the toxic chemicals used in the process. Such informal mining also at-

tracts a range of illicit activities such as prostitution. Moreover, in the relatively

lawless context of remote mining communities, the combination of gold, cash,

alcohol and other factors also contributes to high levels of violence and crime

among those participating in the mining economy of the area.

e desperation and lawlessness in neighboring Venezuela has led armed

criminal groups, loosely referred to as sindicatos, to rob or extort those engaged

in such mining,

including extracting tolls along the rivers delimiting the Guyana-

Venezuela border, and extorting and robbing those in Guyana itself. In November

2018, a Guyanese police ocer was shot in an incident ascribed to the sindicatos.

Such criminal activities include multiple, possibly competing, relatively well-

armed groups of Venezuelans and Brazilians (among others). Some reports sug-

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JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION 209

gest that the Colombian terrorist group Ejército Liberación Nacional (ELN) may

even have a presence in the area, including inside Guyana.

Money Laundering

e extraction of gold creates opportunities for money laundering by a range of

criminal actors. One technique uses illicitly-obtained cash to purchase gold for a

premium, often in Bartica (the gateway town for Guyana’s gold region), and re-

selling that gold to the ocial Guyanese government Gold Board, or one of the

nine private companies ocially licensed to buy it,

producing a certication that

the income came from mining proceeds.

Beyond the mining industry, Guyana’s single operating casino, the Princess, in

Georgetown, is also believed to play a role in money laundering, with large

amounts of cash owing through the enterprise. Indeed, the former Assistant

Commissioner of Police, David Ramnarine, suspiciously declared thousands of

dollars of winnings weekly from the Princess, generating speculation that his

money was actually coming from illicit sources.

On the other hand, George-

town’s two other casinos have shut down, and the Princess (technically) is only

open to foreigners and a select group of Guyanese. Moreover, the single operating

casino in Georgetown compares favorably to the nearby city of Paramaribo, the

capital of Suriname, where there are 28.

Illegal Timber Extraction

Control of the timber operations in Guyana’s interior is inadequate, and compa-

nies such as Bai Shan Lin have been accused of exporting large quantities of wood

from the country without a proper license.

Bai Shan Lin may have concealed its

exports by moving logs in closed containers and using smaller licensed logging

companies operating in the area to actually claim the exports.

Narcotics Production and Narcotrafcking

Guyana is both an exporter of marijuana to Brazil and a transit country for co-

caine. Granger administration Finance Minister Winston Jordan has asserted

(with strong objections from the opposition PPP) that a substantial amount of

the country’s economy depends on the proceeds from narcotracking.

Guyana produces modest quantities of marijuana in plots along the coast, and

in more arid portions of the interior such as near Kurupukari, Annai, and Mahdia.

Although Guyanese marijuana is considered low quality against competing mari-

juana grown in Paraguay and Colombia, some Guyanese marijuana is exported to

the remote neighboring Brazilian state of Roraima, where its low quality is less of

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a problem. at marijuana is traditionally smuggled across the border at Lethem,

contributing to the criminal dynamics of that town.

Modest quantities of cocaine are also smuggled through Guyana. Most is

bound for Europe through Suriname, although some also is believed to be smug-

gled to the US. In general, shipments of cocaine are hidden under shipments of

rice,

sand, and other bulk cargo on barges transiting Guyana’s rivers and depart-

ing from its coast.

For reasons of geography, most of the cocaine transiting Guyana is believed to

originate in Colombia, passing rst through Venezuela to Guyana, then through

Suriname to Europe (generally via the Netherlands). In 2018, two members of the

Brazilian criminal group First Capital Command (PCC) were captured in George-

town, indicating the establishment of a small PCC cell there with the intention of

controlling the cocaine route through Guyana to Europe.

Separately, in October

2014, a semisubmersible craft was found abandoned in the Waini River near Ven-

ezuela.

e craft was thought to be used in smuggling cocaine to Africa or Eu-

rope, or alternatively, toward Trinidad, ultimately to the US.

Overall, the quantity of drugs passing through Guyana to date has been limited

because of the limited commercial shipping routes from Guyana that would pro-

vide cover for smuggling, as well as the limited domestic market. As oil revenues

begin to ow into Guyana in 2020, however, the expansion of the economy, ows

of people and goods, and nancial connections will increase Guyana’s potential as

a narcotracking hub.

Human Smuggling, Trafcking, and Migration

As noted previously, an estimated 2,800 Venezuelans have entered Guyana in recent

years as that nation’s economy has collapsed.

In addition, another 20,000 or more

Guyanese once living and working in Venezuela, have been forced to return.

While the number of migrants arriving in Guyana from Venezuela has been

modest as compared to more than 1.2 million Venezuelans eeing to Colombia,

those arriving in Guyana have placed severe strains on the health, education, and

other infrastructure of the small towns in the sparsely inhabited Essequibo region,

as well as Georgetown. Compounding the problem, those arriving in Georgetown

have been disproportionately female, transforming the dynamic of prostitution

there, which had been previously dominated by Brazilians.

A signicant number of Cubans are also entering Guyana, traveling to George-

town, to purchase products unavailable in Cuba, and to apply for visas to the US

(after it was forced to close its consular oce in Havana). Many of those, as well

as Venezuelans, are taken through the country into Brazil at Lethem, headed to-

ward the southern cone or the US to be exploited as prostitutes. In 2018, an esti-

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JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION 211

mated 25,000 Cubans entered Guyana, of which 10,000 went to Brazil, mostly

crossing at Lethem.

Haitians are also smuggled or tracked through Guyana. Most of those enter-

ing the country are in transit to French Guyana, with a popular Copa ight bring-

ing Haitians from Port au Prince to Panama City, and from Panama City to

Georgetown, from where they travel to French Guyana by land. Some Haitians

also stay in Guyana to obtain citizenship and work there, with those arranging the

transaction reportedly charging US$1,000 per person to obtain Guyanese citizen-

ship through arranged marriages to a Guyanese.

Finally, an unknown, but signicant quantity of Chinese migrants enter Guy-

ana, facilitated by infrastructure projects and other work done in Guyana by Chi-

nese companies. ese immigrants are believed channeled through a network of

Chinese-owned restaurants and shops in which their labor is exploited (some-

times for years) as part of a long-term journey to the US.

Perhaps the most positive element of Guyana’s security environment is that

criminal violence has been limited, especially in urban areas. e country’s mur-

der rate, approximately 19.4/100,000,

is low compared to nearby states such as

Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, Jamaica, and especially Venezuela.

With minor exceptions, the capital Georgetown is relatively free of criminal

street gangs and their related criminal activities.

e country’s most notorious

gangs, associated with the country’s two major ethnic groupings, are generally a

part of the past. ese include the Fine Man Gang,

whose roots were in the

afroguyanese stronghold of Buxton (and believed by some tied to the afroguya-

nese-dominant party the PNC), as well as a narcotracking group tied to Roger

Kahn, with a disproportionate identication among indoguyanese. As this article

went to press, the expected return of Kahn to Guyana in July 2019, after having

served a ten-year sentence in the US,

generated speculation in Georgetown

that he might either seek to re-create his prior criminal enterprise, or alterna-

tively be put on trial in Guyana for other crimes or killed before such a public

trial could occur.

One threat that has been relatively absent from Guyana’s security environment

is radical Islam.

Although Guyana has a modestly sized Islamic community

(between 3 percent and 6 percent of the population),

there have been relatively

few cases of Guyanese traveling to the Middle East to ght for the terrorist

group Islamic State, as happened with at least 175 Muslims from Trinidad and

Tobago.

One dierence may be the relative absence of criminal street gangs in

Guyana, which in Trinidad and Tobago were the principal source of recruitment

by radical mosques.

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Although the Libyan dictator Muammar Gadda was believed to be nurturing

some Islamic radicalism in Guyana in the 1970s, there has not been strong evidence

of similar activities by Iran or other Islamic states of concern in recent years.

e

best known case is arguably Abdul Kadir, former mayor of Linden Guyana, who

was arrested in 2007 for involvement in a plot to bomb JFK Airport in New York.

Many interviewed for this work assessed that Kadir’s involvement was an isolated

incident, and that even he may not have had a signicant role in the plot.

Chinese Commercial and Security Sector Activities

Finally, the growing presence of the PRC in both commercial projects and se-

curity sector activities in Guyana, and the associated growth of its political inu-

ence in Guyana, arguably creates strategic concerns for the US.

During the PPP administrations of Bharat Jagdeo and Donald Ramotar prior

to 2015, the commercial presence of the PRC expanded signicantly through a

number of major infrastructure and other investment projects that raised ques-

tions about the level of Chinese inuence in the country.

Major examples in-

cluded the US$800M Amaila Falls hydroelectric project (subsequently aban-

doned), the renovation of Cheddi Jagan International Airport, the acquisition of

the Omai bauxite mine by the Chinese rm Bosai, construction of the Skeldon

sugar factory, and the construction of electricity transmission infrastructure by the

Chinese rm CEIEC. Other examples include telecommunications cables and

other projects by the Chinese rm Huawei, an education program supplying Chi-

nese Haier-built laptop computers to impoverished Guyanese families, logging

concessions awarded to the Chinese rm Bai Shan Lin,

and the construction of

a new Marriott Hotel by Shanghai Construction Group. In the security sector,

under PPP governments, the Guyana Defence Force was the recipient of a Chi-

nese Y-12 transport aircraft,

and its ocers regularly attended professional

military education and training courses in China (PRC).

Under the APNU-AFC government of David Granger, the concessions to Bai

Shan Lin were largely terminated.

Several of the other Chinese projects also ran

into diculties resulting in the abandonment of the ber-optic cable from

Georgetown to Lethem (over multiple breaks and other technical diculties),

the closing of the Skeldon sugar factory, problems with and the scaling back of

the airport modernization,

and the ending of the One Laptop per Child program

and the associated disappearance of Haier as a computer brand in the country.

Nonetheless, in the face of a more challenging business environment, the Chi-

nese continue to make progress, including participation of China National O-

shore Oil Company (CNOOC) in the Exxon-led coalition to develop Guyana’s

oshore oil, the successful completion of the Marriott as Guyana’s leading luxury

Security Challenges in Guyana

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION 213

hotel, hosting oil industry executives and technical personnel as they came into

the country, a decision by the competing Pegasus Hotel’s owner, Robert Badal, to

contract the construction rm China Harbor for a major expansion project of his

own hotel,

and a number of road construction projects contracted to the Chi-

nese, as well as commercial real estate projects throughout Georgetown funded by

Chinese money. Under the Granger administration, the Chinese also ocially

opened a Confucius institute in the University of Guyana

and engendered con-

siderable goodwill in the security sector by donating over US$2.6M in vehicles

and equipment to the Guyana Police Force (GPF),

donating construction

equipment to the GDF,

and continuously bringing Guyanese government and

security personnel to PRC for training and goodwill visits.

With the likely return of the PPP to power in 2019 elections,

its leadership is

talking about a new generation of infrastructure and other projects likely to be

built by the Chinese and funded by the revenues from oil, including the resurrec-

tion of the Amaila Falls hydroelectric project and an interconnection to the Bra-

zilian power grid (likely to be built by a major Chinese company active in Brazil

such as China State Grid, or State Power Industrial Corporation), the construc-

tion of a deep water port near Berbice, and an associated road and rail link to

Brazil.

It is also possible to anticipate the participation of Chinese oil companies

in future oil exploration and development licensing rounds as well as the entry of

Chinese petroleum service companies in the support sector, and possibly the ex-

pansion of Bosai’s Reunion magnesium mine in the northwest of the country.

While the PPP has also expressed an interest to work closely with the US and

Western investors,

such projects are likely to give the Chinese particular weight

in the economic and political dynamics of the country in a future PPP govern-

ment (as well as, to a lesser extent, in a APNU one).

Response by the Guyana Government and its Security Forces

Under the administration of David Granger, the government has made tangi-

ble, albeit limited steps to respond to the security challenges facing the nation. In

general, the government response has been hampered by a combination of a lack

of resources available to the security sector and a deeply entrenched culture of

societal corruption.

National-Level Planning Processes

With respect to the formulation of security policy and strategy by the Guyanese

government, the National Security Council (NSC) is currently the body most

focused on internal and external security matters aecting the nation. e NSC

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meets once a week, headed by the President, and including (when available) the

Prime Minister, the Minister of State, the Minister of Security, the director of the

National Intelligence and Security Administration (NISA), the Director of the

Police, and the head of the Armed Forces, among others. Narrower and less op-

erational matters of defense policy are handled by the Defense Board, which

meets, in theory, once per month, with a somewhat narrower group and some-

times produces policy directives. Nonetheless, while meetings of the NSC and

Defense Board to some degree foster a process of coordination and planning, the

Guyanese system contrasts with its counterparts in the US and Europe in the

relative absence of a formal process and supporting documents guiding members

of the government from policy guidance to the acquisition of capabilities and

specic lines of action. While the Guyanese constitution species the role of the

Defense Force and other security institutions and there is a nominal document for

National Defense Strategy, there is no overarching national security policy docu-

ment nor a process for analyzing challenges to the nation, determining require-

ments, assessing gaps, and planning coordinated solutions for how to ll them.

Guyana Defence Force

By contrast with some Western nations, the Guyanese Defense Force (GDF)

has responsibility for not only the security, but also the stability of the nation. It

has implicit authority to support the police against internal threats, although of

the elements of that force, only the naval component of the GDF, the Guyana

Coast Guard, has authority to make arrests under normal circumstances. e

GDF is comprised of a land component, a small air corps, and a Coast Guard.

GDF Land Component

e GDF land component is a light infantry force of approximately 2,000 active

duty personnel, including an infantry battalion, a special forces squadron, an artil-

lery company, an engineering battalion, and a services support battalion.

It is

complemented by a recently reorganized and renamed reserve component, the

Guyanese People’s Militia.

e land component has a number of aging Urutu and Cascavel armored ve-

hicles with sometimes low levels of operational availability. As a force, it is very

limited in its combat capability. Most defense analysts consulted for this work

believe that if Venezuela actively pressed its previously mentioned territorial claims,

the GDF would be quickly overrun. Some speculate that the GDF would likely be

outmatched by the military capabilities of neighboring Suriname as well. us,

Guyana’s government, including its current President, retired Brigadier General

Security Challenges in Guyana

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION 215

David Granger, openly emphasizes that the center of its strategy for protecting the

nation against an external aggressor is diplomacy and not military force.

e engineering battalion of the GDF has received special attention under the

Granger government, with the President seeing the GDF, through activities such

as road construction, playing a role in national development. e GDF receives

approximately US$1M in equipment donations per year from the PRC, which are

allowed to accumulate, with the GDF typically taking delivery on a multi-million-

dollar donation from the PRC every couple of years. In 2015, the Granger gov-

ernment and GDF leadership, in coordination with their Chinese counterparts,

decided to use four years of accumulated donation credits in the form of construc-

tion equipment, which was delivered to Guyana in April 2017.

Although a

number of GDF engineers and others have reportedly received training on the

operation and maintenance of the equipment in PRC and the equipment is op-

erational and remains under the control of the GDF, it has not yet been employed

in support of any signicant public works project, with the exception of the “New

Horizons” humanitarian and civic assistance exercise.

e active duty ground force of the GDF is complemented by a reserve force.

is force, previously called the Reserve Battalion, was reorganized in 2015 fol-

lowing the election of the APNU-AFC government. It is now called the Guyana

Peoples Militia (GPM), resurrecting the concept of a local community-based

defense organization from an earlier time in Guyana’s history. e plan for the

GPM was to create a force 1,500 people over a three-year period, recruiting from

and basing the force in each of the nation’s ten regions (although still responding

to centralized-national-level command in a three-battalion structure). By the end

of 2015, the former reserve battalion was transferred under control of the GPM,

and the new organization began standing up its own units in the regions, although

the process remains incomplete. Equipping and constructing the base infrastruc-

ture in each region remains a work in progress.

e concept of the GPM is to serve as a grassroots organization more closely

linked with the communities in Guyana’s sparsely populated interior, leveraging local

knowledge and ties for use in addressing problems related to that area such as main-

taining awareness and defending against incursions of foreigners such as the immi-

grants and criminal bands which enter the interior of the country from Venezuela.

e GPM is also in charge of the National Cadet Corps, a program similar to

scouting in the US. e program is focused on instilling discipline and positive

values as well as creating interest in careers with the GPM and GDF.

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GDF Air Corps

e aviation portion of the GDF, the Air Corps, has almost no operational capa-

bility. Its newest assets are two BN-2 Islander aircraft acquired in 2018 from

Brazil but lacking signicant sensor packages that would magnify their capability

as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. e BN-2s are

considered a practical acquisition, owing to their capabilities for operating from

the often short and soft-eld landing strips throughout the interior of the coun-

try. ey were reportedly acquired from Brazil because the aircraft is familiar to

maintenance technicians in Guyana as it is used in civilian roles as well as military

ones.

Despite hopes within the GDF to eventually outt the aircraft with sen-

sors and other equipment to make them more eective in an ISR role, there are

no specic plans on the books or programed resources to acquire such capabilities.

In addition to the BN-2s, the GDF Air Corps also has one other light xed-

wing aircraft, a Cessna Skyvan.

Like the BN-2s, it is generally used for transport

and observation. Until recently, the GDF also had an older-generation Chinese-

made Harbin Y-12 military transport aircraft, which had been donated. Unfortu-

nately for the GDF, the aircraft had regular mechanical issues and was dicult to

maintain. e Y-12 has subsequently been scrapped, and the GDF reportedly

turned down a Chinese oer to sell them a newer model.

In addition to its three functional xed-wing aircraft, the Air Corps also has

one operational helicopter, a Bell 206, which is used mostly to transport senior

GDF and government personnel. It also reportedly has a Bell 412, which was not

in service at the time this article went to press.

To supplement the lack of aviation assets, the GDF periodically charters civil-

ian aircraft and ies them over the nation’s maritime exclusive economic zone and

other areas, crewed with GDF ocers manned with binoculars, in order to pro-

vide a minimal detection capability.

GDF Coast Guard

e Guyanese Coast Guard, like the Guyanese Air Force, has almost no real ca-

pability to protect the nations maritime areas or inland waterways. e only true

military craft capable of patrolling Guyana’s coastal waters, the Essequibo, was a

repurposed British minesweeper, which lacks the speed to operate and the equip-

ment to be eective. While its heavy metal hull oers some protection in the

eventuality of combat against pirates or others, it is highly fuel inecient and

suers frequent breakdowns. It has been repaired so often as to render its seawor-

thiness in doubt, with the result that it is only periodically used.

Security Challenges in Guyana

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION 217

Beyond the Essequibo, the Coast Guard has seven light Metal Shark patrol

boats acquired from the US. e crews and maintainers are being trained with US

support and will also be able to be used in the nation’s rivers. Beyond these, how-

ever, the Coast Guard has no boats large enough and with enough endurance to

go out into the Atlantic for sustained periods to perform sheries patrols, or to

respond to attacks against, or emergencies involving, the oil platforms that will be

increasingly operating far oshore in Guyana’s EEZ

Although Guyana is known as the “land of many rivers” for the number of

waterways covering the interior, the Coast Guard has almost no riverine craft to

patrol them, save the aforementioned Metal Sharks. In recent years, it has ac-

quired two “mobile bases,” essentially barges with living spaces, command and

control, and fuel and supplies for operating smaller boats. One of these has been

given to the Coast Guard and deployed on the Waini River near the Venezuelan

border, while another has been given to the police. Neither, however, can maintain

a sucient number of boats available to be eective.

By contrast to some other defense organizations in the hemisphere such as

those of the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, the GDF does not have a eet

of boats or other assets conscated from narcotrackers and repurposed to con-

trol the nation’s coast and waterways. is deciency reects both the legal system

of Guyana, which despite the creation of the State Assets Recovery Unit (SARA)

in 2017,

does not have an agile legal procedure for conscating assets. It also

reects the general absence of narcotrackers perceived to be using Guyana’s

rivers and coastal waters.

As noted previously, while the GDF works with both the US and the British,

it also has a signicant and ongoing relationship with the PRC. e GDF receives

approximately US$1M per year in military equipment donations or accumulated

credits and regularly sends personnel to professional military education programs

and training courses in PRC. While the majority of such engagements involve

short courses a few weeks in duration and brief ocial institutional visits, GDF

ocers have also attended the regular People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military

academy program, as well as year-long Command and General Sta courses near

Nanjing, and an extended pilot training course.

Guyana Police Force

For internal security, the (GPF) is the nation’s rst line of defense against crime

and insecurity, with the GDF in a supporting role where necessary. anks in part

to Guyana’s small population and British heritage, which does not emphasize a strong

distinction between the police and military as the US does, GDF-GPF coordination is

relatively good. Nonetheless, there are coordination issues. Police Force Control, for

218 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION

Ellis

example, lacks the ability to communicate directly with the GDF, and there is no Joint

Operations Center.

On its own terms, however, the GPF is both undermined by signicant internal

corruption, and underfunded. e mean pay of a Guyana Police Force member is $300

per month, approximately half that of the next worst-paid police department in the

Caribbean. As a consequence, the GPF does not attract the most capable members of

society to be part of its organization, and police personnel are readily tempted to engage

in bribe-taking just to survive. GPF members are also frequently poorly equipped,

sometimes delaying their responses to serious crimes because of the non-availability of

police cars. A number of GDF facilities are literally falling down from disrepair.

rough funds from the European Union (EU), police training, equipment, and

infrastructure is being improved. Highlights of such eorts include the Citizen Secu-

rity Strengthening Program (CSSP), which helps improve professionalization of the

GPF and increase its focus on community-oriented policing. rough CSSP, approxi-

mately 20 percent of Guyanese police stations have been refurbished, although the

conditions of those that remain is, in some cases, appalling.

In addition to assistance from the EU, the Granger administration also modestly

increased basic police salaries, and the GPF has sought to combat corruption and im-

prove the organization through the counsel of a “strategic management team” com-

prised of former senior police ocers, and with donations of computers and equipment

to the team from the US. Much work remains to be done.

Perhaps one of the highest-prole elements of the GPF, and one of the most politi-

cally controversial, is its Special Organized Crime Unit (SOCU). SOCU was originally

formed to conduct investigations of persons organized as suspicious through the nan-

cial analysis of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). SOCU has been criticized, how-

ever (particularly by the PPP), for focusing its investigations almost entirely on senior

PPP-aliated functionaries of the previous government and their business partners

without, to date, producing any convictions. One of the more public incidents was the

March 2017 arrest of senior PPP leaders Bharat Jagdeo, Roger Luncheon, and Robert

Persaud in a public forum with the press present.

ose more sympathetic to SOCU would say the focus was driven by the involve-

ment of the members of that government in corruption, and that the reason for the lack

of convictions has been the inability or unwillingness of the Director of Public Prosecu-

tion Mrs. Shalimar Ali-Hack (appointed by the previous PPP government), to take

cases forward.

As with the GDF, the GPF has interactions with the Chinese. Most prominently in

November 2017, when the PRC donated US$2.6M in vehicles and other equipment

including 56 pick-up trucks, 44 motorcycles, 35 all-terrain vehicles, and 5 buses, help-

ing the GPF to compensate for its severe shortage of vehicles.

Nonetheless, several of

Security Challenges in Guyana

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION 219

these cars have been lost to accidents since their arrival,

including one just a day after

being donated.

Financial Intelligence Unit

As noted previously, the work of SOCU is, in principle, supported by Guyana’s Finan-

cial Intelligence Unit, whose job it is to monitor nancial transactions and identify

suspicious ones to be investigated by SOCU.

Guyana’s contemporary FIU traces its origins to Anti-Money Laundering / Com-

batting Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) laws of 2009, implemented by then At-

torney General Anil Nandlall during the PPP administration of Donald Ramotar,

following recommendations and pressures from the Caribbean Financial Action Task

Force (CFATF). Despite Nandlall’s initial steps, the CFATF pressured the Ramotar

administration to do more. Nonetheless, the opposing APNU-AFC (with a majority

in parliament), refused to pass laws proposed by the Ramotar government to address

CFATF concerns, on the grounds that they were awed and lled with loopholes that

favored persons aliated with the PPP.

As a result of the impasse, the CFATF and its parent organization, the Financial

Action Task Force, ultimately rated Guyana and its FIU negatively.

When the APNU-AFC coalition took power in 2015 with a majority in par-

liament, it quickly passed a series of laws addressing issues raised by the CFATF

and EU, leading to an improved rating from the former, and removal from the EU

blacklist.

Nonetheless, PPP leaders and legal scholars advise that many of the

new laws, which they believe were passed in haste, may violate due process protec-

tions and are unconstitutional.

Operationally, while the work of the FIU under the current government is well

regarded, some complain that its work sometimes overlaps with the SOCU, and

that it focuses too heavily on politicians who are presumed to receive payos or

otherwise benet from illicit activities rather than the criminal leaders who actu-

ally conduct them.

Customs and Anti-Narcotics Unit

Guyana’s independent Customs Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) is roughly the na-

tion’s equivalent to the US Drug Enforcement AdministratioDEA. Although a

signicant quantity of drugs are not believed to move through Guyana at present,

the organization has played a leading role in the major intercepts which have oc-

curred, including the May 2017 discovery of US$550M in cocaine in a shipment

of wood bound for the US.

220 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION

Ellis

CANU works with, and generally has a positive relationship with, the DEA,

which was invited back into the country at the end of the Ramotar administra-

tion in 2015. Since the DEA’s formal return to the country in February 2016,

the two organizations have built a relationship of trust, in part through the spe-

cial vetting of personnel.

ere are some concerns of corruption within CANU,

including a high-pro-

le mishandling of a drug intercept in 2017, leading the government to suspend

the head of CANU, James Singh, and appoint a commission of inquiry.

e

ability to combat corruption in the ranks is facilitated by the fact that most of the

organization’s personnel work on one-year contracts, making it easier to eliminate

those who fail to pass polygraphs or whose honesty otherwise comes into ques-

tion, by simply not renewing their contracts. Nonetheless, according to one

Guyanese security expert, half of CANU ocers given a polygraph failed it, and

many of those who did are still in the organization.

Within the GPF, the work of CANU is complimented by the police counter-

narcotics unit, which focuses more on the growing, selling, and distribution of

drugs at the local level. Recognizing the overlap that exists between the missions

of both agencies, the Granger administration has proposed to merge the two or-

ganizations into a single National Anti-Narcotics Agency (NANA).

Joint Intelligence Center/

National Intelligence and Security Administration

Beyond the GDF and the GPF, the Guyanese government is working to build a civil-

ian intelligence organization, the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA).

Built from an organization originally designed to coordinate intelligence from police,

military and other sources for national-level decision makers, and conduct electronic

surveillance (the Joint Intelligence Center), NISA is the brainchild of the JIC’s current

head, Bruce Lovell, who seeks to build NISA into an organization which has both an

analytical and collection capability, with a presence in each of Guyana’s regions, and in

theory, eventually some capability to collect intelligence on foreign targets.

Other Organizations

Finally, there are a range of other organizations that play roles in combatting

criminal activity and other security challenges in Guyana as part of their duties.

e Guyana Revenue Authority (GRA) has responsibility for inspecting the

loading of sugar, sand, minerals, and lumber and other bulk material onto barges

for export, including the duty to ensure that illicit substances like cocaine are not

Security Challenges in Guyana

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION 221

buried in the shipments. e GRA, however, has insucient personnel to inspect

more than a miniscule fraction of cargos being loaded.

One of the most challenged organizations within the Guyanese law enforce-

ment system is the Guyana Prison System, a part of the Ministry of Public Secu-

rity. As in many parts of Latin America, the prison system suers from severe

overcrowding and neglect. In July 2017, Guyana’s main prison at Camp Street in

downtown Georgetown was largely destroyed by a re.

Although the facility has

been partially renovated, it now has beds for only 300 prisoners, a fraction of its

previous capacity, and is no longer suitable for maximum security inmates. With

the re in the Camp Street prison, the Lusignan prison facility is now Guyana’s

largest, with capacity for 1,200. It is here that the prisoners from Brazil’s First

Capital Command (PCC) gang are being held. e third prison, Mazaruni, is

relatively isolated, and features better conditions. As of the time this work went to

press, Mazaruni was in the process of a renovation and expansion, to include

construction of a new wing designed to hold 400 prisoners.

Recommendations

e appropriate response for the US to Guyana’s security challenges is compli-

cated by the nation’s current political crisis. Under the APNU-AFC government

of David Granger, the nation was making meaningful, if slow process in combat-

ting corruption and reforming its institutions.

While the PPP governments

which preceded it manifested relatively competent administration and a pro-

business orientation, the accusations of corruption, and their level of cooperation

with leftist populist regimes such as Venezuela, as well as the PRC, arguably

caused discomfort in Washington.

e rst strategic imperative for the US with

Guyana is to avoid taking a position in the current political crisis, either arma-

tively or by omission, inconsistent with Guyana’s constitution and the dictates of

its political process. e US should be prepared to work actively toward security

with whoever prevails so long as they do so consistent with democratic processes

and Guyana’s own constitution. At the same time, given concerns regarding cor-

ruption in prior PPP administrations, while the US should embrace and work in

good faith with a future PPP government, it must do so with its eyes open, hold-

ing the PPP to account with respect to its commitments to transparency, democ-

racy, and commitment to free market and the rule of law.

As Guyana’s oil revenue comes in, the focus of US engagement in the security

and other sectors should aim to strengthen the nation’s capacity for good gover-

nance, including technically competent, rational processes for planning, acquisi-

tion, and program evaluation, to help the country best take advantage of its petro-

222 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION

Ellis

leum and commercial interactions with the PRC, and other opportunities to

advance national development.

US Security Planning Assistance

With the concurrence of the Guyanese government, the US should help its Guy-

anese counterparts develop a process for elaborating defense policy and strategy,

identifying and developing required capabilities. If the Guyanese government is

not comfortable working with US institutions such as the Defense Institution

Reform Initiative (DIRI) or the Ministry of Defense Advisory organization

(MODA), the US should also explore coordination with the British in supporting

United Kingdom (UK) initiatives aligned with the Guyanese experience.

e Guyanese government should rationally determine its own defense needs,

owing from its identication of challenges, the strategy to meet them, an analy-

sis of gaps and alternatives. Nonetheless, there are a range of areas in which help

is needed with respect to the security sector, and in which the US should be pre-

pared to oer its support:

Professional Military Education

e US should oer International Military Education and Training (IMET)

support, with billets at all level for the professional military education of GDF

ocers. Guyana’s US State Partner, the Florida National Guard, arguably has

important contributions to make in this area.

For naval programs, the US Coast Guard arguably will have programs and in-

teractions relevant to Guyana’s needs, both in improving control of its EEZ, as

well as the country’s coast and interior rivers.

e ability of the US to provide certain types of security assistance may become

increasingly constrained as Guyana’s oil revenue begins to come in and its per

capita income grows (putting the country above the threshold for certain types of

assistance under US law). Nonetheless, the US must be prepared to ask for special

exceptions to these laws, recognizing that extra-hemispheric competitors to the

US, PRC, and Russia are likely to increase their own oering for training and ex-

change programs for the Guyanese beyond what they currently provide. While the

US has a compelling case regarding the value of its own programs, and while the

Guyanese government must naturally pay a fair share of their cost, the US must

oer such programs at a cost and under conditions that make them attractive to

the Guyanese government to work with the US and not just PRC as a partner.

With respect to material solutions, while the Guyanese government must make

the nal decisions regarding its needs, following an objective, thorough, and

Security Challenges in Guyana

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION 223

transparent analysis of the alternatives. e analysis in this work suggests that the

US should be prepared to oer comprehensive packages of materiel, spares, train-

ing and maintenance support focused on building Guyana’s ability to patrol the

far oshore waters of its EEZ, respond to encroachments of those waters by the

navies of foreign nations, unauthorized shing vessels, narcotrackers, pirates,

and other actors who might threaten the oil rigs. Such a package would logically

include the capability to respond to emergencies there, including, but not limited

to, oil spills. rough the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, the US may

wish to oer the GDF a limited number of oshore patrol vessels (OPVs) capable

of operating with embarked helicopters, and persistent surveillance platforms,

possibly including UAVs and manned aircraft outtted with appropriate sensors

such as Forward-Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR), as part of that solution.

For the control of the interior, both the GDF and police and other support-

ing agencies will likely need an expanded number of riverine patrol craft. e

US, through providing the GDF Coast Guard seven metal shark boats and as-

sociated support and training, already has a good sense of GDF needs and is

thus well-positioned to suggest well-designed and balanced packages of com-

plimentary capabilities.

On the air side, the GDF will likely need an expanded number of simple, rug-

ged light transport aircraft appropriate for the approximately 120 non-improved

airstrips of the Guyanese interior (such as the previously acquired BN-2s) which

could also potentially serve as maritime patrol aircraft, as well as more vehicles for

both the GDF and police.

Finally, the GDF and GPF will likely need an expanded, albeit limited, heli-

copter-mobile special operations capability to respond to some of the larger and

more heavily-armed criminal groupings operating in the interior, including the

sindicatos and others from Venezuela threatening miners and other local popula-

tions inside Guyana. Such SOF has a training and equipment component, all of

which the US is uniquely well-positioned to suggest a solution appropriate to the

Guyanese reality.

It will be particularly important for the US to work with the Guyanese govern-

ment to design and implement the solution in an incremental, coordinated fash-

ion so that the acquisition of material capabilities proceeds in tandem with the

training of personnel to operate and maintain those assets in a sustained fashion.

Guyana must work in conjunction with the US, the UK European Union and

other partners and fundamentally reform its security and law enforcement institu-

tions, as well as other parts of government. Part of that solution may be a signicant

elevation of police salaries. ese organizations will also require assistance in the

institution of a transparent, merit-based promotion system associated with clearly

224 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION

Ellis

dened requirements for acquiring and demonstrating skills at each level, and ad-

equate training and education opportunities to acquire them. ey will also require

well as reforms in the management of police (and others) to ensure that the skills

invested in are used, through both the retention and wise assignment of personnel.

With such incentives, it will also be important for the US to help the GDF, GPF

and other relevant organizations implement expanded condence testing, such as regu-

lar polygraphs and interviews (not just entry level screening, or specialized units), as

well as periodic investigations including home visits to guard against corruption by

ocers (including leaders, which must not be exempt), by ensuring that the lifestyle of

personnel is commensurate with their salaries.

Organizations undergoing such reform must also ensure that those who are identi-

ed as having engaged in corruption are removed and followed after their removal, and

not simply transferred to another part of their organization.

In improving the institutional capabilities of the GDF and the GPF, there are

a range of good analyses which have already been done and accepted by the Guy-

anese government, although not meaningfully acted upon, including the 2016

report on Security Sector Reform, and the 2018 UK advisor’s follow up report.

Such detailed reports should be the starting point in taking institutional reform

forward. e constructive role played by the UK and the European Union in

Guyana’s security sector reform to date also highlights the importance for the US

of coordinating with such partners as closely as possible to avoid duplication of

work and achieve maximum synergies from their collective eorts, as well as

learning from each other’s successes and errors in the country.

Overall, the institutional reforms and acquisition of capabilities described in this

work represent a signicant departure from where Guyana’s security institutions are

today. While their acquisition in an incremental fashion will ease the burden, they will

not be cheap. Guyana’s expanding oil wealth will not only provide a way to fund such

investments, but an imperative for making them. As noted previously, the economic

growth accompanying those oil operations will both attract persons from across the

world and create signicant new opportunities for criminal activities. While Guyana

has already been prejudiced to some degree by a lack of capability to respond to its ex-

isting internal and external security challenges, without the ability to protect its oil and

without capable, professional security services to maintain control as that wealth ex-

pands, the oil boom and associated development will ultimately be unsustainable.

After a long history of receiving relatively little attention from the developed

world, Guyana is on the cusp of a profound transformation, driven by its soon to

arrive oil wealth. e risk of Guyana becoming “rich” without adequately strength-

ening its institutions risks that the very petroleum revenues that promise to be

Security Challenges in Guyana

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION 225

Guyana’s salvation could be its undoing. For Guyana and its South American and

Caribbean neighbors, and for the US, the imperative of getting it right is strong. q

Notes

1. R. Evan Ellis, “Navigating Guyana’s Muddy Waters,” Global Americans, March 4, 2019, https://

theglobalamericans.org/2019/03/navigating-guyanas-muddy-waters/.

2. “Charrandas Persaud vows to ensure AFC never regains House seats,” Stabroek News, De-

cember 31, 2018, https://www.stabroeknews.com/2018/news/guyana/12/31/charrandas-persaud

-vows-to-ensure-afc-never-regains-house-seats/.

3. “e $20 billion question for Guyana,” e New York Times, July 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes

.com/2018/07/20/business/energy-environment/the-20-billion-question-for-guyana.html.

4. “Hardships after closure of sugar estates,” Kaieteur News, April 23, 2018, https://www

.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2018/04/23/hardships-after-closure-of-sugar-estates/.

5. Interviews, 2019.

6. Interviews, 2019.

7. “Ankoko Island,” Kaieteur News, October 25, 2015, https://www.kaieteurnewsonline

.com/2015/10/25/ankoko-island/.

8. “Venezuela disputes territory Guyana proposes for Beal spaceport,”, Aviation Week &

Space Technology, March 22, 2000, https://aviationweek.com/awin/venezuela-disputes-territory

-guyana-proposes-beal-spaceport.

9. William Neuman, “Venezuela intercepts ship with 5 Americans aboard,” New York Times, Octo-

ber 12, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/12/world/americas/venezuela-intercepts-ship-with

-5-americans-aboard.html.

10. “Guyana says Venezuela threatens ‘peace and security’ over oil and border row,” e Guardian,

June 9, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/09/guyana-says-venezuela-threatens

-peace-and-security-over-oil-and-border-row.

11. David Granger, “e defence of the New River, 1967-1969,” Stabroek News, February 15 2009,

https://www.stabroeknews.com/2009/features/02/15/the-defence-of-the-new-river-1967-1969/.

12. “New River Triangle,” Global Security, Accessed March 9, 2018, https://www.globalsecurity.org

/military/world/war/new-river.htm.

13. “Bouterse says New River ‘back on agenda’ – de Ware Tijd,” Stabroek News, October 2, 2015,

https://www.stabroeknews.com/2015/news/guyana/10/02/bouterse-says-new-river-back-on-agenda

-de-ware-tijd/.

14. Dennis Chabrol, “Greenidge defends spending big on settling Guyana’s border rows; says US$10

million on boundary dispute gave Guyana lucrative Liza 1 well,” Demerara Waves, December 20, 2018,

http://demerarawaves.com/2018/12/20/greenidge-defends-spending-big-on-settling-guyanas-border

-rows-says-us10-million-on-boundary-dispute-gave-guyana-lucrative-liza-1-well/.

15. See, for example, “Corentyne boat captain found dead after pirate attack,” Stabroek News, May 18,

2017, https://www.stabroeknews.com/2017/news/guyana/05/18/corentyne-boat-captain-found-dead-

pirate-attack/.

16. Bebi Oosman, “Search continues for 16 Guyanese missing after pirate attack,” Stabroek

News, May 2, 2018, https://www.stabroeknews.com/2018/news/guyana/05/02/search-continues

-for-16-guyanese-missing-after-pirate-attack/.

226 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION

Ellis

17. “Guyana’s border towns threatened by violent gangs as Venezuela crisis deepens,” e

Guardian, August 2, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/02/venezuela-crisis

-violence-guyana-border.

18. Denis Chabrol, “BREAKING: Sindicato shoots Guyanese policeman on Guyana-Vene-

zuela border,” Demerara Waves, November 13, 2018, http://demerarawaves.com/2018/11/13

/sindicato-shoots-guyanese-policeman-on-guyana-venezuela-border/.

19. While some aliated with the government, consulted for this work, said that the ELN had

indeed been seen inside Guyana, other security experts in Guyana questioned whether the ELN

would have crossed Venezuela from their traditional operating area on the northwest border with

Colombia, and whether Guyanese government personnel had been able to distinguish, with preci-

sion, the group aliation of various armed, spanish-speaking persons of interest seen in the border

region. Interviews, 2019.

20. “Mohamed’s Trading is top gold exporter for 2018,” Kaieteur News, January 5, 2019, https://

www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2019/01/05/mohameds-trading-is-top-gold-exporter-for-2018/.

21. Interviews, 2019.

22. Interviews, 2019.

23. Latoya Giles, “Bai Shan Lin circumvents Guyana’s logging laws…Ships Billions $$$$ of

high priced logs monthly,” Kaieteur News, August 7, 2014, https://www.kaieteurnewsonline.

com/2014/08/07/bai-shan-lin-circumvents-guyanas-logging-laws-ships-billions-of-high-priced

-logs-monthly/.

24. “Exploration or exploitation?” Kaieteur News, August 13, 2014, https://www.kaieteurnewsonline

.com/2014/08/13/exploration-or-exploitation/.

25. “Jagdeo blasts Minister Jordan for “drug economy” statement,” Guyana Times, October 18, 2018,

https://guyanatimesgy.com/jagdeo-blasts-nance-minister-for-drug-economy-statement/.

26. Interviews, 2019.

27. “Rice shipment from Guyana busted with cocaine in Jamaica,” Guyana Chronicle, August 30,

2017, http://guyanachronicle.com/2017/08/30/rice-shipment-guyana-busted-cocaine-jamaica.

28. Interviews, 2019.

29. Kyra Gurney, “In First, Guyana Finds ‘Narco’ Submarine,” Insight Crime, August 18, 2014,

https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/guyana-discovers-narco-submarine-highlighting-growing

-drug-tracking-problem/.

30. “e inux of Venezuelans in Guyana: Refugees to some, ‘silent invaders’ to others,” Kai-

eteur News, November 5, 2018, https://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2018/11/05/the-inux-of

-venezuelans-in-guyana-refugees-to-some-silent-invaders-to-others/.

31. Interviews, 2019.

32. “Colombia to allow Venezuelans to enter on expired passports,” Reuters, March 8, 2019, https://

news.yahoo.com/colombia-allow-venezuelans-enter-expired-passports-013716023.html.

33. Interviews, 2019.

34. Interviews, 2019.

35. Interviews, 2019.

36. Interviews, 2019.

37. “Guyana’s homicide, robbery and burglary rates signicantly exceed global average – IDB

nds,” Kaieteur News, December 13, 2018, https://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2018/12/13

/guyanas-homicide-robbery-and-burglary-rates-signicantly-exceed-global-average-idb-nds/.

38. Interviews, 2019.

Security Challenges in Guyana

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION 227

39. “AT LAST!!! Guyana’s most wanted ‘Fine Man’, ‘Skinny’ killed,” Kaieteur News, August 29,

2008, https://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2008/08/29/at-last-guyana’s-most-wanted-‘ne-man’

-‘skinny’-killed/.

40. “Roger Khan gets 40 years,” Kaieteur News, October 17, 2009, https://www.kaieteurnewsonline

.com/2009/10/17/roger-khan-gets-40-years/.

41. As an example of the relative absence of Islamic extremism as a politically salient issue, the PPP

candidate for the presidency in this year’s elections, Irfaan Ali, is a practicing Muslim. Yet while his selec-

tion has caused some unease among the majority Hindi East Indians in his party, religion has not been

raised as a signicant issue thus far in the campaign.

42. Interviews, 2019.

43. R. Evan Ellis, “Gangs, Guns, Drugs and Islamic Foreign Fighters: Security Challenges in Trini-

dad and Tobago,” Global Americans, September 8, 2017, http://theglobalamericans.org/2017/09/gangs

-guns-drugs-islamic-foreign-ghters-security-challenges-trinidad-tobago/.

44. Interviews, 2019.

45. R. Evan Ellis, “Chinese Commercial Engagement with Guyana: e Challenges of Physical

Presence and Political Change” China Brief, Vol. 13, No. 19, September 27, 2013.

46. Ellis, 2013.

47. “Bai Shan Lin and the Great Guyana Giveaway,” Stabroek News, August 8, 2014, https://www

.stabroeknews.com/2014/features/in-the-diaspora/08/18/bai-shan-lin-great-guyana-giveaway/.

48. “Army appoints captains for Chinese Y-12 plane,” Stabroek News, August 29, 2012, https://www

.stabroeknews.com/2012/news/guyana/08/29/army-appoints-captains-for-chinese-y-12-plane/.

49. Ellis, 2019.

50. Denis Chabrol, “GFC scraps Baishan Lin’s forest concessions; moves to recover debts,” De-

merara Waves, September 7, 2016, http://demerarawaves.com/2016/09/07/gfc-scraps-baishanlins

-forest-concessions-moves-to-recover-debts/.

51. “Government draws line under Lethem-Georgetown cable project,” TeleGeography, May 16,

2017, https://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2017/05/16/government

-draws-line-under-lethem-georgetown-cable-project/.

52. Ray Chickrie, “Commentary: Guyana’s US$150 million ugly airport blunder,” Caribbean News

Now, January 4, 2019, https://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/2019/01/04/commentary-guyanas-us150

-million-ugly-airport-blunder/.

53. “Pegasus unveils 15-storey tower in US$100M expansion - Badal urges tax, scal incentive

reforms,” Kaieteur News, March 9, 2018, https://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2018/03/09/

pegaus-unveils-15-storey-tower-in-us100m-expansion-badal-urges-tax-scal-incentive-reforms/.

54. According to Guyanese interviewed for this work, it is not, however, as involved in political

and business aairs in the country, as Confucius Institutes elsewhere in the Caribbean. Interviews

o-the-record in Georgetown, Guyana, February 2019.

55. “Chinese Donate Millions in Vehicles To Police Force,” YouTube, November 6, 2017, https://

www.youtube.com/watch?v=umITcrNTVWg.

56. “China’s army donates $1.2B in equipment to GDF,” Stabroek News, April 4, 2017, https://www

.stabroeknews.com/2017/news/guyana/04/04/chinas-army-donates-1-2b-equipment-gdf/.

57. Ellis, 2019.

58. Based on interviews with senior PPP ocials, Georgetown, Guyana, February 2019.

228 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION

Ellis

59. “BOSAI turns to manganese acquires Reunion project for US$10M,” Guyana Chronicle,

November 12, 2016, https://guyanachronicle.com/2016/11/12/bosai-turns-to-manganese-ac-

quires-reunion-project-for-us10m.

60. Interviews, 2019.

61. “Guyana-Army,” IHS Jane’s, September 27, 2018.

62. “Diplomacy integral to safeguarding Guyana’s sovereignty, economic development-

President,” iNews Guyana, April 4, 2017, https://www.inewsguyana.com/diplomacy-integral

-to-safeguarding-guyanas-sovereignty-economic-development-president/.

63. “China’s army donates $1.2B in equipment to GDF,” Stabroek News, April 4, 2017, https://www

.stabroeknews.com/2017/news/guyana/04/04/chinas-army-donates-1-2b-equipment-gdf/.

64. Interviews, 2019.

65. See, for example, “People’s Militia, National Cadet Corps to be introduced in Region 2,” Kaieteur

News, February 13, 2019, https://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2019/02/13/peoples-militia-national

-cadet-corps-to-be-introduced-in-region-2/.

66. Interviews, 2019.

67. “Guyana-Air Force,” IHS Jane’s, September 27, 2018.

68. Interviews, 2019.

69. “State Asset Recovery Act sets out guidelines for director’s appointment,” DPI, April 20, 2017,

https://dpi.gov.gy/state-asset-recovery-act-sets-out-guidelines-for-directors-appointment/.

70. is absence likely reects both the fact that Guyana is not situated on one of the principal drug

transit routes to either Europe or the United States, and that drug smugglers traditionally have used

other means, such as barges lled with bulk cargo such as sand or rice, to smuggle drugs through Guya-

nese waters. It may also reect the lack of Guyanese assets to detect narco vessels, and other deciencies

in Guyanese law enforcement.

71. “GDF ocers complete ghter pilot training,” Guyana Chronicle, August 2, 2018, http://

guyanachronicle.com/2018/08/02/gdf-ocers-complete-ghter-pilot-training.

72. Interviews, 2019.

73. Interviews, 2019.

74. Denis Chabrol, “UPDATED: Jagdeo, Luncheon, Robert Persaud arrested, released; others still

detained,” Demerara Waves, March 7, 2017, http://demerarawaves.com/2017/03/07/updated-jagdeo

-luncheon-robert-persaud-arrested-released-others-still-detained/.

75. Interviews, 2019.

76. “Chinese Donate Millions in Vehicles To Police Force,” YouTube, November 6, 2017, https://

www.youtube.com/watch?v=umITcrNTVWg.

77. See, for example, “Cop battling for life after Herstelling crash,” Stabroek News, December

11, 2018, https://www.stabroeknews.com/2018/news/guyana/12/11/cop-battling-for-life-after

-herstelling-crash/.

78. “Vehicles donated by the People’s Republic of China get inspected,” Kaieteur News, Novem-

ber 8, 2018, https://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2018/11/08/vehicles-donated-by-the-peoples

-republic-of-china-get-inspected/.

79. Svetlana Marshall, “Guyana o EU blacklist,” Guyana Chronicle, February 15, 2019, http://

guyanachronicle.com/2019/02/15/guyana-o-eu-blacklist.

80. Interviews, 2019.

81. “Cocaine worth $550 million found in lumber,” Guyana Chronicle, May 15, 2017, http://

guyanachronicle.com/2017/05/15/cocaine-worth-550m-found-in-lumber.

Security Challenges in Guyana

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAS  THIRD EDITION 229

82. Fareeza Hani, “DEA oce ocially opens in Guyana, Guyana Chronicle, February 10, 2016,

http://guyanachronicle.com/2016/02/10/dea-oce-ocially-opens-in-guyana.

83. Interviews, 2019.

84. “CoI dismisses corruption claims levelled at CANU” Guyana Times, July 22, 2016, https://

guyanatimesgy.com/coi-dismisses-corruption-claims-levelled-at-canu/.

85. “Shake-up for CANU,” Guyana Chronicle, June 3, 2017, http://guyanachronicle.com/2017/06/03

/shake-up-for-canu.

86. Interviews, 2019.

87. “CANU, police narcotics unit to be merged,” Guyana Chronicle, September 14, 2015, http://

guyanachronicle.com/2015/09/14/canu-police-narcotics-unit-to-be-merged.

88. “Guyana moves to stamp out identity theft, boost border intelligence, ght narcotics,” De-

merara Waves, October 13, 2016, http://demerarawaves.com/2016/10/13/guyana-moves-to-stamp

-out-identity-theft-boost-border-intelligence-ght-narcotics/.

89. Interviews, 2019.

90. “Fire attens entire Camp St prison,” Stabroek News, July 9, 2017, https://www.stabroeknews

.com/2017/news/guyana/07/09/major-disturbance-camp-st-prison-prison-ocer-shot/.

91. “Mazaruni Prison expansion on schedule – Prisons Director,” iNews Guyana, September 16,

2018, https://www.inewsguyana.com/mazaruni-prison-expansion-on-schedule-prisons-director/.

92. Ellis, 2019.

93. Ellis, 2019.

94. “Accelerate implementation of security sector reforms – President to GPF,” iNews Guyana,

January 10, 2019, https://www.inewsguyana.com/accelerate-implementation-of-security-sector

-reforms-president-to-gpf/..

Dr. Evan Ellis, PhD

He is a research professor of Latin American Studies at the Institute of

Strategic Studies of the US Army War College with a focus on the re-

gion's relations with China and other non-Western Hemisphere actors.

Dr. Ellis has published more than 90 works, including the 2009 book

China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores (China in Latin

America: the whys and whys), the 2013 book The Strategic Dimension

of Chinese Engagement with Latin America (The strategic dimension

of Chinese activities in Latin America) and the 2014 book, China on

the Ground in Latin America. Dr. Ellis has presented his work in a

wide range of commercial and government forums in 25 countries. He

has testified about Chinese activities in Latin America before the US

Congress, and has talked about his work in China and other external

actors in Latin America in a wide range of radio and television pro-

grams, including CNN International, CNN En Español, The John

Bachelor Show, Voice of America and Radio Martí. Dr. Ellis is usually

quoted in the print media in both the US and Latin America for his

work in this area, including the Washington Times, Bloomberg, Amer-

ica Economy, DEF and InfoBAE. Dr. Ellis has a doctorate in political

science with a specialization in comparative politics. The opinions ex-

pressed in this article are strictly yours.