1
© 2023. School of Government. e University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BULLETIN NO. 2023/01 | JANUARY 2023
CONTENTS
Introduction...1
I. The Law of No-Knock Warrants...3
A. Federal Law...3
B. North Carolina Law...6
C. Is There Legal Authority to Issue No-Knock
Warrants in North Carolina?...10
II. The Prevalence and Practice of No-Knock
Warrants in North Carolina...12
A. Prevalence of No-Knock Warrants...13
B. Justications in No-Knock Applications...13
C. Documentation of Permission
for No-Knock Entry...14
D. Quick-Knock Entries...15
III. Eorts to Prohibit or to Limit the Use
of No-Knock Warrants...18
A. Legislative Action ...18
B. Court System Action ...19
C. Local Board Action ...20
D. Agency Action ...21
Conclusion...22
The Law and Practice of No-Knock
Search Warrants in North Carolina
Jerey B. Welty
Introduction
A no-knock search warrant is a warrant that allows an ocer to force his or her way into a
premises without rst knocking on the door and announcing his or her presence and purpose.
ese warrants are controversial. Since Breonna Taylor was killed during the execution of a
no-knock warrant, they have been the subject of a national debate.
1
ey have been addressed in
the media
2
and in law reviews.
3
Jerey B. Welty is a professor of public law and government at the School of Government. His areas of
interest include criminal law and procedure, particularly the law of policing, search and seizure, digital
evidence, and criminal pleadings.
1. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., et al., What to Know about Breonna Taylor’s Death, N.Y. T, Apr.
26, 2021 (noting that the case has drawn “national attention” and involved a no-knock warrant, though
there is a dispute over whether ocers actually executed the warrant without knocking and announcing).
2. See, e.g., Courtney Kan et al., What to Know about No-Knock Warrants, W . P, Apr. 6, 2022.
3. Compare, e.g., Blanche Bong Cook, Something Rots in Law Enforcement and It’s the Search Warrant:
e Breonna Taylor Case, 102 B.U. L. R. 1 (2022) (arguing that no-knock warrants have become
routine), and Brian Dolan, Note, To Knock or Not to Knock: No Knock Warrants and Confrontational
Policing, 93 S. J' L. R. 201 (2019) (critiquing no-knock warrants), with Donald B. Allegro, Note,
Police Tactics, Drug Tracking, and Gang Violence: Why the No Knock Warrant Is an Idea Whose Time
Has Come, 64 N D L. R. 552 (1989) (supporting no-knock warrants).
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© 2023. School of Government. e University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Many criminal justice reformers want no-knock warrants restricted or eliminated.
4
Some
states have taken steps in that direction,
5
and President Biden has issued an executive order
limiting the authority of federal law enforcement agencies to make no-knock entries.
6
On the
other hand, some supporters of no-knock warrants see them as vital tools for preventing the
destruction of evidence and for getting a tactical advantage over potentially dangerous suspects.
7
Critics contend that no-knock warrants are issued routinely and with little scrutiny.
8
Proponents argue that no-knock warrants are rare and carefully considered.
9
is bulletin takes a deep dive into the law and practice regarding no-knock warrants
in North Carolina. Among the conclusions are: (1) there is no explicit authority for North
Carolina judicial ocials to issue no-knock warrants; (2) judicial ocials sometimes issue such
warrants anyway; (3) no-knock warrants seem to be very rare; (4) when an application for a
no-knock warrant is granted, the resulting warrant does not always include an express judicial
determination regarding the need for a no-knock entry or an express judicial authorization of
such an entry; and (5) quick-knock entries, where ocers knock and announce their presence
and then immediately force entry, may be widespread.
4. See, e.g., John Guzman, Breonna Taylor, Amir Locke, and the Dangers of Warrant Executions,
NAACP L D. F (Mar. 18, 2022, https://www.naacpldf.org/end-no-knock-warrants/ (arguing
that ending no-knock warrants is “the bare minimum”); Campaign Zero, E A N K, https://
endallnoknocks.org/ (last visited May 5, 2022) (arguing that no-knock warrants should be banned and
that police should be required to wait at least thirty seconds after knocking and announcing to enter).
5. See infra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.
6. Executive Order on Advancing Eective, Accountable Policing and Criminal Justice Practices to
Enhance Public Trust and Public Safety (May 25, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieng-room/
presidential-actions/2022/05/25/executive-order-on-advancing-eective-accountable-policing-and-
criminal-justice-practices-to-enhance-public-trust-and-public-safety/ (limiting federal agencies’ use of
no-knock warrants and requiring certain recordkeeping and reporting).
7. See, e.g., Emily R. Daniel, No Knock Warrants: Mend em, Don’t End em, M
S T., Nov. 8, 2020, https://www.startribune.com/no-knock-warrants-mend-them-don-t-end-
them/572996872/ (asserting that while “dramatic limits” on no-knock warrants are appropriate,
they “are needed in imminent danger cases”); Wesley E. Nunn, No Knock Warrants a Valuable Tool,
A J.-C., June 18, 2014, https://www.ajc.com/news/opinion/knock-warrants-valuable-
tool/Tcl4g5l8uJZgwixfhANnjJ/ (arguing that no-knock warrants are used rarely, in extraordinary
circumstances, after judicial review). Notably, the National Tactical Ocers’ Association has recently
concluded that “[n]o-knock search warrants, though well-intended, no longer pass the test of tactical
science, risk mitigation practices, and liability-conscious decision-making.” National Tactical Ocers’
Association, NTOA Releases Position Statement on No Knock Warrant Service (Feb. 25, 2022), ht tps://
www.ntoa.org/ntoa-releases-position-statement-on-no-knock-warrant-service/.
8. See, e.g., e Justice Collaborative Institute, End No-Knock Raids 2 (June 2020), https://www.
lesforprogress.org/memos/no_knock_raids.pdf (arguing that “no-knock warrants are not reserved for
the most egregious of crimes” and are often used against unarmed drug suspects); Dolan, supra note 3,
at 223 (asserting that “magistrate judges give no-knock authorization lightly and routinely”); Kevin Sack,
Door-Busting Raids Leave a Trail of Blood, N.Y. T, Mar. 18, 2017 (“e no-knock process often begins
with unreliable informants and cursory investigations that produce adavits signed by unquestioning
low-level judges.”).
9. See, e.g., John Henderson, Here’s How Often No-Knock Warrants Are Used in Fayetteville,
F O, Dec. 24, 2020 (recounting police chief’s statement that no-knock warrants have
not been used in years and that they are appropriate only in “extreme cases, such as a hostage situation in
which there is a need for stealth to avoid putting a hostage’s life in danger”); Nunn, supra note 7.
The Law and Practice of No-Knock Search Warrants in North Carolina 3
© 2023. School of Government. e University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
I. The Law of No-Knock Warrants
Law enforcement ocers in North Carolina are bound to follow the United States Constitution,
the state constitution, and state statutory law—all as interpreted by the state’s appellate courts
and the Supreme Court of the United States. Over the past several decades, those courts have
issued many decisions about no-knock warrants and related matters. is section summarizes
existing law.
A. Federal Law
e Fourth Amendment says nothing about how an ocer may execute a search warrant
beyond the general command that all searches must be reasonable. In Wilson v. Arkansas, the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the “common-law ‘knock and announce’ principle
forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.”
10
Wilson did not say
that an ocer must knock and announce in every case, or even clearly establish that knocking
and announcing should be the rule rather than the exception. Looking to English common law,
it held only that “in some circumstances an ocer’s unannounced entry into a home might be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”
11
is modest statement has been strengthened in subsequent cases. For example, the Court has
since said that “the Fourth Amendment incorporates the common law requirement that police
ocers entering a dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity and purpose
before attempting forcible entry.”
12
e Court has recognized that knocking and announcing
serves at least three purposes: (1) it reduces the risk that a sudden entry will “provoke violence
in supposed self-defense by the surprised resident”; (2) it protects the occupants’ property by
allowing the occupants to open the door rather than having the ocers break it down; and (3) it
protects the dignity of the occupants by allowing them to get out of bed, get dressed, and prepare
to receive the police.
13
e risk of violence in self-defense may be especially acute in states, like
North Carolina, that embrace the so-called Castle Doctrine, which presumes that a person who
unlawfully and forcibly enters another’s home is there to commit a violent crime, presumes that
the resident fears death or great bodily harm from an unlawful and forcible entry, and therefore
presumptively entitles the resident to respond with deadly force.
14
10. 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995).
11. Id. at 934.
12. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387 (1997).
13. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006).
14. See Chapter 14, Section 51.2 of the North Carolina General Statutes (hereinafter G.S.). e
presumptions discussed in the text do not apply when an ocer knocks and announces before entry.
G.S. 14-51.2(c)(4) (stating that the presumption of reasonable fear does not apply when “[t]he person
against whom the defensive force is used is a law enforcement ocer . . . who enters or attempts to
enter . . . in the lawful performance of his or her ocial duties, and the ocer . . . identied himself or
herself in accordance with any applicable law”). See also Carly Amendola, Cops, Not Robbers: e Clash
Between No-Knock Warrants and the Castle Doctrine, C L. O, Jan. 2, 2021, ht tp://
campbelllawobserver.com/cops-not-robbers-the-clash-between-no-knock-warrants-and-the-castle-
doctrine/ (“One does not need to be a legal expert to understand that there is a dangerous overlap
between no-knock warrants and the castle doctrine. Since the proliferation of no-knock warrants in the
1980s countless civilians and law enforcement ocers have been killed carrying out no-knock warrants.”).
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e interests that support the knock-and-announce requirement are not absolute. e Court
stated in Wilson that an ocer might not be required to knock and announce, for example,
“under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence,” or “where police ocers have
reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given.”
15
In Richards v. Wisconsin,
16
the Court found it “indisputable” that drug investigations will
frequently involve both of those factors, though it rejected the idea that ocers are categorically
excused from knocking and announcing in drug cases. e Court noted that knocking and
announcing may be necessary even in a drug case where the only people present are not suspects
or when the nature of the drugs would not allow for quick disposal.
e Richards Court provided what is still the most succinct encapsulation of the
constitutional standard for no-knock entries:
In order to justify a “no-knock” entry, the police must have a reasonable
suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular
circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the eective
investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.
17
Two points are worth highlighting about Richards. First, the Court indicated that reasonable
suspicion, rather than probable cause, is the quantum of evidence necessary to establish an
exception to the knock-and-announce requirement.
18
Second, the potential justications for
no-knock entry are stated in the disjunctive: an ocer need not knock and announce if doing so
would be dangerous or futile or would allow the destruction of evidence.
Richards is also signicant because it highlighted the distinction between a no-knock warrant
and a no-knock entry. e ocer who obtained the warrant in that case asked the issuing
magistrate for a no-knock warrant. e magistrate issued a standard search warrant, deleting
the no-knock language from the warrant before signing it. e ocers who executed the warrant
nonetheless made a no-knock entry, and the Supreme Court said that was permissible, as the
magistrate’s determination “does not alter the reasonableness of the ocers’ decision, which
must be evaluated as of the time they entered the motel room.”
19
In a footnote, the Court stated:
“e practice of allowing magistrates to issue no-knock warrants seems entirely reasonable
when sucient cause to do so can be demonstrated ahead of time. But, as the facts of this case
demonstrate, a magistrate’s decision not to authorize a no-knock entry should not be interpreted
to remove the ocers’ authority to exercise independent judgment concerning the wisdom of a
no-knock entry at the time the warrant is being executed.”
20
When ocers do knock and announce, they may force entry if the occupants do not answer
the door suciently quickly. However, the Supreme Court has not established a xed amount
of time that ocers must wait after knocking and announcing before they may force entry. In
United States v. Banks,
21
the Court found a fteen-to-twenty-second wait sucient given that
15. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936.
16. 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
17. Id. at 394.
18. Id. at 395 (footnote omitted) (concluding that ocers could dispense with knocking and
announcing because they “had a reasonable suspicion that [an occupant] might destroy evidence if given
further opportunity to do so”).
19. Id. at 395.
20. Id. at 396 n.7.
21. 540 U.S. 31 (2003).
The Law and Practice of No-Knock Search Warrants in North Carolina 5
© 2023. School of Government. e University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
the investigation concerned illegal drugs that could quickly be ushed down a toilet or otherwise
destroyed. e defendant argued that was not enough time for him to get to the front door, but
the Court responded that “when circumstances are exigent because a pusher may be near the
point of putting his drugs beyond reach, it is imminent disposal, not travel time to the entrance,
that governs when the police may reasonably enter.”
22
When ocers enter without knocking and announcing (or after knocking and announcing,
if not promptly admitted by an occupant), they may damage the property to do so. e Court
stated in United States v. Ramirez that the lawfulness of a no-knock entry does not “depend[]
on whether property is damaged in the course of the entry.”
23
In Ramirez, ocers broke a
window, though it is more common for ocers to break doors. Either may be permissible,
though gratuitous or excessive property damage may run afoul of the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness requirement.
24
In Hudson v. Michigan,
25
the Court ruled that a failure to knock and announce does not
require the suppression of evidence seized in the ensuing search. It reasoned that “[t]he interests
protected by the knock-and-announce requirement . . . do not include the shielding of potential
evidence from the government’s eyes,” so a violation of the rule should not result in the exclusion
of evidence.
26
And it found that the cost of suppressing important evidence was not justied by
the need to deter misconduct, given the deterrence potential of civil suits against police.
27
Federal statutory law codies the knock-and-announce requirement. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3109,
an “ocer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house,
or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose,
he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the
execution of the warrant.” e Supreme Court of the United States has held that this statute
incorporates the common law exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule discussed above.
28
Because this ruling leaves little daylight between the statutory and constitutional analyses, and
because the statutory provision may apply only to federal investigations,
29
further discussion of
this provision is beyond the scope of this bulletin.
22. Id. at 40.
23. 523 U.S. 65, 70 (1998).
24. Id. at 71 (“Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate
the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search are not subject
to suppression.”).
25. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
26. Id. at 593.
27. Id. at 595–98.
28. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 73 (stating that the statute “codies the common law in this area, and the
common law in turn informs the Fourth Amendment”).
29. A majority of federal courts have held that 18 U.S.C. § 3109 does not apply to state ocers. See
United States v. Gatewood, 60 F.3d 248, 249 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that the statute “regulates only federal
ocers”); United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 847–48 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding, along with “the majority
of federal courts,” that the statute does not apply to state ocers in the course of state investigations);
United States v. Moore, 91 F.3d 96, 98 (10th Cir. 1996) (opining that the statute “does not directly apply to
state actors,” though it may be a guide to the constitutional analysis); United States v. Jones, 133 F.3d 358,
361 (5th Cir. 1998) (“e federal ‘knock and announce’ rule codied at 18 U.S.C. § 3109 does not apply,
because the search of Jones’ apartment was conducted by state ocers.”). e Fourth Circuit has said
that the statute “governs” searches by federal ocers and “provides the proper framework” for analyzing
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B. North Carolina Law
Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibits general warrants as
“dangerous to liberty.” e state constitution does not mention probable cause and does not
expressly include a reasonableness requirement. e texts of the state and federal constitutions
therefore dier signicantly. Even if they did not, they could be interpreted dierently: North
Carolina’s state courts are “not bound by opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States
construing even identical provisions in the Constitution of the United States.”
30
Nonetheless, as a general matter, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that the
state constitution “provides the same protection against unreasonable searches and seizures”
as the federal Constitution does.
31
Our appellate courts therefore give Supreme Court opinions
concerning the Fourth Amendment “great weight”
32
when interpreting the state constitution,
and only rarely have North Carolina’s appellate courts diverged from the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment rulings.
33
Some opinions have gone so far as to say that “there is no variance
between the search and seizure law of North Carolina and the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States.”
34
erefore, it is unlikely
that Article I, Section 20 constrains no-knock warrants more than the Fourth Amendment does.
State statutory law codies the knock-and-announce requirement, providing that an
ocer executing a search warrant must, before entering the premises, give
appropriate notice of his identity and purpose to the person to be searched, or
the person in apparent control of the premises to be searched. If it is unclear
whether anyone is present at the premises to be searched, he must give the notice
in a manner likely to be heard by anyone who is present.
35
searches by state ocers given that it encompasses the constitutional requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. United States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 882 (4th Cir. 1994).
30. State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 642 (1984).
31. State v. Elder, 368 N.C. 70, 73 (2015). See also State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 659 (2005) (reciting
that the state constitution provides protection “similar” to the Fourth Amendment).
32. Campbell, 359 N.C. at 642. See also State v. McLendon, 350 N.C. 630, 635 (1999) (nding the
Supreme Court’s reasoning “compelling”).
33. e most notable example of divergence is State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709 (1988), where the Supreme
Court of North Carolina declined to follow the Supreme Court of the United States in nding an
exception to the exclusionary rule for searches conducted in good-faith reliance on a search warrant.
Interestingly, just four years later, in State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491 (1992), the court said that “there is
nothing to indicate anywhere in the text of Article I, Section 20 any enlargement or expansion of rights
beyond those aorded in the Fourth Amendment” and that the state constitution “should not be viewed
as a vehicle for any inventive expansion of our law” beyond what the Fourth Amendment provides. Id. at
506.
34. State v. Hendricks, 43 N.C. App. 245, 251–52 (1979). Notably, Hendricks was decided before Carter.
35. G.S. 15A-249.
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State statutory law also contains exceptions to the requirement. Importantly, these are
narrower than the exceptions in the Fourth Amendment case law. Under G.S. 15A-251:
An ocer may break and enter any premises or vehicle when necessary to the
execution of the warrant if:
(1) e ocer has previously announced his identity and purpose as required by
G.S. 15A-249 and reasonably believes either that admittance is being denied or
unreasonably delayed or that the premises or vehicle is unoccupied; or
(2) e ocer has probable cause to believe that the giving of notice would
endanger the life or safety of any person.
As discussed above, the risk of destruction of evidence can render an unannounced entry
“reasonable” for Fourth Amendment purposes. But it cannot support an unannounced entry
under G.S. 15A-251(2)—only a danger to a person’s life or safety may do so. Courts have
considered the potential for destruction of evidence when determining whether entry has been
unreasonably delayed under G.S. 15A-251(1), but that subsection only allows entry after the
ocer has knocked and announced.
Another dierence between the requirements of Fourth Amendment law and those imposed
by state statute concerns the risk of injury to any person. Under the statute, an ocer must
have probable cause to believe that knocking and announcing would endanger a person, while
the Fourth Amendment requires only reasonable suspicion to dispense with the knock-and-
announce requirement.
Although this bulletin focuses on search warrants, it is worth mentioning that the knock-and-
announce requirement also applies by statute when an ocer enters a premises to execute an
arrest warrant, subject to exceptions similar to those for search warrants.
36
State case law has addressed several common issues regarding the knock-and-announce
requirement as it pertains to search warrants. For example, actually knocking on the door is not
always required. e essence of the knock-and-announce requirement is making the occupants
aware of the ocers’ presence and purpose, and the relevant state statute requires only that an
ocer “give appropriate notice of his identity and purpose.”
37
us, if a door is standing open, an
ocer may announce his or her presence without knocking on the door.
38
Likewise, when ocers
set o a “distraction device” and shouted “Sheri’s Department, search warrant,” they “certainly
had announced their presence and purpose” even though they did not knock on the door.
39
36. See G.S. 15A-401(e) (providing that an ocer may enter private premises by force to eect an arrest
with a warrant only if “[t]he ocer has given, or made reasonable eort to give, notice of his authority and
purpose” and reasonably believes that admittance is being denied or unreasonably delayed, or if there is
“reasonable cause to believe that the giving of such notice would present a clear danger to human life.”
No appellate case explores the signicance, if any, of the use of “probable cause” in G.S. 15A-251(2) but
“reasonable cause” in G.S. 15A-401(e)(2).
37. G.S. 15A-249.
38. State v. Rudisill, 20 N.C. App. 313, 315 (1973) (an ocer executing a search warrant entered
through an open door and announced his presence; the existence of the “open door obviated the demand
for admittance by rst knocking,” as knocking would have been a “vain act” and the announcement alone
provided proper notice to the occupants).
39. State v. Pelham, 164 N.C. App. 70, 82 (2004).
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e most frequently litigated issue in the state appellate cases is how long ocers must wait
after knocking and announcing before forcing entry. e standard of unreasonable delay in
G.S. 15A-251(1) is a exible one: “e amount of time required to be given between notice and
entry must depend on the particular circumstances.”
40
e relevant circumstances include those
behind the knock-and-announce rule itself, such as whether the occupants have had sucient
time to gather themselves, prepare to receive visitors, and answer the door. Other pertinent
factors may include the size of the residence (it takes longer to get to the door of a large home
than a hotel room); the time of day or night (if the occupants are likely sleeping, they may need
more time to rouse themselves and admit the ocers); and perhaps the age and mobility of the
occupants. Evidence that the occupants are moving around without answering the door may also
be relevant, especially if they are moving quickly or seem to be concerned by the presence of law
enforcement. After considering all the facts and circumstances, reviewing courts have repeatedly
approved of ocers forcing entry after short waits, sometimes just a few seconds.
e precise reasoning on which courts have upheld these entries varies. In some cases, courts
have simply ruled that the ocers waited long enough to comply with the knock-and-announce
requirement.
41
In other cases, courts have concluded that the occupants unreasonably delayed
entry under G.S. 15A-251(1). As noted above, although destruction of evidence is not expressly
mentioned in G.S. 15A-251(1), courts have frequently considered the risk of destruction of
evidence in determining whether entry has been unreasonably delayed.
42
40. State v. Gaines, 33 N.C. App. 66, 70 (1977) (nothing improper about ocer’s entry shortly after
announcing where no one objected and door was standing open).
41. In State v. Terry, 207 N.C. App. 311 (2010), the court found that the ocer complied with the
knock-and-announce requirement despite the short time between announcement and entry. e court
did not directly address the exceptions in G.S. 15A-251, stating simply that “the knock and announce
procedure was properly executed.” Id. at 319. Its reasoning nonetheless factored in the risk of destruction
of evidence, stating that “[s]ince [marijuana, the target of the search warrant] was a drug that could be
easily and quickly disposed of, we hold that the brief delay between notice and entry was reasonable
in this case.” Id. See also State v. Bareld, 23 N.C. App. 619, 622 (1974) (in a case that arose before G.S.
Chapter 15A was enacted, the court ruled that a delay of ninety seconds to two minutes before forced
entry was sucient, stating that “[t]he ocers did knock, announce their identity, state the source of their
authority, request admission, and then wait a reasonable length of time before entering the house”).
42. For example, State v. Marshall, 94 N.C. App. 20 (1989), is a drug case where the court considered
a delay of just “a couple of seconds” after announcement. Citing only to G.S. 15A-251(1), the court found
that the ocers had “reason to believe that admittance was being denied or unreasonably delayed”
because after announcement they heard people running and the word “police” inside the residence. Id.
at 30. Similarly, in State v. Vick, 130 N.C. App. 207 (1998), the court approved of ocers forcing entry
to execute a search warrant for drugs ten to fteen seconds after knocking and announcing. e court
reasoned that entry was being unreasonably delayed under G.S. 15A-251(1), given the afternoon hour and
the destructibility of drug evidence.
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In several cases, courts have found probable cause that a longer delay would have endangered
the ocers or others, and thus that entry was supported by G.S. 15A-251(2).
43
And courts have
often mentioned the concept of exigent circumstances, especially as it pertains to the risk of
destruction of evidence—a concept that might support immediate entry, almost without regard
to the existence of the warrant.
44
Another issue that the appellate courts have discussed is the remedy for a violation of the
knock-and-announce rule. Some older cases concluded that the suppression of evidence was
a proper remedy,
45
while others found that relatively minor violations of the rule—such as
announcing an ocer’s presence, but not his or her purpose—were not grave enough to require
suppression.
46
After the Supreme Court of the United States ruled categorically in 2006 that
knock-and-announce violations do not require suppression as a matter of federal constitutional
law,
47
however, the North Carolina Court of Appeals quickly followed suit as a matter of state
statutory law. In State v. White,
48
ocers knocked and announced, “may” have waited about ve
seconds, then broke down the defendant’s door. ere was no evidence of any factor requiring a
rapid forcible entry, and the parties agreed that this was a substantial violation of G.S. 15A-251.
Still, the State argued, and the appellate court agreed, that suppression of evidence found in the
search was not appropriate, as the evidence was not found “as a result” of the unlawful entry as
required by G.S. 15A-974. e court noted that “the cocaine would have likely been located even
in the absence of the forced entry.”
49
43. An example of this type of case is State v. Lyons, 340 N.C. 646 (1995), a drug case in which an
informant reported that the suspect had a “nasty attitude,” was “mean,” and might have a rearm in his
apartment. e court ruled that ocers were justied in entering the home by force after a minimal
announcement as they had “probable cause to believe that the giving of notice would endanger the life or
safety of any person” as required by G.S. 15A-251(2). Id. at 673 (quoting statutory language).
44. An often-cited case in this area is State v. Knight, 340 N.C. 531 (1995), where ocers investigating
a murder obtained a search warrant for the suspect’s house. e ocers believed that the suspect might
be armed and could potentially take others in the home hostage. ey knocked and announced at 4:00
a.m., and after waiting thirty to sixty seconds, forced their way in. e reviewing court found that
this was proper, invoking both the “exigent circumstances” that justied the entry and also citing G.S.
15A-251(2). See also State v. Reid, 151 N.C. App. 420, 426 (2002) (ocers executing a search warrant for
drugs knocked and announced, waited six to eight seconds, then forced entry; this did not violate the
defendant’s constitutional or statutory rights; the court cited G.S. 15A-251(1) and also stated that “exigent
circumstances may be found to exist where police are executing a search warrant for narcotics which may
be easily disposed of prior to being discovered”).
45. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 35 N.C. App. 634 (1978) (nding a substantial violation of the
knock-and-announce rule and suppressing evidence under G.S. 15A-974 in a drug case; ocers created
a distraction outside the suspect’s house, then entered, in plain clothes and without knocking or
announcing, while the suspect was outside looking at the distraction).
46. See State v. Willis, 58 N.C. App. 617, 622 (1982) (where “the police ocer, at best, announced his
identity as he entered the front door” but did not state his purpose, the violation of the knock-and-announce
rule was not so substantial as to require suppression). See also State v. Sumpter, 150 N.C. App. 431, 434
(2002) (an ocer executing a search warrant for drugs “announced his presence and purpose simultaneously
with the opening of the door and entry into the dwelling”; this violated the knock-and-announce
requirement, but under the circumstances—including that the door was unlocked and that the ocer was
looking for readily destructible items—the violation was not substantial enough to require suppression).
47. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
48. 184 N.C. App. 519 (2007).
49. Id. at 525.
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e lack of a suppression remedy appears to have reduced litigation over the knock-and-
announce rule and its exceptions. ere are very few North Carolina appellate cases on this issue
after 2007.
50
is may be because there is little incentive for criminal defendants to raise the
issue in the trial courts or on appeal. Of course, alleged violations of the knock-and-announce
rule may form the basis for civil lawsuits, but the volume of civil suits is small compared to the
number of criminal appeals.
C. Is There Legal Authority to Issue No-Knock Warrants in North Carolina?
North Carolina’s appellate courts have never directly addressed whether judicial ocials have
the authority to issue no-knock warrants. In some states, the answer to that question is obvious
because there are statutes authorizing judicial ocials to issue such warrants under certain
circumstances. For example, a New York statute provides that a search warrant application
may contain a “request that the search warrant authorize the executing police ocer to enter
premises to be searched without giving notice of his authority and purpose” if knocking and
announcing would risk the destruction of evidence or create a danger to any person.
51
In
Arizona, “[o]n a reasonable showing that an announced entry to execute the warrant would
endanger the safety of any person or would result in the destruction of any of the items described
in the warrant, the magistrate shall authorize an unannounced entry.”
52
By contrast, some states have statutes that eectively prohibit the issuance of no-knock
warrants. For example, Virginia recently amended its search warrant statute to provide:
No law-enforcement ocer shall seek, execute, or participate in the execution of
a no-knock search warrant. A search warrant for any place of abode authorized
under this section shall require that a law-enforcement ocer be recognizable
and identiable as a uniformed law-enforcement ocer and provide audible
notice of his authority and purpose reasonably designed to be heard by the
occupants of such place to be searched prior to the execution of such search
warrant.
53
North Carolina is not in either of these camps. e search warrant statutes in North Carolina
are silent about whether judicial ocials may issue no-knock search warrants.
54
As noted
above, the search warrant statutes generally require that an ocer “give appropriate notice of
50. One exception is State v. Winchester, 260 N.C. App. 418, 426 (2018) (nding no violation
of the statute where ocers knocked, announced, and then entered the defendant’s vacant home,
notwithstanding the defendant’s contention that “ocers deliberately waited until [he] vacated the
premises before breaking open the door”).
51. N.Y. C. P. L § 690.35(4)(b).
52. A. R. S. § 13-3915(B).
53. V. C § 19.2-56B.
54. e issue is addressed obliquely in the ocial commentary to the search warrant statutes, which
provides: “Section 15A-249 and G.S. 15A-251 deal with an issue to which the most serious and close
attention was given: whether search warrants may be executed without giving notice of the ocer’s
identity and purpose. Section 15A-249 simply states the general rule: An ocer executing a search
warrant must, before entering the premises, give notice of his identity and purpose. e only exception
is contained in G.S. 15A-251(2). ere was general agreement that an ocer should have the authority
to execute a warrant without notice and with the use of force whenever he had probable cause, either at
the time of applying for or at the time of executing the warrant, to believe that notice would endanger
the life or safety of any person.” G.S. Ch. 15A, Art. 11, Ocial Commentary. e reference to “probable
The Law and Practice of No-Knock Search Warrants in North Carolina 11
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his identity and purpose”
55
before entering but also allow an ocer to enter without notice if
the ocer has probable cause to believe that knocking and announcing would endanger any
person.
56
In other words, it is clear that ocers have the authority to make a no-knock entry
under certain circumstances. But the statutes that directly address the role of a judicial ocial in
issuing a warrant and the required contents of a warrant do not speak at all to a court’s authority
to waive the knock-and-announce requirement in advance.
57
One could argue that a judicial ocial authorized to issue a search warrant has the inherent
authority to address related matters, such as the manner of execution, when necessary to the
administration of justice. For example, it is common practice, though without specic appellate
authority in North Carolina, for ocers seeking search warrants for meth labs to ask the issuing
ocial to authorize in advance the destruction of hazardous chemicals found during execution.
58
And North Carolina’s appellate courts have upheld several types of investigative orders not
specically permitted by statute, including investigative orders for records
59
and anticipatory
search warrants.
60
On the other hand, inherent authority generally is available “to ll in gaps not addressed
by the statutes or rules . . . [but] does not empower a court to override legislative decisions.”
61
One could argue that the absence of any reference to no-knock warrants in the statutes was an
intentional decision by the General Assembly to deny no-knock authority to judicial ocials,
especially given that G.S. 15A-251(2) appears to assign to the executing ocer the decision
whether knocking and announcing creates a risk to any person.
ere is no appellate case in North Carolina adopting one or the other of the above
arguments. Courts in other states are split on the issue.
62
Until there is a North Carolina case on
point, the authority of North Carolina judicial ocials to issue no-knock warrants is uncertain.
cause . . . at the time of applying for . . . the warrant” could be read as supporting the issuance of no-knock
warrants, but the fact that no procedure for seeking such warrants was included in the statutes makes any
inference a weak one.
55. G.S. 15A-249.
56. G.S. 15A-251(2).
57. See G.S. 15A-245, -246.
58. For a discussion of some of the legal issues involved in these warrants, see Je Welty, Search
Warrants for Meth Labs, N.C. C. L.: A UNC S. G’ B (Feb. 6, 2014), ht tps://nccriminallaw.
sog.unc.edu/search-warrants-for-meth-labs/.
59. See, e.g., In re Super. Ct. Order Dated Apr. 8, 1983, 315 N.C. 378, 380 (1986) (holding that a superior
court judge may issue investigative orders compelling the production of records to a district attorney
when “the interests of justice so require,” despite the lack of statutory authorization for such an order).
60. See State v. Smith, 124 N.C. App. 565, 571 (1996) (nding no “real issue” regarding whether an
anticipatory warrant may issue given the lack of any constitutional impediment and the provision in G.S.
15A-231 that “[c]onstitutionally permissible searches and seizures which are not regulated by the General
Statutes of North Carolina are not prohibited”).
61. Michael Crowell, Inherent Authority, N.C. S C J’ B 1 (Jan. 2015),
https://benchbook.sog.unc.edu/general/inherent-authority.
62. A leading treatise states that “[t]he prevailing but not unanimous view is that a magistrate may not
issue a so-called no-knock search warrant in the absence of [an express] statutory provision.” W
R. LF , 2 S S § 4.8(g) (6th ed. 2020). Cases nding no inherent authority to issue
no-knock warrants include State v. Bamber, 630 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 1994) (nding no statutory
authority for issuance and stating that no-knock warrants are “limited largely to those states that have
enacted statutory provisions authorizing their issuance”; stating further that conditions may change
and are best assessed at the time of entry, not the time of issuance), and Davis v. State, 859 A.2d 1112,
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II. The Prevalence and Practice of No-Knock Warrants in North Carolina
Whether or not North Carolina judicial ocials properly may issue no-knock warrants, court
ocials sometimes do issue them. is section of this bulletin provides information about the
prevalence and practice concerning no-knock warrants in North Carolina.
e information presented here is necessarily incomplete. North Carolina, like most but
not all states, does not track the issuance of no-knock warrants.
63
e author’s eorts to
understand the prevalence and practice of no-knock warrants included reviewing hundreds of
search warrants obtained by dozens of law enforcement agencies in clerks’ oces across the
state;
64
searching the appellate records of cases in which court opinions referenced no-knock
warrants; tracking down no-knock warrants mentioned in media articles; asking for examples of
no-knock warrants from law enforcement agency attorneys and from criminal defense lawyers;
1121, 1124, 1132 (Md. 2004) (noting that “Maryland does not statutorily authorize its judicial ocers to
issue ‘no-knock’ warrants”; collecting cases and stating that “[t]here is a split of authority among states
that do not have ‘no-knock’ warrant statutes as to whether judicial ocers may, nevertheless, authorize
‘no-knock’ entries when they issue a search and seizure warrant”; and “com[ing] out on the side of those
courts that, in the absence of valid statutory authority, refuse to authorize a judicial ocer to make
an advance determination of exigency,” instead leaving the decision to the ocer on scene). Courts
allowing the issuance of no-knock warrants despite a lack of clear statutory authorization include State
v.Henderson, 629 N.W.2d 613, 622 (Wis. 2001) (citing State v. Cleveland, 348 N.W.2d 512 (Wis. 1984))
(the court stated that “[i]n Wisconsin, judicial ocers are authorized to issue no-knock warrants,” despite
the lack of statutory authorization, and indicated that both citizens and ocers may benet from judicial
review of the need for entry without notice; the court also noted that judicial approval is not required
and that ocers always may enter without notice if circumstances support doing so), and State v. Smith,
467 S.E.2d 221, 222 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Jones v. State, 193 S.E.2d 38 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972)) (stating
that “[a] search warrant with a no-knock provision may be issued where the facts set out in the adavit
demonstrate exigent circumstances”).
63. Chapter 626, Section 14(4) of the Minnesota Statutes now requires agencies that obtain
no-knock warrants to report them to the commissioner of public safety. About ve months after the
law took eect, local media reported that seventy no-knock warrants had been obtained statewide,
forty-nine of which were executed as no-knocks. Only 23 percent of the warrants were obtained in
drug investigations, and about three-fourths targeted Black suspects. See Hannah Flood, BCA: 70
"No-Knock" Search Warrants Issued Since September, FOX 9 (Feb. 9, 2022), https://www.fox9.com/news/
bca-82-of-search-warrants-executed-since-september-were-no-knock.
64. e author reviewed 279 search warrants, sought by 38 dierent agencies, at 6 clerks’ oces
across the state, focusing mainly on search warrants for residences because those are the most likely
to be no-knock warrants. None of the warrants contained no-knock language. In order to review a
large number of warrants eciently, the author focused on warrants in the alphabetical le of returned
warrants, not yet associated with a criminal case. See N.C. Admin. O. of the Cts., Rules of Recordkeeping,
Rule 9.4 (“When the original warrant or order is returned to the clerk, it shall be led in the folder of
the case to which it pertains. Where there is no related pending case, the original warrant or order shall
be led alphabetically in a le section designated for these documents.”). Most of the warrants were
issued in connection with investigations concerning drug oenses or violent crimes. ese are the types
of investigations in which no-knock authority is most likely to be sought. However, no-knock language
may be more common in search warrants located in criminal case les than in warrants located in
the alphabetical le. No-knock warrants are often sought when a suspect is believed to be present at a
residence, in which case, an arrest and criminal charges may often follow immediately upon execution of
the warrant, resulting in the warrant being placed immediately in a criminal case le. is is one of many
reasons why the sample of warrants reviewed by the author is not necessarily scientic or representative.
The Law and Practice of No-Knock Search Warrants in North Carolina 13
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and consulting with law enforcement agencies about their use of no-knock warrants. is
procedure resulted in the collection of a signicant amount of information, but it is necessarily
impressionistic and may not reect practices in all parts of the state.
A. Prevalence of No-Knock Warrants
No-knock warrants appear to be very rare in North Carolina. None of the 279 warrants the
author reviewed in spot checks of clerks’ oces across the state were no-knock warrants—even
though the author focused mostly on search warrants for residences in cases involving drugs or
violent crimes, which are the types of cases in which no-knock warrants are most likely to be
sought.
A search of appellate court opinions found just three references to no-knock warrants.
65
Consultations with agencies revealed no agencies that seek no-knock warrants routinely,
though several agencies indicated that they did so occasionally, and some produced examples
of no-knock warrants.
66
Of course, police practices change over time and the recent focus on
no-knock warrants may have led agencies to seek such warrants less frequently. But the author is
aware of no evidence that the practice has ever been prevalent in North Carolina.
A variety of judicial ocials issued the no-knock warrants identied by the author, including
magistrates, superior court judges, and at least one district court judge. at is consistent with
the pattern for search warrants more broadly, where magistrates appear to issue the majority of
warrants, with superior court judges fairly close behind, district court judges next, and clerks
only rarely issuing warrants.
67
B. Justications in No-Knock Applications
Every no-knock warrant the author located was issued in connection with a drug investigation.
Approximately half of all search warrants are issued in drug investigations, and drug cases often
involve a risk of destruction of evidence and the potential presence of weapons.
68
It is therefore
not surprising that many no-knock warrants are issued in such cases.
65. See State v. Daye, 253 N.C. App. 408 (2017) (unpublished) (drug case from Iredell County; issues
on appeal did not relate to the no-knock authorization, which was based on “the extensive weapons
charges on [the target]”); State v. McLean, 245 N.C. App. 131 (2016) (unpublished) (drug case from
Lincoln County; issues on appeal did not relate to the no-knock authorization, which was based on the
target’s criminal history and the possible presence of rearms); State v. Holmes, 195 N.C. App. 598 (2009)
(unpublished) (gun possession and drug case from Brunswick County; issues on appeal did not relate to
the no-knock authorization, which was based on the target’s criminal history and known possession of
rearms).
66. Agency policies regarding no-knock warrants are discussed below at notes 102–10 and
accompanying text.
67. e order in this list is based on the author’s review of warrants as well as discussions with judicial
ocials and attorneys for law enforcement agencies.
68. See, e.g., State v. Tripp, 381 N.C. 617, 633 (2022) (“Firearms are tools of the trade for individuals
involved in the illegal distribution of drugs.”); State v. Smith, 99 N.C. App. 67, 72 (1990) (“As a practical
matter, rearms are frequently involved for protection in the illegal drug trade.”).
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e specic justications provided for no-knock entry most often referenced the criminal
record of the suspect and the likely presence of rearms. For example, the application in one case
contained the following:
Aant, taking into consideration the past criminal history and numerous felony
convictions of Adolph Holmes and the recent knowledge of him possessing
rearms for security of his cocaine, requests that the court issue a NO KNOCK
AND ANNOUNCE SEARCH WARRANT based on his past history of violence
toward Law Enforcement Ocers.
Similarly, in another case the adavit stated:
Based on the criminal history of the target in this investigation, Adrian Bernard
McLean, the possibility of rearms readily available in the residence and the
possibility of injury to the ocer[s] executing this search warrant this applicant
requests the court authorize a No-Knock search warrant . . .
As the samples above reect, the justications for no-knock entry were typically a few
sentences long. Fewer than half of the adavits specically referenced the probable cause
standard of G.S. 15A-251(2), but most expressly identied ocer safety as the concern animating
the request for no-knock authority. Very few identied threats to civilians as a factor. One
application emphasized the suspect’s aliation with a violent street gang as part of the basis for
the request.
C. Documentation of Permission for No-Knock Entry
In each of the cases examined by the author, the adavit by the applicant requested no-knock
authority and a judicial ocial issued a warrant based on the application. However, none of the
warrants contained an express judicial nding that no-knock entry was justied, nor did any of
the warrants expressly authorize no-knock entry. In each instance, the judicial ocial simply
signed Side One of AOC-CR-119, the search warrant form promulgated by the North Carolina
Administrative Oce of the Courts.
69
e ocial’s signature is axed beneath a block of text
that provides in part:
I, the undersigned, nd that there is probable cause to believe that the property
and person described in the application on the reverse side and related to the
commission of a crime is located as described in the application.
You are commanded to search the premises, vehicle, person and other place
or item described in the application for the property and person in question. If
the property and/or person are found, make the seizure and keep the property
subject to Court Order and process the person according to law.
You are directed to execute this Search Warrant within forty-eight (48) hours
from the time indicated on this Warrant and make due return to the Clerk of the
Issuing Court.
69. A current version of the form is available at https://www.nccourts.gov/documents/forms/
search-warrant/search-warrant.
The Law and Practice of No-Knock Search Warrants in North Carolina 15
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e judicial ocial’s signature represents a nding of probable cause and an order to carry
out a search of the place described in the application within forty-eight hours of issuance. e
pre-printed text contains no nding regarding danger to any person and no order authorizing
unannounced entry. Absent any handwritten notation on those points, it is at least an open
question whether the warrants in these cases actually provided judicial imprimatur for no-knock
entry.
If an issuing ocial concludes that he or she is authorized to issue a no-knock warrant, a
better practice may be for the issuing ocial to make ndings supporting the need for no-knock
entry and to grant such authority expressly. As shown in Figure 1, there is a small amount of
space on the AOC-CR-119 where that could be written in. Alternatively, the applicant could draft
and present to the judicial ocial an additional brief document with the appropriate ndings
and order.
70
D. Quick-Knock Entries
e scarcity of no-knock warrants may be explained in part by the prevalence of so-called
“quick-knock,” “minimal delay,” or “dynamic entry” procedures. None of these terms are
statutorily dened, but all refer to a practice in which ocers announce their presence and
immediately force entry, moving quickly to overwhelm occupants before anyone who is inclined
to resist is able to do so. One law professor and former police ocer describes the practice as
follows:
[A] no-knock or quick-knock raid is designed to ensure that the occupant
is caught o guard, is unclear about what is happening, and is generally too
disoriented to react in a considered way. Ideally, ocers establish control of the
scene so quickly that, by the time the suspect has overcome his confusion, he has
no opportunity to resist.
71
70. At least one agency routinely does this when seeking authorization for a quick-knock entry. See
email correspondence from Ronnie Mitchell, Attorney for the Cumberland County Sheri’s Oce, to
author (Apr. 28, 2022) (on le with author) (explaining the process and attaching a sample document).
71. Motion by Seth Stoughton for Leave to File a Brief as Amicus Curiae, and Amicus Curiae Brief
Supporting Petitioner, Kane v. Lewis, 577 U.S. 947 (2015) (No. 15-193), 2015 WL 5451031.
Figure 1. Space on AOC-CR-119 That Could Be Used to Document Approval of No-Knock Entry
Approval language could go here.
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For simplicity, this bulletin will use the term “quick-knock entry” to refer to this procedure.
As discussed above, there is no xed amount of time that ocers must wait after knocking and
announcing, and traditional knock-and-announce entries may themselves involve relatively
short waits for the occupants to open the door.
72
But if the entry is nearly simultaneous with
the announcement and occupants have virtually no time to answer the door or prepare for the
ocers’ arrival, the entry may be classied as a quick-knock entry.
73
For some law enforcement ocers, quick-knock entries may be seen as oering the best of
both worlds. By announcing their presence, ocers reduce the risk that they will be mistaken for
intruders and greeted with violence. Yet a rapid entry allows ocers to seize the initiative and
reduces the time occupants have to access weapons or destroy evidence. “e theory underlying
the tactic is that by entering a home quickly and with overwhelming force, law enforcement can
discourage or prevent any attempt by the occupants to arm themselves or destroy evidence.”
74
No statewide data are available on the prevalence of quick-knock entries in North Carolina.
e author’s discussions with those in the eld suggest that such entries are common—likely
the norm in some agencies. is impression is bolstered by more systematic examinations
of practices in other states. A study of seventy-three search warrants executed in Louisville,
Kentucky, found that “every entry involved using a ram to break the door down” and that
ocers “announce their presence and purpose in conjunction with the rst hit on the door.”
75
In
litigation regarding the execution of a search warrant in Topeka, Kansas, an ocer testied that
the police department’s Street Crime Action Team “developed a pattern of executing drug search
warrants as ‘dynamic entries’ by breaking the door with a battering ram without knocking.”
76
e ocer estimated that only 5 to 10 percent of warrants were executed after knocking and
announcing.
77
And a Dallas ocer testied that “we always make what we refer to as dynamic
entries . . . we do not go up and announce our presence until we are actually knocking down the
door.”
78
Whatever their prevalence, quick-knock entries do not serve all the purposes of the knock-
and-announce requirement.
79
ey may serve the rst purpose, reducing the risk that occupants
will respond to an unannounced intrusion with violence in self-defense. ey do not serve the
72. See supra notes 21–22, 41 and accompanying text.
73. e line between a quick-knock entry and a traditional knock-and-announce entry is a blurry one,
as illustrated by State v. Vick, 130 N.C. App. 207 (1998). In that case, members of a tactical team that
specialized in “dynamic entries” executed a search warrant at a drug dealer’s home. A sergeant in the
tactical unit explained that in executing a search warrant, ocers “don’t want . . . for people to be able to
prepare . . . [or] arm themselves” so they are “as quiet as possible until the last second we make the entry.”
Id. at 211. In total, about ten seconds elapsed from the rst knock on the suspect’s door until the ocers
forced entry. e reviewing court found that this was sucient given the destructibility of evidence and
the potential for danger to the ocers, concluding specically that “[t]he ocers’ assumption . . . that
entry was being denied or unreasonably delayed was reasonable,” thus indicating that the entry was
justied under G.S. 15A-251(2). Id. at 217.
74. Estate of Brown v. omas, 7 F. Supp. 3d 906, 916 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
75. Brian Patrick Schaefer, Knocking on the Door: Police Decision Points in Executing Search Warrants
128 (May 2015) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Louisville), https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/2095.
76. State v. Shively, 999 P.2d 259, 261 (Kan. 2000).
77. See id.
78. Wickware v. State, No. 05-95-01767-CR, 2000 WL 1195682, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2000)
(unpublished).
79. ese purposes are discussed above at notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
The Law and Practice of No-Knock Search Warrants in North Carolina 17
© 2023. School of Government. e University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
second purpose, preserving the occupants’ property, because they typically entail breaking the
door in rather than allowing the occupants to open it. And they do not serve the third purpose,
allowing occupants time to dress and prepare to receive visitors, because of the brevity of the
delay.
For these reasons, courts generally have treated quick-knock entries as noncompliant with
the knock-and-announce requirement.
80
us, as a constitutional matter, they are permissible
only when there is a legal basis for excusing that requirement, such as reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing would endanger a person or result in the destruction of evidence.
81
As
a state statutory matter, they are permissible only when there is probable cause to believe that
knocking and announcing would endanger a person or when entrance has been “unreasonably
delayed.” As discussed above, the risk of destruction of evidence may be considered in
determining whether a delay is unreasonable. But it seems dicult to justify near-simultaneous
announcement and forced entry as the result of an unreasonable delay—at that point, there has
been no delay of any kind.
e author is aware of only one agency that regularly seeks court approval before carrying
out quick-knock entries. Other agencies may choose not to do so for a variety of reasons,
including the lack of clear judicial authority to grant such approval; the statutory authorizations
in G.S. 15A-251(1) and (2); or a belief that because quick-knock entries do typically include
an announcement of ocers’ presence and purpose, they are compliant with the knock-and-
announce requirement despite the immediate forced entry.
Quick-knock entries have been the subject of several recent civil suits against law enforcement
agencies.
82
Given the current level of public interest in how search warrants are executed, and the
apparent prevalence of quick-knock entries, more litigation in this area is likely.
80. See State v. Sumpter, 150 N.C. App. 431, 434 (2002) (an ocer executing a search warrant for drugs
“announced his presence and purpose simultaneously with the opening of the door and entry into the
dwelling”; this violated the knock-and-announce requirement; but under the circumstances—including
that the door was unlocked and that the ocer was looking for readily destructible items—the violation
was not substantial enough to require suppression); State v. Willis, 58 N.C. App. 617, 622 (1982) (“the
facts show that the police ocer, at best, announced his identity as he entered the front door” and did
not state his purpose; this “violated the statutory requirements for execution of the search warrant”; but
the violation was not so substantial as to require suppression). Signicant cases outside North Carolina
include Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2014) (analyzing a “dynamic entry” as non-compliant
with the knock-and-announce rule and denying qualied immunity to ocers who killed a houseguest
while making a dynamic entry into a home based on suspected possession of personal-use amounts of
drugs); Moore v. City of Memphis, 853 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2017) (analyzing a “dynamic entry” as violating
the knock-and-announce rule but nding it justied based on the suspect’s prior threats against ocers
and other factors); and Doran v. Eckold, 409 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (similar).
81. See generally G.S. 15A-251(2). If an ocer may dispense with knocking and announcing completely,
it follows that the ocer may take the lesser step of knocking and announcing but waiting only a brief
time before entering. See generally State v. Lyons, 340 N.C. 646, 671–74, 673 (1995) (ocers announced
their presence at the same time as they hit the door with a battering ram; the reviewing court found that
the circumstances posed a risk to the ocers’ lives and that an unannounced entry was justied under
G.S. 15A-251(2); the fact that the ocers did announce their presence was immaterial as there is “nothing
in the statute to forbid an announcement of police presence and purpose when ocers also face exigent
circumstances”).
82. Cases that have resulted in published federal appellate opinions include Bellote v. Edwards, 629
F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2011) (analyzing a dynamic entry as a no-knock entry, nding it unjustied in a child
pornography case, and denying qualied immunity); Terebesi, 764 F.3d 217 (analyzing a dynamic entry
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© 2023. School of Government. e University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
III. Eorts to Prohibit or to Limit the Use of No-Knock Warrants
In recent years, ocials at all levels of government have taken action with respect to no-knock
warrants and no-knock entries. ere have been far fewer eorts to regulate quick-knock entries.
is section of this bulletin summarizes the actions that have been taken by state and local
governments across the country and notes the status of each in North Carolina.
83
A. Legislative Action
Legislatures in several states have prohibited no-knock warrants. For example, in 2020, Virginia
passed a bill providing that “[n]o law enforcement ocer shall seek, execute, or participate in the
execution of a no-knock search warrant.”
84
In 2021, Tennessee enacted legislation providing that
“[a] magistrate shall not issue a ‘no knock’ search warrant.”
85
Other states have limited the use of no-knock warrants without banning them entirely. In
Kentucky, the legislature limited no-knock warrants to investigations of violent crimes and
required ocers seeking such warrants to have supervisory approval and to consult with a
prosecutor.
86
It also required such warrants to be executed by SWAT teams or other specially
trained personnel, with body cameras or other recording equipment active.
87
Utah prohibited
the use of no-knock warrants in misdemeanor investigations and required that an ocer seek
supervisory review before applying for a no-knock warrant in a felony case.
88
e supervisor
is required to “ensure reasonable intelligence gathering eorts have been made” and “ensure a
threat assessment was completed on the person or building to be searched” before approving the
submission of an application for a no-knock warrant.
89
e North Carolina General Assembly has not enacted legislation restricting no-knock search
warrants. Several bills were introduced in the 2021 legislative session that would have limited
no-knock warrants or entries, but none passed.
90
as a no-knock entry in a case involving small quantities of drugs; nding such entry, including the use
of “ashbang” devices, unjustied; and denying qualied immunity); Moore, 853 F.3d 866 (analyzing a
dynamic entry as a no-knock entry and nding it justied in a case where the suspect had previously
cursed at and threatened to kill ocers and was believed to have a weapon); and Doran, 409 F.3d 958
(divided en banc court analyzes dynamic entry to execute a drug search warrant as a no-knock entry;
the majority nds the entry reasonable). Quick-knock executions are at issue in a current case pending
against the Raleigh Police Department. See Virginia Bridges, Federal Lawsuit Demands Raleigh Police
Change No-Knock and Quick-Knock Raid Policies, R N O, May 6, 2022, ht tps://
www.newsobserver.com/news/local/crime/article261108052.html; Maggie Brown, Lawsuit Accuses
Raleigh Police of Illegally Raiding Two Families' Homes Using No-Knock Warrant, WRAL. (Feb. 22,
2022), https://www.wral.com/lawsuit-accuses-raleigh-police-of-illegally-raiding-two-families-homes-
using-no-knock-warrant/20153669/.
83. Federal reforms have generally been limited to federal law enforcement agencies and so are beyond
the scope of this bulletin.
84. H.B. 5099, § 1.B., 161st Gen. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Va. 2020), amending V . C § 19.2-56.
85. S.B. 1380, § 5, 112th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2021), amending T. C § 40-6 -105.
86. S.B. 4, § 1, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021), adding K. R. S. § 455.180, https://apps.
legislature.ky.gov/recorddocuments/bill/21RS/sb4/bill.pdf.
87. Id.
88. H.B. 124, § 3, 2022 State Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2022), adding U C § 77-7-78.1, ht tps://
le.utah.gov/~2022/bills/static/HB0124.html.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., H.B. 532, § 6.1, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2021) (bill would have required search
warrant application to include allegations establishing safety threat before ocer would be permitted
The Law and Practice of No-Knock Search Warrants in North Carolina 19
© 2023. School of Government. e University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
B. Court System Action
Individual judicial ocials address no-knock warrants by issuing them or by declining to do
so, and by ruling on their legality after the fact in the course of suppression hearings or civil
lawsuits. In some jurisdictions, the court system has also addressed no-knock warrants and
entries administratively. For example, in South Carolina, the chief justice of the state supreme
court issued an administrative order concerning no-knock warrants expressing concern that
magistrates “do not understand the gravity of no-knock warrants,” do not understand the
requirements for issuing them, and routinely issue them “without further inquiry.”
91
e order
therefore imposed “a moratorium upon the issuance of no-knock warrants by all circuit and
summary court judges of this state.”
92
e prohibition is to “remain in eect until instruction
is provided to circuit and summary court judges statewide as to the criteria to be used to
determine whether a requested no-knock warrant should be issued.”
93
In Arizona, the chief justice of the state supreme court issued an administrative order creating
a Task Force on Issuing Search Warrants.
94
e mandate of the Task Force was to “review the
process for issuing no-knock and nighttime search warrants” and make recommendations.
e Task Force recommended a new court rule regarding no-knock warrants and nighttime
execution of warrants, plus judicial education about the new rule.
95
In North Carolina, neither the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court nor the
Administrative Oce of the Courts have publicly convened a body to study no-knock warrants,
and no system-wide guidance has been issued to court ocials. However, some judicial
education regarding no-knock warrants has been oered: a session entitled “No Knock Searches
and Arrest Entries” was presented at the superior court judges’ educational conference in June
2021.
96
to make a no-knock entry pursuant to G.S. 15A-251); S.B. 656, § 6.1, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.C. 2021) (same); H.B. 656, § 1 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2021) (bill would have prohibited
no-knock entries entirely except in hostage situations). e approach of requiring applicants to include a
justication for no-knock entry in the adavit was recommended by the North Carolina Task Force for
Racial Equity in Criminal Justice (TREC). See TREC, Report 2020, Recommendation 26, p. 42 (Dec. 2020),
https://ncdoj.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/TRECReportFinal_02262021.pdf (proposing that G.S.
15A-251(2) be amended to require that “probable cause [supporting no-knock entry] is specically listed
in the warrant”).
91. Donald W. Beatty, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of South Carolina, Order, Issuance of No-Knock
Search Warrants by Circuit and Summary Court Judges (July 10, 2020), https://www.sccourts.org/
courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=2020-07-10-01 (citing the chief justice’s administrative role
under article V, section 4 of the state constitution).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Robert Brutinel, Chief Justice, Arizona Supreme Court, Admin. Order No. 2021-34, Establishment
of a Task Force on Issuing Search Warrants (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/22/
admorder/Orders21/2021-34.pdf?ver=2021-03-10-130052-137.
95. Arizona Supreme Court, Report of the Task Force on Issuing Search Warrants to the Arizona
Judicial Council 10–13 (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/ISWReportOctober2021.pdf
(proposing a new court rule that would require an “application for an unannounced entry” to “discuss
safety factors,” including seven enumerated considerations such as the nature of the criminal activity
at issue; any history of violence among known occupants; and the presence of other persons, including
children, the elderly, and persons experiencing mental health crises).
96. Robert C. Ervin, North Carolina superior court judge, “No Knock Searches and Arrest Entries,”
presentation at the UNC School of Government’s Superior Court Judges Conference (June16,2021)
(PowerPoint slides available at https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/default/les/course_materials/
No-Knock%20Search%20Warrants_Ervin.pdf).
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© 2023. School of Government. e University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
C. Local Board Action
In some jurisdictions, local governing boards have directed law enforcement agencies to limit or
eliminate no-knock entries. In Louisville, Kentucky, where Breonna Taylor was killed, the city
council voted unanimously to prohibit no-knock entries.
97
e city council in Aurora, Colorado,
adopted a similar measure.
98
e city council in Salisbury, North Carolina, confronted the issue of no-knock warrants after
the 2016 shooting of Ferguson Claude Laurent Jr. during the execution of such a warrant.
99
e
city council sought guidance from the North Carolina Department of Justice, which advised
the council that local regulation of search warrants was preempted by the comprehensive
statutory scheme in Chapter 15A of the General Statutes.
100
at advice relied in part on a
previous advisory letter from the state Department of Justice concerning the Fayetteville City
Council’s attempt to direct the police department not to conduct certain consent searches. e
Department of Justice concluded that consent searches are allowed by G.S. 15A-221 and that
Chapter 15A represents a “complete and integrated regulatory scheme” concerning criminal
procedure that local governments may not alter.
101
Perhaps in part because of this advice from the Department of Justice, the Salisbury City
Council ultimately did not issue any direction to the police department. As far as the author is
aware, nor has any other local government board in North Carolina voted to ban or to restrict
no-knock warrants.
97. See Rebekah Reiss & eresa Waldrop, Louisville Council Passes “Breonna’s Law” Banning
No-Knock Warrants, CNN. (June 11, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/11/us/louisville-breonnas-
law-no-knock-warrants-ban/index.html (noting that the council vote was 26-0).
98. See John Aguilar, Aurora Becomes First Colorado City to Ban “No-Knock” Warrants, D
P, Oct. 19, 2020, https://www.denverpost.com/2020/10/19/aurora-police-no-knock-warrant-breonna-
taylor/ (noting that the city council voted to ban “no knock raids” in the wake of Ms. Taylor’s death).
99. See Amanda Raymond, Autopsy: Laurent Had 10 Gunshot Wounds from Execution of
No-Knock Warrant, S P, Jan. 12, 2017, https://www.salisburypost.com/2017/01/12/
autopsy-laurent-shot-10-times-execution-no-knock-warrant/.
100. Letter from Hal F. Askins, Special Deputy Attorney General, to F. Rivers Lawther, Jr., Salisbury
City Attorney (Feb. 24, 2017) (on le with author). See also City of Salisbury, N.C., Rumor Control (May 30,
2017), https://salisburync.gov/Government/Communications/Rumor-Control (stating that the Attorney
General advised the city that “a local government agency cannot restrict law enforcement tactics that are
outlined in . . . state statute.”). After the city council in Lexington, Kentucky, voted to prohibit no-knock
warrants, the Fraternal Order of Police sued, arguing in part that the ban was preempted by state law
allowing no-knock entries under certain circumstances. e suit was dismissed by the trial court. Order,
Fraternal Order of Police, Bluegrass Lodge No. 4 v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, Civil Action
No. 21-CI-01972 (entered Dec. 8, 2021) (nding that state law did not create a “comprehensive scheme”
sucient to preempt local measures concerning no-knock warrants). An appeal remains pending as of
this writing. See Kentucky Ct. App. case no. 2022-CA-0029.
101. Letter from John J. Aldridge III, Special Deputy Attorney General, to Tom Bergamine, Fayetteville
Chief of Police (Feb. 21, 2012) (on le with author).
The Law and Practice of No-Knock Search Warrants in North Carolina 21
© 2023. School of Government. e University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
D. Agency Action
Many law enforcement agencies have adopted policies limiting or prohibiting the use of
no-knock warrants. Because agency reforms are so numerous, this section focuses only on steps
taken by North Carolina agencies. Agencies in this state have considered or implemented at least
the following policies:
• Prohibiting no-knock entries. Some agencies have determined that there are no
circumstances under which no-knock warrants or entries should be used. For example, the
Buncombe County Sheri’s Oce has announced that it will not seek or execute no-knock
warrants.
102
e Raleigh Police Department has taken the same position.
103
Other agencies
likewise have formal or informal policies prohibiting no-knock entries.
104
• Limiting no-knock warrants to narrow circumstances. Some agencies have determined
that no-knock warrants should be obtained, or no-knock entries made, only under narrow
circumstances. For example, the Asheville Police Department policy is that it will “not seek
or serve ‘no-knock’ search warrants unless circumstances exist that would compromise the
safety of the ocer(s) or another individual,” such as in a hostage situation.
105
is is in line
with G.S. 15A-251(2) but is more restrictive than federal constitutional law allows, as it does
not permit no-knock entry to prevent the destruction of evidence.
106
• Requiring supervisory review. Some agencies require supervisory or legal review of some
or all search warrant applications. For example, the Burlington Police Department policy
provides that “No ocer should apply for or execute a ‘No Knock’ search warrant, without
the permission of the Chief of Police or his designee.”
107
e Salisbury Police Department
102. Andrew Jones, Update: Buncombe Sheri Candidates Speak on Miller’s New Ban on No-Knock
Warrants, A C T, Apr. 26, 2022, https://www.citizen-times.com/story/
news/2022/04/26/buncombe-county-sheri-bans-no-knock-warrants/7451502001/.
103. Joe Fisher, RPD Says ey Don't Use No-Knock Warrants Amid Criticism from Civil Rights Groups,
WRAL. (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.wral.com/rpd-says-they-don-t-use-no-knock-warrants-amid-
criticism-from-civil-rights-groups/20155737/ (quoting police chief’s statement that “As far as I am
concerned and where I stand, that will be the position of this organization, that we do not seek or utilize
no-knock warrants”).
104. See, e.g., C-M P D’, I D G, Directive
500-004-D, “Search Warrants,” § IV.C.3.a (eective Sept. 15, 2022), https://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/
Documents/Resources/CMPDDirectives.pdf (“CMPD will not seek or serve ‘no-knock’ search warrants.”);
F P D’, P M, “Operating Procedures” ch. 4, § 4.2.2.B (eective Mar.
4, 2022), https://www.fayettevillenc.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/21665/637976242264870000
(stating that “THE EXECUTION OF NO-KNOCK WARRANTS IS PROHIBITED. UNDER NO
CIRCUMSTANCES WILL AN OFFICER ATTEMPT TO OR MAKE ENTRY INTO A PREMISE
WITHOUT GIVING NOTICE OF HIS/HER IDENTITY AND PURPOSE FOR BEING ON THE
PREMISES,” but later stating that “[i]f there is probable cause to believe that giving notice would endanger
the life or safety of any person, then forcible entry may be made without notice. Facts supporting this
belief should be included in the search warrant adavit if available at the time the adavit is drafted.”).
Additionally, several agency attorneys have advised the author that their agencies do not permit no-knock
entries.
105. Jones, supra note 102.
106. Regarding the relationship between federal constitutional law and the statute, see note 35 and
accompanying text, above.
107. B, N.C., P D’, D, p. 10, (eective Feb. 19, 2021).
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requires that all applications for no-knock warrants be reviewed by the chief of police
and another senior ocer.
108
e Raleigh Police Department requires that a supervisor be
present for the execution of all residential search warrants, no-knock or otherwise.
109
• Limiting execution to tactical personnel. Because no-knock entries are typically made
under circumstances involving danger to ocers and civilians, some agencies require that
such entries be made only by ocers with advanced tactical training, such as SWAT teams.
For example, in Greensboro, all no-knock warrants must be served by the Special Response
Tea m.
110
Conclusion
In recent years, no-knock warrants and unannounced entries have been the subject of
tremendous public interest. Yet they have not been the focus of many signicant appellate
opinions over the past decade, likely in part because both the state and federal courts have
ruled that the suppression of evidence is not the proper remedy for violations of the knock-and-
announce requirement. e lack of legal development and the variety of local practices that have
emerged over time have left ocers, agencies, courts, legislative ocials, and the public with
little current information about no-knock warrants, no-knock entries, and quick-knock entries.
e author hopes that this bulletin provides a starting point for discussion of these important
practices and is helpful to those investigating this area of the law.
108. City of Salisbury, N.C., Rumor Control (May 30, 2017), https://salisburync.gov/Government/
Communications/Rumor-Control (noting a new policy requiring “oversight and nal approval by Chief
Stokes and Major Barnes to obtain future knock and announce warrants”). See also Andrew Jones, supra
note 102 (noting that the Asheville Police department requires that applications for no-knock warrants be
approved by the chief of police or his or her designee).
109. R P D’, W D, No. 1110-08, “Searches and Seizures: Investigative
Stops and Frisks,” “Search Warrants: Searches of Residences” (eective May 17, 2022), https://
cityofraleigh0drupal.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/drupal-prod/COR23/rpd-written-directives.pdf (“A ny
ocer who intends to execute a search warrant of a residence must ensure that a police supervisor is
present.”).
110. Email from Andrea Harrell, Greensboro Police Department Attorney, to author (May 25, 2022) (on
le with author).
