Many chapters in this volume have highlighted gender dis-
parities in various markers of well-being.  ese disparities
are receding in some areas, such as education (Chapter 6),
but remain large in others, such as employment and wages
(Chapter 4), and are even widening in others such as sex ratio
at birth (Chapter 8). As discussed in other chapters, many of
these inequalities are rooted in institutional structures—such
as labour markets—which provide unequal access to men
and women. In this chapter, we focus on cultural norms
and their operation within households. Anyone who has
seen burqa-clad girls zooming around on two wheelers in
Ahmedabad, or women in ghunghat working on construc-
tion sites knows that tradition is not destiny. However, it
is also important to note that gender inequality emerges
within a context of cultural norms. Marriage and kinship
patterns provide a background against which parents are
faced with heart wrenching choices between sons and
daughters, resulting in the preferential treatment of boys.
is chapter provides empirical information regarding the
behaviours and norms that shape the narrative of womens
lives.
TRADITION AND CONTOURS OF
WOMEN’S LIVES
Marriage and kinship patterns aff ect both mens and womens
lives. As a vast number of sociological and anthropological
studies attest, marriage and kinship practices in India vary
tremendously between regions, social classes, and commu-
nities. But these myriad variations notwithstanding, some
broad patterns shape womens lives.  ese patterns are iden-
tifi ed below.
Early and Arranged Marriage
In spite of rising levels of education and images of growing
westernization in India, love marriages remain a rarity, even
among urban educated elite. India is unusual, even among
developing countries, in that marriage in India is almost
universal and most men and women marry at a relatively
young age.
1
As Table A.10.1a indicates, even though the legal
minimum age at marriage for women is 18, 60 per cent are
married before that age.  e average age at marriage ranges
between 16 and 23 years among ever-married women 25
years and older in the IHDS sample.
2
Women in poor and less
educated households often marry around the age of 16, but
even women from better off and more educated households
marry around age 19–20.  e average age at marriage is 19.3
years in metropolitan cities and is considerably lower in less
developed villages. Regional diff erences in age at marriage
are striking, with an average age at marriage of 15–17 years
in central states like Bihar and Madhya Pradesh, and a higher
average age at marriage in Punjab and Himachal Pradesh, as
well as in the southern states (see Table A.10.1b).
Gender and Family Dynamics
10
1
For data on age at marriage in other developing countries, see Mensch, Singh, and Casterline (2005).
2
We exclude ever-married women under age 25 from this calculation. If we were to include younger cohorts, then women who marry at young ages
would be included and those who delay marriage would not.  us, including younger cohorts would bias the sample towards women who marry at young
ages, such as those in rural areas and those with low levels of education.
    149
Not surprisingly, many of the young brides have not
attained puberty at the time of marriage. In Bihar and
Rajasthan, the states with the earliest age at marriage, around
25 per cent of the girls had not attained puberty at the time
of marriage. At the same time, a focus on the formal age at
marriage may well be mistaken in a context in which early
marriage is not synonymous with an early age at entry into a
sexual union.
As documented by many anthropologists, early marriage
is often associated with a delay in consummation in which
the bride remains with her parents until a formal gauna or
bidai ceremony occurs. States with a very early age at formal
marriage also follow the custom of a gap of a year or more
between marriage and gauna. Tables A.10.1a and A.10.1b
show the waiting period of at least six months following the
wedding before cohabitation. About 75 per cent of women
in Bihar and 88 per cent of women in Rajasthan waited six
months or more to begin living with their husbands. As
Figure 10.1 shows, this waiting period is often associated
with the relative youth and immaturity of the bride, and
tends to decline as the age at marriage increases.
Regardless of the age at which formal marriage occurs,
however, the average age at which cohabitation, or eff ective
marriage, begins is about 18–19 years in most states, and
is even younger in some. Table A.10.1a also suggests a very
small increase in age at marriage.  e average age at mar-
riage has changed only marginally across cohorts, although
the proportion of women marrying before puberty has
decreased.
Most marriages are arranged. Less than 5 per cent of
women in the IHDS sample said they chose their husbands
independent of their parents.  e rest reported a variety of
arrangements through which their families made marriage
decisions. Most reported very limited contact with their
husbands before marriage. Sixty nine per cent met their
husbands on the day of the wedding or shortly before, and an
additional 9 per cent knew their husbands for a month before
the wedding. Only 23 per cent knew their husbands for more
than a month when they married. Although educated women
are more likely to have a longer acquaintance with their
husbands, a long period of acquaintance is not normative,
even among these women as Figure 10.2 indicates.
3
Yet, in spite of the popular stereotype of women being
coerced into arranged marriages, about 62 per cent felt
that their wishes were considered in the selection of their
partners. Not surprisingly, women from educated families
and urban women are given more of a say. Women in Bihar
and Rajasthan, states with the lowest age at marriage, are
the least likely to report having a say in the selection of
their husbands. Women who have some say in choosing
the groom are also likely to have a longer acquaintance with
their prospective partners. Among women who reported not
having a say in the choice of spouse, only 10 per cent met
their husbands at least a month before the wedding. Among
women who had a say, about 30 per cent claimed such an
acquaintance.
Centrality of Childbearing in Womens Lives
Fertility in India has been declining steadily. As measured
by the NFHS, the total fertility rate dropped from 3.7 in
1992–3 to 2.7 in 2005–6. Still, childbearing remains central
to womens lives: as measured by IHDS, 97 per cent women
aged 25 and older had at least one child. Tables A.10.1a and
A.10.1b also document diff erences in fertility across diff erent
social groups and across states. In these tables, we focus on
women aged 40–9 who have largely completed childbearing.
Figure 10.1 Gap Between Marriage and Cohabitation by Age at Marriage
Source: IHDS 2004–5 data.
3
It is important to note that because our data was collected from women only, much of this discussion has focused on womens choices, and lack
thereof. However, much of this discussion also applies to males who have little opportunity to get to know their wives.
150    
On an average, women in this age group had 3.85 children
in their reproductive years.
4
Educated women and women
in urban areas have fewer children than women with lesser
education and those in rural areas. Interestingly, although
fertility is lower in richer families than poorer ones, this
diff erence is far smaller than that associated with womens
education. Women in Kerala and Tamil Nadu have the
smallest family size, and those in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and
Rajasthan have the largest.
Table A.10.1a also documents that the mean age at
rst birth for women aged 25 years and older is 20.6 years.
e median age at fi rst birth is slightly lower, at 20.08. A
comparison of age at marriage and age at fi rst birth presents
an interesting paradox.
e variation in age at marriage
is not consistently refl ected in age at fi rst birth.
5
ere
is considerable variation in the mean age at fi rst marriage
between diff erent states and diff erent social groups.  e
diff erence in mean age at marriage between Bihar (15.2)
and Kerala (20.9) is more than four years. Yet, the diff erence
in age at fi rst birth is much smaller: 20.7 for Bihar and
22.7 for Kerala. Similarly, although the diff erence between
uneducated and college educated women is about 6.5 years
for age at marriage, it is only 4.5 years for age at fi rst birth.
A variety of factors play a role in the smaller diff erence by
education for age at fi rst birth, including the low fecundity of
adolescent girls. However, perhaps the most important factor
is one we noted earlier. Marriage is not synonymous with
entry into sexual union, and young brides are much more
likely to delay cohabitation than older brides, reducing the
risk of pregnancy.  is delay also poses an interesting policy
dilemma.  e prevention of child marriage is important for
the well-being of adolescent girls and may lead to increased
education, but its fertility impact may be small until a
substantial delay in age at marriage is attained.
Womens Natal Family Ties and
Social Support Networks
Although emotional bonds between parents and daughters
endure over time and space, wedding rituals like bidai and
crossing over the threshold refl ect realities of most womens
lives. Marriage is a transition point at which women are
expected to leave the familiar environment and the traditions
of their parents’ homes and assimilate into a new family,
often with a relatively abrupt break.
We asked women about their immediate post-marriage
residence, and an overwhelming majority (more than 90
per cent) reported that they lived with their parents-in-law.
e north Indian custom of village exogamy ensures that
women marry outside their own village because all men
from their own village, or even a set of closely related villages,
are considered close kin. Even urban families may be reluctant
to marry their daughters into families originating from
villages close to their native place. Consequently, as Table
A.10.2b indicates, in states like Haryana and Uttar Pradesh,
less than 10 per cent of women marry within their own
towns or villages. While marrying within the natal village is
permitted in south India and marriage with a close cousin
or uncle is often preferred, the number of suitable matches
4
e NFHS-III documents 4.0 children for women of this age group (IIPS 2007).
5
is paradox was fi rst noted by Basu (1993).
Figure 10.2 Length of Acquaintance Before Marriage by Education
Source: IHDS 2004–5 data.
    151
within a close community is limited. Consequently, even in
south India, the majority of women marry outside their own
village and circle of close relatives.
Within-family marriages are particularly prevalent
among Muslims. About 24 per cent of the Muslim women
marry within the family, compared with less than 12 per cent
among the other social groups. Unlike many other aspects
of social life, marriage traditions have little relationship with
the socioeconomic standing of the family, and regional dif-
ferences predominate. In Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan,
and Madhya Pradesh, around 10 per cent of women marry
within their own village or town, and a negligible percent-
age marry their uncles or cousins. In contrast, in Kerala
and Tamil Nadu, more than 25 per cent marry within their
own village or town, and 23–30 per cent of women in
Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu
marry a cousin or an uncle.
Exogamy is associated with an abrupt transition in
womens lives. Once married, many women fi nd themselves
cut off from the social support networks off ered by their
natal families. Although tradition dictates that a daughter
visit her parents or brothers for certain festivals such as
Raksha Bandhan, Makar Sankranti, or Durga Puja, many
women are unable to visit regularly. Many reasons prevent
these visits. For example, sometimes the natal family is far
away and women are not allowed to travel unaccompa-
nied. Sometimes women are needed to cook and care for
the elderly, sometimes demands of child care and childrens
education restricts their travel, and a minority of women
have no close family left. But regardless of the reason, when
a woman barely manages to visit her family once a year or
even less, she is cut off from a potential source of social
support. Table A.10.2b indicates that womens visits with
their families are most restricted in areas like Delhi, Uttar
Pradesh, Bihar, and Jharkhand. Additionally, women in
many states are married at such a distance from their natal
families that many cannot visit their families and return in
a day. Poor transportation networks may also play a role in
womens isolation.
e location of the most recent childbirth provides
an interesting marker of womens contact with their natal
families. In some communities, women return to their natal
family for the delivery. In others, delivery occurs in the
husband’s home. Over all, about 20 per cent of all recent
births took place in the natal home. On the whole, returning
to the natal family for delivery seems more common among
upper income groups and more educated families (see Table
A.10.2a). Regional diff erences are also important. Since
68 per cent of women delivering at the natal home either
deliver in a hospital, or are attended to by a trained doctor
or nurse as compared to 53 per cent for births in the marital
home, delivery at the natal home is an important marker of
womens well-being. It is also important to remember this
dislocation when designing prenatal care systems.
THE BELOVED BURDEN: A PARENTAL DILEMMA
In previous chapters, we noted that the discrimination
against daughters results in higher mortality of girls and
lower educational expenditures for daughters. We would be
remiss if we did not point out some of the factors motivating
parents into these grievous choices. In a primarily patriarchal
society, a variety of factors combine to increase the fi nancial
burdens of raising a daughter and reduce the daughter’s ability
to provide fi nancial and physical support to their parents.
Dowry and Wedding Expenses
Activist groups often implicate dowry demands in increased
domestic violence and the oppression of women. It has also
been reported that dowry infl ation belies progress on many
other fronts, such as improvements in womens education.
Wedding expenses and dowries are also associated with long-
term debt for households.  e IHDS found that more than
15 per cent of the loans that households acquired are directly
related to marriage expenses. Nationwide data on dowries
or wedding expenses are notoriously diffi cult to collect,
particularly in view of the Dowry Prohibition Act. In large-
scale surveys, most respondents tend to be hesitant about
reporting illegal activities within their own family, but are
comfortable enough to provide general information about
the practices within their community, or for families with
similar social and economic standing within their jati. While
we realize that this general information can be somewhat
infl ated, it provides an interesting marker of diff erences in
expectations across social and economic groups. We focus on
the following dimensions of marriage-related expenses:
(1) wedding expenses for the brides and the grooms
families,
(2) types of gifts given to a daughter at the wedding, and,
(3) cash gifts, or what is commonly referred to as dowry.
e results in Table A.10.3a are interesting. While wedding
expenses for brides family are uniformly higher than those
for the grooms family (on average, about 50 per cent higher),
the expenses for the grooms family are not trivial.  e IHDS
shows a nationwide average wedding expenditure of about
Rs 60,000 for the grooms family and about Rs 90,000 for
the brides family. Even among households in the lowest
income quintile, the expenditure for the grooms family is
about Rs 43,000, while that for the brides family is about
Rs 64,000. Among better off households, a girl’s wedding
can cost upwards of Rs 1,50,000. In addition to wedding
expenses, gifts of large consumer durables in dowry seem to
be quite prevalent. When respondents were asked whether
152    
a family with a similar socioeconomic standing as them
would frequently give any of four items—a car, motorcycle,
refrigerator, or TV—about 24 per cent responded in the
affi rmative. An additional 43 per cent reported that these
gifts are sometimes given. Even among households in the
lowest income quintile, nearly 16 per cent reported that
these items are frequently given.  e comparable gure is
about 39 per cent for the top quintile.
Both wedding gifts and wedding expenses are the lowest
among Adivasi households, and among this group, there is
surprisingly little diff erence in wedding expenses for boys and
girls. Given that Adivasis seem to have the most favourable
sex ratio at birth, as recorded in Chapter 8, gender parity in
wedding expenses is an interesting observation. Dowry and
wedding expenses appear to be one area in which education,
upper caste status, and upper income are associated with
less favourable gender outcomes. In the IHDS, cash gifts to
daughters—pure dowry, by many defi nitions—seem to be
relatively small compared with other expenses.  e average
amount of cash gift is about Rs 22,000, compared with the
average wedding expense of Rs 92,000 for a daughter.
Regional diff erences in wedding expenses and gifts
reported in Table A.10.3b are striking. On the whole, the
richer states of Punjab and Haryana as well as Karnataka and
Kerala have higher wedding expenses than the poorer states
like Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, but gifts of large
consumer durables seem to be far more a northern than a
southern phenomenon. In contrast, cash dowries seem to be
the highest in Kerala.
Sons as a Source of Old-age Support
In addition to higher wedding costs for daughters and higher
dowries, low expectations of fi nancial support from daughters
are one of the most important reasons for son preference in
India.  e IHDS asked women about their expectations for
old-age support. First they were asked, ‘Who do you expect
to live with in your old age?’  ose who indicated that they
expected to live with their sons were further asked, ‘If your
son does not want to, or is unable to live with you, would
you consider living with a daughter?’ Similar questions were
asked about fi nancial support in old age.  e results, shown
in Table A.10.4a, suggest that an overwhelming majority
expect to be supported by sons. Eighty fi ve per cent expect
to live with sons in old age, and 86 per cent expect fi nancial
support. Only 9 per cent expect to live with daughters, and
11 per cent expect fi nancial support from daughters. It is
even more interesting to look at expectations in the event that
sons are not able or willing to care for them.  e proportion
of women who do not expect or are unwilling to accept any
support from their daughters is striking. Only 24 per cent
would be willing to live with their daughters, and 30 per cent
are willing to accept fi nancial support from them.
Responses to these questions must be placed in the
cultural context, where traditions dictate that parents give to
a daughter and not take from her. In some areas, even today,
parents are not expected to eat or drink at their daughters
home. Moreover, as we have shown in Table A.10.2a, only
14 per cent of women marry within their village or town
and, hence, most are not easily available to provide support
to their parents. All of these considerations are factored
into the responses of the sample women who do not see
receiving support from their daughters as realistic or socially
acceptable. Educated women are marginally more willing to
accept support from their daughters, but on the whole there
is little social class or group variation in this respect.
However, there is substantial regional variation in
parental willingness to rely on daughters, as shown in Table
A.10.4b.  is variation is consistent with other dimensions
of gender inequality we noted above. Parents in Haryana,
Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, and Madhya Pradesh are far less
willing to rely on daughters for any help than are those in the
south. Women in the North-East and Kerala, two regions
with a long matrilineal tradition, were most likely to mention
daughters as a potential source of fi nancial and residential
support.  e expectation that sons will support parents in
old age seems consistent with our results in Chapter 9, where
we showed that an overwhelming proportion of the elderly
live with their children (mainly sons) and seem to have few
other sources of income.
FAMILIES DIVIDED: POWER IN THE HOUSEHOLD
While rocking the cradle may well give women a way of
ruling the world, ruling the household seems to be a dif-
ferent matter.  e Indian womens movement and scholarly
research have consistently documented unequal access to
household resources by women and have argued that public
policies need to recognize these inequalities for the provi-
sion of services as well as ownership of resources allocated
via public programmes. We focus on two dimensions of
household dynamics below: womens access to and control
over household resources, and womens control over their
own physical space and mobility.
Access to and Control over Resources
One of the most striking features of rural bazaars—particu-
larly in north India—is that they are predominated by male
shoppers. In many families, women rely on men to purchase
day-to-day necessities, as well as medicines and other neces-
sary items.  is should reduce the likelihood that women
have cash in hand for such purchases.  e IHDS asked
ever-married women aged 15–49 whether they had cash
on hand at the time of interview.  e results are shown in
Table A.10.5a. About 83 per cent responded affi rmatively—a
very high proportion, in some ways refl ecting the increasing
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monetization of the economy. Women were also asked
whether they had any say in buying an expensive item for
household use. Again about 70 per cent replied affi rma-
tively.
While this data refl ect positively on womens participa-
tion in day-to-day decision making, when it comes to having
control over these decisions or having control over larger
family fi nances, the story is quite diff erent. Only 11 per cent
women are primarily responsible for making decisions regard-
ing large household purchases such as TVs or refrigerators.
In households that have a bank account, only 18 per cent of
women have their names on the account; among households
that have rental or homeownership papers, only 15 per cent
of women have their names on the documents.  ese latter
two facets of the household economy, in particular, refl ect
womens vulnerability in the event of domestic discord or the
husband’s death.  e likelihood of the woman being one of
the owners (or the sole owner) of a bank account is greater
for households with higher incomes, higher education, and
urban residence. But this increased likelihood with income,
education, and urban residence is far less marked in womens
ownership of, or title to the residential property.
Womens access to and control over resources diff er
substantially across states (see Table A.10.5b) with greater
variation across states than between diff erent social and eco-
nomic categories. Gujarat and Uttarakhand rank the highest
in womens title to property, followed by Karnataka, Delhi,
and the North-East.
Control over Physical Mobility
One of the biggest challenges Indian women face in
controlling their own lives is a lack of physical mobility
and access to public space, which is caused by several
factors. Cultural norms surrounding female seclusion and
the practice of purdah or ghunghat, familial control over
womens physical movement, reluctance of women as well
as families to allow them to venture alone into public spaces,
and sexual harassment in public places.  e IHDS asked
women whether they practice purdah or ghunghat, whether
they need permission to go to a health centre, and whether
they could go alone to a health centre. For some women,
such as those in Haryana or eastern Uttar Pradesh, ghunghat
may cover the face fully. For others, such as those in Gujarat,
partial covering of the face is more a nod to propriety than a
large impediment. In the all India sample, 73 per cent need
permission from other household members to go to a health
centre, and 34 per cent cant or wont go alone to the health
centre. Education and urban residence seem to increase
womens control over their physical mobility and reduce
seclusion. But even among college graduates, nearly 60
per cent need permission to go to a health centre and
17 per cent cannot or will not go alone (see Table A.10.5a).
Regional diff erences in womens physical mobility are
vast (see Table A.10.5b). Purdah/ghunghat prevalence is
extremely low (10–12 per cent) in Tamil Nadu, Andhra
Pradesh, and Karnataka. It is very high in Uttar Pradesh,
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan, with more than 85
per cent of women practising purdah or ghunghat. In some
states, 40 –60 per cent of women cannot go to a health centre
alone (see Box 10.1).
It is important to note that this is a complex issue. When
women respond to questions about their physical mobility,
they are not refl ecting dissatisfaction with the status quo, but
rather are stating the realities of their lives in the context
of cultural norms governing appropriate behaviour. From a
policy perspective, however, it is important to note womens
exclusion from public spaces. For example, any restructur-
ing of maternal and child health services must consider that
areas where women are more constrained have a far greater
need of domiciliary services. In areas where women are freer
to travel, it may be possible to concentrate on clinic-based
services.
WOMEN’S STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES
Data on diff erent markers of womens lives for diverse socio-
economic groups and across regional divides are diffi cult to
come by. While a large-scale survey like the IHDS has many
shortcomings and is often unable to probe to uncover hidden
dimensions of gendered experiences, the kinds of questions
the IHDS addresses are quite unique and provide an interest-
ing snapshot of diff erent dimensions of gender inequality in
India. Documenting these inequalities does not mean that
all Indian women are downtrodden or lack agency. In fact,
we are surprised by the candour and confi dence with which
most women responded to the questions.  e IHDS asked
interviewers to rate diff erent dimensions of their interac-
tions with the respondents and found that a vast majority
of women were able to interact very well with the interview-
ers. Eighty one per cent had no diffi culty understanding the
questions, 16 per cent had some diffi culty, and 3 per cent
had a lot of diffi culty.Regarding knowledge of household
expenditures—the most diffi cult set of questions for women
to answer, given their lack of control over resources—only a
small minority had very little knowledge (9 per cent), and
the rest had either fairly good knowledge (41 per cent), or
excellent knowledge (51 per cent).
ese strengths are refl ected in increasing levels of
womens participation in a variety of government and non-
government activities as well as a growing desire among
women to educate their daughters as much as their sons.
Among the IHDS respondents, 85 per cent would like to
educate their sons and daughters equally, and 3 per cent
would like to give more education to their daughters than
to their sons.
154    
However, in spite of these many strengths of individual
women, their vulnerabilities are also striking. Due to ethical
concerns associated with the fear of endangering respondents,
the IHDS did not directly ask about womens experience
of domestic violence. But to get their sense of general
prevalence of domestic violence in their community, the
IHDS asked whether, under a series of conditions, women
in their communities are usually likely to be beaten by their
husbands.  ese hypothetical conditions were, going out
without permission, family not giving expected money (that
is, dowry), neglecting the house or children, and not cooking
properly.
e responses, presented in Table A.10.6a, show a
striking pattern of vulnerability. Nearly 30–40 per cent of the
respondents said that women are usually beaten up for going
out without asking permission, not bringing the expected
dowry, neglecting the house or children, and not cooking
properly. Only 50 per cent do not believe that women in
their communities are beaten for any of these reasons.
Special care is needed in interpreting these results.  e
IHDS did not ask about womens own experiences but rather
those of other women in their communities. Interestingly,
The absence of women from public spaces is striking in many parts of India. Women’s physical mobility is often restricted, and women  nd it
dif cult to go alone to places like health centres. Several factors contribute to these limitations: fear of social sanctions, concerns about physical
safety, or discomfort about venturing into unfamiliar terrain. Regardless of the causes of these limitations, they have serious consequences for
women’s ability to obtain government services. If they must wait for permission or need to be accompanied, they may be less likely to visit
health centres than if they are able to venture alone.
About 34 per cent of IHDS sample women claim that they cannot go alone to a health centre. The proportion varies considerably across
states, with 50 per cent or more of women in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Jharkhand stating that they cannot go alone to the health centre,
compared with less than 15 per cent in Maharashtra, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu. The two graphs presented here correlate state-level averages
for women who cannot go to a health centre alone with the completion of three DPT vaccinations for children (from Chapter 8) and doctor-
assisted deliveries (from Chapter 7). These graphs show strong inverse correlations between constrained physical movement and the utilization
of health services. States in which women are able to go to a health centre freely have children with higher levels of vaccination as well as a
higher likelihood of a physician-assisted delivery.
Source: IHDS 2004–5 data.
Box 10.1 Womens Freedom of Physical Movement and Access to Health Care
education and economic status seem to play an important
role in these expectations. Educated women and women
from upper income groups indicate a lower prevalence of
violence in their communities than women from the more
disadvantaged communities. It is not clear whether this is
because there is actually less violence in communities where
women have a higher education or because educated women
are less likely to report pervasive violence. But in any case,
even among the most educated group 30 per cent of women
indicate that women in their communities are likely to be
beaten for one of the four reasons listed above.
Given low levels of contact with natal families, it seems
highly likely that many women, subject to violence or in
other diffi cult circumstances, may fi nd it diffi cult to get help
from their families. Moreover, low levels of wage employment
and lack of control over housing titles increase the obstacles
to their building an independent life. Regional diff erences in
expectation of domestic violence are large (Table A.10.6b)
with about 70 per cent of the respondents in Assam and the
North-East considering it unlikely that women are beaten
for any reason, while the corresponding percentage is only
about 20 per cent in Bihar and Jharkhand.
    155
DISCUSSION
In this chapter, we attempted to provide a context for
the gender diff erences in health, labour force participation,
and (to a lesser extent) education, documented in this report.
Several insights from these results are noteworthy, particularly
as we consider public policy implications.
First, while many gendered outcomes are documented
at the household level, such as a parental preference for
investing in boys’ education, it is important to look beyond
the household for the sources of such behaviour. Most parents
love their daughters as well as sons, but as documented in
Chapter 9, the dependence of the elderly on their children for
social and fi nancial support makes a preference for investing
in sons rather than daughters seem rational.  is preference
is strengthened by a cultural context in which daughters
are married outside the village with limited contact with
their natal families after marriage, and where they have few
nancial resources and independent decision-making powers
to help their parents.
Second, while education and economic growth have
changed many facets of human development in India, gender
inequality in many areas seems impervious to this change.
Higher income households are more gender unequal in some
cases, such as with regard to dowries. Not even high levels of
education empower women in all spheres.  us, we need to
think of alternative strategies for womens empowerment.
ird, regional diff erences in gender roles and norms are
enormous, and seem to swamp other social and economic
diff erences.  ese pose interesting challenges for public
policy. At the most basic level, public policies must be
mindful of these traditions while shaping service delivery.
Health services may need to be delivered into the home in
areas where womens physical mobility is curtailed. Girls
schools may increase secondary school enrolment in the
cultural context emphasizing male–female separation, but
may not be necessary in other areas. Policies regarding home
registration and preferential banking schemes could be
expanded to increase womens control over family home and
bank accounts. However, at a larger level, regional diff erences
off er a vision of alternative social realities that can be used to
spur public discourse. While the Kerala story has often been
told, it is interesting to note that the northeastern states fare
very well on many markers of gender roles described in this
chapter.  ese are also the states where the gender gap in
literacy is very low and the sex ratio is more balanced. A focus
on diff erent cultural traditions, with some more favourable
to overall social development than others, makes it possible
to think of indigenous models of womens empowerment
that do not rely on global norms but that are consistent with
the best of Indian traditions.
HIGHLIGHTS
The mean age at marriage for women is 17.4 years, with about 60 per cent marrying before the legal age
of 18.
Women in north India tend to marry outside of their natal village and consequently have less access to social
support networks than their sisters in the south.
Arranged marriage remains the norm, with less than 5 per cent women selecting their husbands without input from
other family members.
About 85 per cent women expect to live with their sons in old age; about 9 per cent, with daughters. A similar small
proportion expects  nancial help from daughters.
Many women practice ghunghat or purdah, particularly in central India, and 73 per cent need permission to go to
a health centre.
• Wife beating and domestic violence remain pervasive, with about 50 per cent respondents claiming that women
in their community are often beaten for minor transgressions like going out without permission.
156    
Table A.10.1a Marriage and Family Patterns
Per cent Mean Per cent Not Mean Per cent Per cent Per cent Knew Children Age at
Married Age at Cohabiting Age at Marrying With Any Husband Ever Borne First
Before Marriage* Immedi- Cohabiting* Before Say in Before Women Birth*
Age 18* ately* Puberty* Marriage* Marriage* 40–9
All India 60 17.4 51 18.0 16 62 23 3.85 20.6
Woman’s Age
25–9 57 1 7.6 48 18.1 13 64 24 20.0
30–9 61 17.4 50 18.0 15 62 22 20.5
40–9 60 17.3 53 18.0 18 59 23 3.85 21.3
Woman’s Education
Illiterate 75 16.1 64 17.0 20 50 20 4.38 20.1
1–4 Std 65 17.1 45 17.5 14 65 24 3.58 20.0
5–9 Std 53 17.9 40 18.3 11 68 26 3.35 20.6
10–11 Std 32 19.5 33 19.8 6 81 27 2.66 21.8
12 Std Some college 21 20.7 31 20.9 7 84 26 2.43 22.8
College graduate 7 22.6 24 22.8 5 89 29 2.13 24.6
Place of Residence
Metro cities 38 19.3 31 19.5 5 82 26 2.73 21.5
Other urban area 47 18.5 44 19.0 11 71 27 3.46 21.2
More developed village 63 17.2 54 17.8 15 64 25 3.80 20.4
Less developed village 70 16.5 56 17.3 22 49 17 4.42 20.3
Income
Lowest Quintile 70 16.5 56 17.3 19 55 20 4.16 20.4
2nd Quintile 68 16.7 55 17.4 18 58 23 4.07 20.3
3rd Quintile 66 17.0 54 17.7 16 58 22 4.13 20.4
4th Quintile 57 17.6 48 18.2 14 65 24 3.85 20.5
Highest Quintile 42 19.0 40 19.4 10 73 25 3.26 21.5
Social Groups
High Caste Hindu 49 18.4 41 18.9 10 68 20 3.18 21.2
OBC 63 17.2 55 18.0 18 58 23 3.76 20.7
Dalit 71 16.5 55 17.2 17 59 19 4.20 20.0
Adivasi 64 17.1 54 17.7 18 63 29 4.01 20.8
Muslim 61 17.2 50 17.7 16 60 30 5.07 20.1
Other religion 18 20.8 30 21.1 5 84 25 2.77 22.8
Note:*Only calculated for women aged 25 years and above to reduce selectivity due to inclusion of women marrying at very young ages.
Source: IHDS 2004–5 data.
    157
Table A.10.1b Marriage and Family Patterns by State
Per cent Mean Per cent not Mean Per cent Per cent Per cent knew Children Age at
Married Age at Cohabiting Age at Marrying With Any Husband Ever Borne First
Before Marriage* Immedi- Cohabiting* Before Say in Before Women Birth*
Age 18* ately* Puberty* Marriage* Marriage* 40–9
All India 60 17.4 51 18.0 16 62 23 3.85 20.6
Jammu and Kashmir 41 18.9 57 19.3 7 43 32 4.63 21.5
Himachal Pradesh 43 18.6 28 18.9 12 64 32 3.61 21.0
Uttarakhand 55 17.6 27 17.8 16 42 13 4.49 21.1
Punjab 28 19.7 37 19.9 2 63 9 3.56 21.7
Haryana 56 17.4 74 18.3 13 65 4 3.59 20.9
Delhi 32 19.2 45 19.6 5 64 28 2.96 21.4
Uttar Pradesh 76 16.1 72 17.5 22 31 9 5.23 20.8
Bihar 86 15.2 75 16.6 26 20 6 4.92 20.7
Jharkhand 64 17.4 54 17.9 13 36 14 4.47 20.2
Rajasthan 79 15.8 88 17.4 25 21 7 4.91 20.2
Chhattisgarh 75 16.0 87 17.1 29 60 17 3.87 20.9
Madhya Pradesh 76 16.0 59 17.0 20 49 6 4.02 20.2
North-East 31 20.6 37 20.8 5 80 59 3.64 22.3
Assam 35 19.5 31 19.6 37 94 26 3.25 21.2
West Bengal 61 17.5 16 17.6 9 76 13 3.36 20.0
Orissa 53 17.9 13 18.0 3 40 19 4.15 20.4
Gujarat 48 18.2 69 18.9 29 93 17 3.31 20.9
Maharashtra, Goa 53 18.1 20 18.2 8 70 17 3.55 20.8
Andhra Pradesh 77 15.9 71 16.5 13 80 49 3.36 19.3
Karnataka 54 17.7 66 18.2 6 90 61 3.42 20.4
Kerala 19 20.9 21 21.0 1 99 40 2.45 22.7
Tamil Nadu 47 18.8 36 19.0 16 87 46 2.90 20.9
Note:*Only calculated for women aged 25 years and above to reduce selectivity due to inclusion of women marrying at very young ages.
Source: IHDS 2004–5 data.
158    
Table A.10.2a Womens Social Support Networks
(per cent)
Per cent Per cent Natal Visit Natal Last
Marrying in Marrying Family Family Delivery
Same Cousins/ Lives 2+ times at Natal
Village/Town Relatives Near by a Year Home
All India 14 12 57 68 21
Woman’s Age
15–19 NA NA 60 81 39
20–4 NA NA 58 77 27
25–9 14 12 56 73 22
30–9 13 11 56 66 14
40–9 15 12 56 61 9
Woman’s Education
Illiterate 13 13 52 63 16
1–4 Std 16 15 61 68 24
5–9 Std 15 12 61 72 24
10–11 Std 15 9 60 76 27
12 Std Some college 14 7 61 75 34
College graduate 15 6 61 75 30
Place of Residence
Metro cities 17 11 53 62 31
Other urban area 17 13 60 71 24
More developed village 14 15 60 72 21
Less developed village 11 8 52 64 18
Income
Lowest Quintile 12 12 56 66 19
2nd Quintile 14 13 57 68 18
3rd Quintile 16 12 57 69 20
4th Quintile 14 12 56 68 21
Highest Quintile 13 9 57 69 27
Social Groups
High Caste Hindu 10 8 50 66 23
OBC 12 11 57 68 21
Dalit 14 12 56 66 20
Adivasi 17 8 56 67 15
Muslim 24 24 64 70 23
Other religion 15 4 72 83 24
Note: Ever-married women age 15–49; NA—not calculated for women under 25 to avoid selectivity bias due
to early marriage; and + refers to 2 or more.
Source: IHDS 2004–5 data.
    159
Table A.10.2b Womens Social Support Networks by State
(per cent)
Per cent Per cent Natal Visit Natal Last
Marrying in Marrying Family Family Delivery
Same Cousins/ Lives 2+ times at Natal
Villiage/Town Relatives Near by a Year Home
All India 14 12 57 68 21
Jammu and Kashmir 23 21 55 88 31
Himachal Pradesh 11 0 61 77 7
Uttarakhand 8 1 57 51 1
Punjab 5 1 58 83 24
Haryana 3 2 39 84 13
Delhi 19 2 39 42 21
Uttar Pradesh 5 5 55 50 9
Bihar 6 6 24 50 16
Jharkhand 8 6 43 38 24
Rajasthan 11 2 53 71 18
Chhattisgarh 7 1 41 65 10
Madhya Pradesh 10 4 42 78 14
North-East 42 3 71 70 8
Assam 27 1 81 75 2
West Bengal 20 4 56 66 26
Orissa 17 9 65 52 11
Gujarat 8 3 75 85 33
Maharashtra, Goa 12 26 61 66 35
Andhra Pradesh 17 29 38 79 20
Karnataka 12 23 71 85 47
Kerala 28 3 84 90 23
Tamil Nadu 27 30 86 80 44
Note: Ever-married women aged 15–49 years; and + refers to 2 or more.
Source: IHDS 2004–5 data.
160    
Table A.10.3a Average Expected Marriage Expenses and Dowry**
Average Wedding Per cent Usually Average
Expenses Giving Large Items Cash
Males Females in Dowry* Dowry
All India 59,879 92,853 24 22,421
Woman’s Age
15–19 41,941 63,143 15 15,534
20–4 52,065 80,698 21 19,181
25–9 58,818 90,936 25 22,823
30–9 59,903 93,620 24 22,880
40–9 67,344 1,03,741 25 24,138
Woman’s Education
Illiterate 46,045 66,766 19 15,298
1–4 Std 48,618 77,610 16 20,468
5–9 Std 64,054 1,02,405 26 24,896
10–11 Std 81,922 1,36,240 32 37,875
12 Std Some college 94,609 1,56,358 39 38,996
College graduate 1,27,966 2,05,526 43 44,488
Place of Residence
Metro cities 86,743 1,27,151 27 34,205
Other urban area 79,931 1,22,822 32 26,999
More developed village 56,680 93,492 23 24,055
Less developed village 45,734 67,942 19 15,902
Income
Lowest Quintile 43,426 64,553 16 17,175
2nd Quintile 41,680 63,782 16 14,959
3rd Quintile 51,105 78,422 20 19,240
4th Quintile 62,406 99,688 26 23,596
Highest Quintile 99,011 1,54,066 39 36,500
Social Groups
High Caste Hindu 89,394 1,35,470 36 34,345
OBC 58,466 90,468 23 22,989
Dalit 43,275 66,107 20 14,373
Adivasi 30,685 37,974 6 6,352
Muslim 55,913 91,744 22 21,634
Other religion 91,231 1,83,352 34 39,972
Notes: *Large items include TV, refrigerator, car, and motorcycles.
**Refers to practise in community and not women’s own experiences.
Source: IHDS 2004–5 data.
    161
Table A.10.3b Average Expected Marriage Expenses and Dowry Across States**
Average Wedding Per cent Usually Average
Expenses Giving Large Items Cash
Males Females in Dowry* Dowry
All India 59,879 92,853 24 22,421
Jammu and Kashmir 1,53,027 2,10,342 38 18,233
Himachal Pradesh 94,237 1,14,839 72 6,555
Uttarakhand 61,216 80,619 52 9,441
Punjab 1,05,421 1,57,250 61 6,603
Haryana 1,12,527 1,58,056 65 3,709
Delhi 1,24,476 1,90,929 86 24,648
Uttar Pradesh 71,876 98,748 46 21,134
Bihar 50,801 77,798 19 28,971
Jharkhand 50,304 85,400 26 33,606
Rajasthan 88,607 1,14,649 35 8,328
Chhattisgarh 38,996 47,289 10 272
Madhya Pradesh 43,937 57,950 33 4,523
North-East 54,312 67,648 37 9,535
Assam 24,916 34,947 6 1,828
West Bengal 40,121 71,543 7 24,549
Orissa 53,619 88,745 29 25,496
Gujarat 77,586 92,331 7 2,743
Maharashtra, Goa 58,704 76,861 9 20,980
Andhra Pradesh 38,178 71,350 21 50,048
Karnataka 59,731 1,04,430 5 37,731
Kerala 49,709 1,93,112 10 72,954
Tamil Nadu 55,657 1,02,953 13 9,572
Notes: *Large items include TV, refrigerator, car, and motorcycles.
**Refers to practise in the community and not women’s own experiences.
Source: IHDS 2004–5 data.
162    
Table A.10.4a Exepctation of Old Age Support from Sons and Daughters
Per cent Expecting to Per cent Expecting Financial
Live With… Help From...
Sons Daughters Daughters Sons Daughters Daughters
If Son If Son
Unable Unable
All India 85 9 24 86 11 30
Woman’s Age
15–19 70 9 21 70 10 27
20–4 78 9 23 79 11 30
25–9 85 11 26 85 12 32
30–9 87 10 24 87 11 30
40–9 89 8 23 89 11 29
Woman’s Education
Illiterate 89 7 22 90 9 27
1–4 Std 86 10 24 85 13 35
5–9 Std 83 10 24 84 12 32
10–11 Std 82 13 26 82 16 33
12 Std Some college 76 17 30 76 20 36
College graduate 71 18 31 70 19 33
Place of Residence
Metro cities 77 12 22 76 12 28
Other urban area 82 11 26 82 13 29
More developed village 87 10 25 87 13 33
Less developed village 88 7 22 88 9 29
Income
Lowest Quintile 86 10 25 85 12 32
2nd Quintile 86 9 24 87 10 30
3rd Quintile 86 8 21 87 11 29
4th Quintile 86 10 24 86 12 30
Highest Quintile 84 11 24 84 13 29
Social Groups
High Caste Hindu 84 9 22 84 12 28
OBC 87 9 24 87 11 30
Dalit 85 10 25 86 10 31
Adivasi 82 11 27 82 13 34
Muslim 87 8 22 87 10 30
Other religion 79 20 29 79 23 34
Source: IHDS 2004–5 data.
    163
Table A.10.4b Statewise Expectation of Old Age Support from Sons and Daughters
Per cent Expecting to Per cent Expecting Financial
Live With… Help From...
Sons Daughters Daughters Sons Daughters Daughters
after Probing after Probing
All India 85 9 24 86 11 30
Jammu and Kashmir 96 6 26 93 10 34
Himachal Pradesh 78 10 31 80 9 25
Uttarakhand 77 6 29 78 6 31
Punjab 93 0 3 93 1 6
Haryana 95 3 8 95 3 12
Delhi 84 3 12 80 2 19
Uttar Pradesh 93 9 27 93 9 25
Bihar 98 3 15 98 4 16
Jharkhand 90 7 30 90 7 30
Rajasthan 95 1 17 95 1 19
Chhattisgarh 83 5 10 83 6 9
Madhya Pradesh 93 4 7 93 4 7
North-East 73 31 40 79 40 51
Assam 80 9 17 82 15 54
West Bengal 71 13 23 73 14 34
Orissa 88 7 26 88 12 35
Gujarat 83 9 31 83 14 28
Maharashtra, Goa 86 5 13 85 8 30
Andhra Pradesh 86 16 42 85 20 60
Karnataka 83 14 30 82 19 36
Kerala 75 36 45 75 43 56
Tamil Nadu 71 13 29 73 11 30
Source: IHDS 2004–5 data.
164    
Table A.10.5a Womens Control Over Resources and Physical Mobility
(in percentage)
Has Any Purchasing Large Items… Name on…* Per cent of Women Who…
Cash on Any Say Primary Bank Home Practice Need Cannot
Hand Decision Account Papers Purdah or Permission Go to
Ghunghat to Go to Health
A Health Center
Center Alone
All India 83 71 11 18 15 55 73 34
Woman’s Age
15–19 62 52 4 5 4 70 86 66
20–4 77 62 5 10 7 61 85 50
25–9 83 66 8 16 11 56 78 39
30–9 85 74 12 19 16 53 71 27
40–9 86 76 17 22 22 52 65 27
Woman’s Education
Illiterate 82 70 12 10 14 63 77 40
1–4 Std 80 70 11 13 15 53 72 31
5–9 Std 83 70 10 18 14 52 72 30
10–11 Std 84 72 9 32 16 42 68 26
12 Std Some college 89 76 9 39 18 36 66 23
College graduate 91 79 13 58 25 28 58 17
Place of Residence
Metro cities 92 84 12 33 18 36 56 16
Other urban area 88 73 13 25 17 44 67 23
More developed village 81 69 11 15 15 52 74 32
Less developed village 80 68 10 12 13 68 79 45
Income
Lowest Quintile 82 72 15 10 14 61 73 38
2nd Quintile 80 69 12 9 12 59 76 38
3rd Quintile 81 69 10 12 14 56 76 35
4th Quintile 83 72 11 19 14 52 73 31
Highest Quintile 88 71 9 37 20 48 68 27
Social Groups
High Caste Hindu 87 72 9 29 18 51 70 30
OBC 85 72 11 16 15 52 74 33
Dalit 82 72 14 13 14 55 74 33
Adivasi 78 62 10 10 13 47 76 38
Muslim 76 64 11 13 11 84 77 44
Other religion 77 80 11 33 16 15 63 15
Note: *Only for households with bank account or home ownership/rental papers.
Source: IHDS 2004–5 data.
    165
Table A.10.5b Statewise Womens Control Over Resources and Physical Mobility
(in percentage)
Has Any Purchasing Large Items… Name on…* Per cent of Women Who…
Cash on Any Say Primary Bank Home Practice Need Cannot
Hand Decision Account Papers Purdah or Permission Go to
Ghunghat to Go to Health
A Health Center
Center Alone
All India 83 71 11 18 15 55 73 34
Jammu and Kashmir 72 50 13 25 11 76 89 25
Himachal Pradesh 91 54 12 32 19 45 81 19
Uttarakhand 91 83 12 31 34 45 68 24
Punjab 89 84 8 24 6 32 82 21
Haryana 92 86 7 12 8 81 66 19
Delhi 96 94 9 40 25 43 58 11
Uttar Pradesh 86 78 9 18 14 87 77 50
Bihar 89 71 5 27 14 88 93 73
Jharkhand 88 52 15 26 9 59 68 52
Rajasthan 81 55 6 12 8 94 79 44
Chhattisgarh 79 50 6 7 3 58 90 62
Madhya Pradesh 74 68 7 7 16 93 91 47
North-East 76 75 38 26 20 28 67 13
Assam 69 47 18 6 6 68 64 48
West Bengal 60 74 15 16 8 70 72 31
Orissa 77 57 8 6 4 64 80 36
Gujarat 93 86 5 20 49 76 78 23
Maharashtra, Goa 88 66 8 23 11 38 56 14
Andhra Pradesh 96 66 10 14 13 12 83 26
Karnataka 83 80 12 15 29 12 89 23
Kerala 43 62 7 23 20 15 52 13
Tamil Nadu 94 86 31 11 13 10 42 12
Note: *Only for households with bank account or ownership/rental papers.
Source: IHDS 2004–5 data.
166    
Table A.10.6a Common Perception of Domestic Violence in the Community
(in percentage)
In Respondent’s Community It is Common to Beat a Women if She…. No Wife
Beating
Goes Out Family Does Neglects Does Not Under Any
Without Not Give House Cook of These
Permission Expected Properly Conditions
Money
All India 39 29 35 29 50
Woman’s Age
15–19 48 33 40 35 43
20–4 42 31 35 29 46
25–9 41 30 35 29 48
30–9 38 29 35 30 50
40–9 35 26 32 28 53
Woman’s Education
Illiterate 45 33 38 33 43
1–4 Std 40 32 39 31 47
5–9 Std 36 27 32 27 53
10–11 Std 30 24 31 23 57
12 Std Some college 24 19 25 20 62
College graduate 18 15 20 15 70
Place of Residence
Metro cities 29 21 22 18 63
Other urban area 29 24 31 24 57
More developed village 41 31 39 32 46
Less developed village 44 31 36 32 46
Income
Lowest Quintile 47 35 41 36 41
2nd Quintile 42 32 38 32 46
3rd Quintile 40 30 35 30 48
4th Quintile 35 27 34 28 52
Highest Quintile 30 22 26 21 60
Social Groups
High Caste Hindu 33 25 29 23 57
OBC 40 31 37 31 48
Dalit 43 32 37 31 46
Adivasi 40 23 35 30 49
Muslim 42 30 36 31 47
Other religion 16 20 26 21 65
Source: IHDS 2004–5 data.
    167
Table A.10.6b Statewise Common Perception of Domestic Violence in the Community
(in percentage)
In Respondent’s Community It is Common to Beat a Women if She…. No Wife
Beating
Goes Out Family Does Neglects Does Not Under Any
Without Not Give House Cook of These
Permission Expected Properly Conditions
Money
All India 39 29 35 29 50
Jammu and Kashmir 58 26 60 41 25
Himachal Pradesh 25 7 16 11 71
Uttarakhand 42 16 14 12 56
Punjab 12 9 7 7 86
Haryana 22 8 18 21 67
Delhi 16 21 12 7 70
Uttar Pradesh 40 25 23 19 50
Bihar 66 57 69 69 21
Jharkhand 58 55 54 46 22
Rajasthan 39 20 27 30 49
Chhattisgarh 22 9 13 15 73
Madhya Pradesh 48 23 37 29 48
North-East 10 10 23 8 73
Assam 8 10 11 8 84
West Bengal 30 28 28 24 65
Orissa 39 27 24 20 55
Gujarat 54 25 44 34 39
Maharashtra, Goa 61 41 56 44 25
Andhra Pradesh 20 29 23 17 63
Karnataka 56 50 52 46 39
Kerala 15 24 29 21 58
Tamil Nadu 20 16 37 28 56
Source: IHDS 2004–5 data.