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Anonymous’ Cyberwar Against
ISIS and the Asymmetrical Nature
of Cyber Conflicts
Ralph Martins
ABSTRACT
W
arfare in the physical world, both asymmetrical and conventional,
has occurred throughout history. However, war in cyberspace is a
more recent phenomenon, and there is still much to be explored and
understood. Because cyberspace is inherently asymmetric, many lessons
learned from asymmetric warfare in the physical world also apply to cyber conflicts.
This article will examine the online battle waged by Anonymous against ISIS and
analyze five asymmetrical characteristics of cyber conflicts: the vulnerability of con-
ventionally-powerful actors to attacks from relatively weaker adversaries, the uncon-
ventional nature of offensive tactics, the low level of intensity of those tactics, the
ability of actors to organize and aggressively operate in an extremely decentralized
manner, and the strategic goal of breaking willpower or forcing a change of policy.
Understanding the asymmetrical nature of cyber conflicts and applying appropriate
lessons learned will lead to a more effective defensive posture against cyber-aggressors
and facilitate a more secure operating environment in cyberspace.
INTRODUCTION
War in cyberspace is a recent phenomenon, as the first computer networks were
implemented only in the mid-20th century. In early 2015, the world for the first time
witnessed a public declaration of war by a non-state actor that operates almost exclu-
sively in cyberspace—the collective known as Anonymous—as they openly challenged
the Islamic State and their online resources and operations. This conflict has waged
on into 2017
[1]
, and it serves to highlight the many similarities between asymmetri-
cal conflicts in the physical world and conflicts carried out solely online. As a result,
many lessons learned from fighting kinetic wars against asymmetrical foes also apply
to the fight against non-state actors in cyberspace. This article will examine this battle
© 2017 Ralph Martins
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Ralph Martins has over twenty-one years of
professional experience as a management con-
sultant and a United States Marine leading
teams in the cyber security, cyber warfare
and intelligence fields. As a consultant, he has
served clients in the Department of Defense
and Intelligence Community, and as a Marine,
has served in Iraq, Africa, and Cuba, among
other locations. He holds graduate degrees in
Engineering Management and Military Studies
from George Washington University and Ameri-
can Military University respectively and is
currently pursuing graduate studies in Inter-
national Relations at Harvard University. He
maintains a number of professional certifica-
tions including the Certified Ethical Hacker
(CEH), Certified Information Systems Security
Professional (CISSP), and Project Management
Professional (PMP).
and analyze the five asymmetrical characteristics of
cyber conflicts that make cyberspace an inherently
friendly environment for asymmetrical conflicts.
Who Are Anonymous? Why Do They Matter?
Anonymous is a hacktivist collective,
[2]
a network
of loosely affiliated individuals, groups and other
entities with little to no structure, organization or
membership requirements that attacks targets in
cyberspace and is motivated by various causes oen
related to freedom of information and human rights.
Historically, Anonymous’ favorite targets can be
categorized as the “big three”: big business, big
government, and big religious organizations.
[3]
Anon-
ymous describes itself as having “a very loose and
decentralized command structure that operates on
ideas rather than directives.”
[4]
Major Anonymous
operations are typically driven and guided by a
very small group of core members relying on their
ability to convince other potential supporters of
the worthiness of the proposed cause—a process
that has historically caused internal friction and
disagreement.
[5]
Anonymous’ most common online tactics include
website defacements, distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attacks, unauthorized account access, and
data exfiltration. To execute DDoS attacks, Anony-
mous members use publicly available tools such as
Gigaloader, JMeter, Low-Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC),
and botnets.
[6]
Their tactics are frequently illegal
and oen cause damage to their targets. As one
expert notes,
“…downtime that lasts for hours or days
can cost companies thousands in lost rev-
enue or extra bandwidth cost. Participating
in a DDoS attack is also illegal, breaking
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in the
United States as well as the 2006 Police
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and Justice Act in the United Kingdom; in both countries, perpetrators face a
maximum penalty of ten years in prison.”
[7]
While DDoS attacks and the defacement of websites require precious resources (such as
time and money) to restore networks, systems, and data to their original state, the more
important result is the attention drawn by such attacks. This is where Anonymous makes
its most significant impact. The group influences public opinion and government policies
by training the proverbial spotlight on its chosen issues through the use of cyberattacks.
As an example, Anonymous took on the repressive regime of Tunisian President Zine
El Abidine Ben Ali in January of 2011 via the use of DDoS attacks, website defacement,
the sharing of cybertools with dissidents, and facilitating the flow of information into
and out of the country in support of the rebels.
[8]
Shortly aer Anonymous initiated its
online involvement, Ben Ali dissolved his government and fled to Saudi Arabia. However,
around the same time that Ali’s regime was collapsing, the Islamic State was beginning
to actively and aggressively oppose the fledgling Iraqi democracy, terrorize Iraqi citizens
and spreading its violence to neighboring Syria.
The Rise of ISIS
The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as ISIL, Daesh or simply the
Islamic State, is a Sunni militant group attempting to create a worldwide caliphate.
[9]
ISIS
can trace its beginnings to 1999, when a Jordanian militant named Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, who had previously met and been influenced by Osama bin Laden, formed a
group called Jamā‘at al-Tawhīd wa-al-Jihād (The Organization of Monotheism and Jihad).
In 2004, Zarqawi renamed the group Tanzīm Qā‘idat al-Jihād fī Bilād al-Rāfidayn, although
it was known as al-Qaeda in Iraq.
[10]
The group merged with several other similar orga-
nizations over time and went through two significant leadership changes. Zarqawi and
several subsequent leaders were killed by US and coalition action, and in 2010, Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi assumed command. Baghdadi leads an organization that, in the opinion of one
expert, “has exploited these technologies more successfully than any of its contemporaries
in the Islamist world.”
[11]
Throughout its history, ISIS has proven to be especially adept at leveraging cyberspace
and, more specifically, social media in order to conduct the full lifecycle of terrorist oper-
ations.
[12]
Through their online operations, ISIS operatives recruit members, issue opera-
tional instructions, disseminate propaganda, and, more directly related to their ultimate
goal, provoke fear in an attempt to change the behavior and policy of their targets.
[13]
As
one defense analyst notes,
Although the overarching message is fear, the Islamic State’s propaganda ma-
chine has two distinct functions. In the jihadist organization’s aggressive territorial
expansion, its social media postings have served a role once filled by leaflets air-
dropped ahead of invading armies, sowing terror, disunion, and defection. Mean-
while, its messaging to the wider global community, however gruesome to many
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viewers, serves largely to bind the militants of the Islamic State more tightly to-
gether—and rally more sympathetic Westerners to its cause. Both these functions
rely almost exclusively on media platforms that were nonexistent a decade ago.
[14]
ISIS has effectively incorporated online resources into almost every facet of what it does.
However, just as cyberspace provides ISIS with a highly effective conduit for operation, it
also provides opportunities for opponents to counter these efforts.
What Is Asymmetrical Warfare?
Asymmetrical warfare is a conflict between actors whose military capabilities and pow-
er are so unevenly matched that the weaker side must resort to low-intensity, indirect
and unconventional tactics and strategies to oppose its stronger opponent(s). However,
weaker belligerents in an asymmetrical war do not typically seek the total eradication
of their opponents, as is oen the goal for conventional belligerents. Instead, the objec-
tive of the weaker power—oen a revolutionary movement, insurgency, terrorist group or
other resistance effort—can range from forcing a change in policy to completely wresting
away political power from a government. Recent examples of asymmetrical battles include
Al Shabaab’s struggle against the Somalian government, the Kurdish fight for autonomy
against several Middle Eastern nations and the ongoing conflict between Hezbollah and
Israel. ISIS’s fight against Iraq and Syria is another example of an asymmetrical war.
Upon analysis, it is possible to identify trends and common characteristics of asymmet-
rical battles in the physical world that differentiate them from conventional wars. Five
of the more significant features of these conflicts are: the imbalance of power between
belligerents, the reliance of asymmetrical forces on unconventional tactics, the relatively
low intensity of these unconventional tactics, the decentralized nature of asymmetrical
forces, and the asymmetric force’s ultimate goal of breaking its enemies’ strategic will-
power in order to bring about the change in policy or collapse of an entire government.
These elements can be further described as follows:
Imbalance of power: The catalyst for asymmetrical warfare is the clash of two
unevenly matched adversaries. The entity with more conventional power–oen (but
not necessarily) a nation-state–typically maintains a significantly more potent
conventional military capability and has access to greater resources and more
advanced technology than the weaker force. It is this imbalance of power that
compels the weaker force to leverage unconventional tactics to have any chance of
opposing the stronger power. Specifically, when an adversary is significantly more
powerful to the degree that a conventional battle would be a futile effort, unconven-
tional tactics become necessary.
Unconventional tactics: Unconventional tactics are those that diverge from
traditional, standard, direct combat operations. On a traditional battlefield, they
include covert action, hit-and-runs, ambushes, subversion, harassment, and the
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heavy use of improvised weapons and explosives. This type of combat oen re-
quires the ability to blend into an indigenous population so fighters can operate
clandestinely and wait for opportune times to strike. Unconventional tactics
require fighters to utilize creativity, flexibility, adaptability, extreme mobility,
deception, and patience. Unconventional weapons are oen cheap, easy to impro-
vise and require less formal training than conventional weapons.
Low intensity: By relying on unconventional tactics, an asymmetrical force, by
definition, chooses to forego the use of more conventional and potent tactics, as
using these tactics against a conventionally stronger enemy would be unlikely
to result in victory. Instead of attempting to precipitate mass casualties and
destruction and ultimately land a killing blow, an asymmetrical force aims to
wear down the stronger adversary with smaller attacks, oen more frequent but
lower in intensity.
Decentralization: Asymmetrical forces in the physical world do not have a tradi-
tional hierarchical shape in their organizational structures. They are composed
of networks of individuals and smaller cells with varying degrees of connectivity
to each other. These networks are, by their very nature, resilient and difficult to
destroy. And while cells can be eliminated, they can also be easily reconstituted.
Each cell is self-sufficient, and destroying the greater organization’s leadership
does not necessarily render the components (individuals and cells) of that network
incapable of operating.
Breaking strategic willpower: Unlike in conventional war, the goal of an asym-
metrical force is not the total destruction of its enemy’s forces or even the signifi-
cant degrading of its enemy’s ability to fight. Instead, unconventional fighters are
oen employed as part of a long-term plan to achieve submission, capitulation or
retreat by breaking the will of the enemy on a strategic level. It is the willpower of
leadership that is the real target of the asymmetrical fighter.
Anonymous and Its Online War on ISIS
Anonymous has been waging an online war against ISIS since 2015—a conflict that
demonstrates the asymmetrical nature of cyberspace. This war began with a violent at-
tack in the physical world by a related group. In January 2015, members of Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) carried out several attacks within the city of Paris, high-
lighted by the shooting at the Charlie Hebdo newspaper office.
[15]
Anonymous responded
to these attacks by launching Operation Charlie Hebdo, promising a “massive” response
in retribution and immediately taking down a French extremist website.
[16]
Shortly there-
aer, Anonymous expanded its attacks to other related militant targets in cyberspace
as it initiated Operation ISIS and took down 1,500 ISIS-associated Twitter and Facebook
accounts, claiming, “From now on, there [will be] no safe place for you online—you will
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be treated like a virus, and we are the cure. We own the internet now.”
[17]
Following the
November 2015 ISIS attacks in and around Paris that killed 130 people, Anonymous again
declared a new war on ISIS and announced Operation Paris to “defend our values and
our freedom.”
[18]
One member of Anonymous summarized the organization’s perspective
on ISIS as follows: “We believe that [sic] all of us combined, we can show the world that
ISIS does not have as much power as it claims it does and show the world that if ordinary
people can fight ISIS [successfully] then the governments of the world certainly can.” The
member continued, “ISIS is a plague on the internet and humanity.”
[19]
While Anonymous’
war against ISIS has had its struggles and some members have claimed to have given up
the battle,
[20]
for many supporters it will continue for the foreseeable future.
[21]
An analysis of Anonymous’ online conflict with ISIS exhibits the five characteristics
of traditional asymmetrical forces enumerated earlier. First, Anonymous is taking on an
adversary that is clearly stronger regarding conventional power and has access to greater
resources. ISIS brought in $2 billion in 2014
[22]
causing it to be labeled the world’s “richest
terror group”
[23]
and the “best financially endowed terrorist organization in history.”
[24]
Anonymous, on the other hand, has no meaningful budget. Instead, it relies on occasional
donations
[25]
and largely operates by crowdsourcing volunteers of various skill levels
to participate in its operations on an ad-hoc basis.
[26]
Despite this apparent limitation,
Anonymous has demonstrated hacking capabilities to such a degree of sophistication
that its ability to confront ISIS online is highly regarded and some experts even consider
Anonymous to be a serious challenge to ISIS’s online operations.
[27]
This aspect of the
conflict, in particular, demonstrates that cyberspace can be “a great equalizer.”
[28]
Second, Anonymous has a highly decentralized presence and leverages the talents of
its members from around the world in its online fight against ISIS. The organization has
been described as an “online global brain of community users”
[29]
and a “decentralized
online community of users”
[30]
who expend effort “promoting collaborative global hacktiv-
ism”
[31]
and who are “based around the world and hail from every walk of life.”
[32]
However
Anonymous might be characterized, it lacks the well-defined organizational structure that
would be expected in other groups of similar size. Nowhere is this more evident than in
the fight against ISIS. As one think tank researcher describes it:
Like most hacktivist groups, #OpISIS is ostensibly flat and leaderless, though day-
to-day operations are sustained by a few dozen long-serving members who form
the concrete core of the movement. In turn, they guide the efforts of hundreds
of volunteers. Fragmentary groups tend to focus on different things (taking down
websites, tagging Twitter accounts, locating propaganda videos, infiltrating jihadi
forums), their roles converging and diverging at random. The result is organic and
more than a little chaotic. But it works.
[33]
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Anonymous leverages cyber-attacks conducted by individuals and teams spread across
the globe,
[34]
and although collaboration occurs, few, if any, of the participants launching
the attacks are physically collocated, and most do not know each other.
[35]
Third, the online tactics, techniques and procedures used by Anonymous against ISIS
fit the definition of unconventional. Anonymous has used online mockery,
[36]
disruption of
communications,
[37]
counter-propaganda efforts,
[38]
and disruption of finance
[39]
to thwart
ISIS operations and try “to shut down their ability to talk to the public.”
[40]
Furthermore,
online attacks are in themselves unconventional in that attack skills are simple and in-
expensive to acquire. This is made evident by the fact that hackers-for-hire are relatively
cheap
[41]
and, despite Anonymous’ lack of an operational budget, some of its most elite
members have executed “devastating” attacks on high-profile targets are self-taught.
[42]
Fourth, the online conflict between Anonymous and ISIS is low-intensity, and Anon-
ymous is making use of tactics that are intended to wear down support for ISIS and its
effectiveness over time.
[43]
Nothing Anonymous has done or can do online (DDoS, website
defacements, propaganda dissemination) will likely result in the death of ISIS members
or large-scale physical destruction of their resources. This is simply due to the constraints
of cyberspace —the inability to create kinetic effects (kill people or break things) via online
attacks. All of this means that there will likely not be any powerful or decisive blow, but
rather a continuous series of many small, disruptive attacks.
Fih, because Anonymous knows it cannot destroy ISIS through cyberspace, it instead
seeks to contribute to the effort to break its willpower by restricting its operations and
eroding its capabilities. Twitter is an effective tool for ISIS propaganda,
[44]
and an Anony-
mous-affiliated group has claimed responsibility for shutting down over 70,000 ISIS Twit-
ter accounts.
[45]
In November of 2015, Foreign Policy noted that Anonymous and its cohorts
“claim to have dismantled some 149 Islamic State-linked websites and flagged roughly
101,000 Twitter accounts and 5,900 propaganda videos” and then described Anonymous
as postured to combat ISIS via the Twitter “town square” and the depths of the deep web.
[46]
The Asymmetrical Nature of Cyberspace
Perhaps similar to Billy Mitchell’s struggle to convince and educate his contemporaries
about the potential application of air power in the early 20th century, there is a learning
curve to climb in understanding and institutionalizing the knowledge about the opera-
tions of cyber actors and the inherent nature of online combat. It stands to reason that
as everything from military weapon systems to everyday objects in our lives are increas-
ingly interconnected and reliant on information systems, vulnerabilities and available
attack vectors will increase accordingly and therefore so will the frequency and effects of
attacks. Anyone who wishes to assert power and influence in the modern, globalized world
must recognize and prepare for this obvious trend.
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However, cyberspace is more than just a new warfighting domain that will be increas-
ingly conducive to conflict over time. Its makeup is such that it is inherently asymmetrical,
as exhibited in the online skirmish between Anonymous and ISIS, and this characteristic
is a critical point in understanding the cyberwars of the future. Cyberspace is designed
so that actors with relatively little conventional power can impose meaningful effects on
significantly more powerful adversaries. Analyst John Arquilla once noted that “The
destructive and disruptive power of small groups and even individuals—in the physical
world as well as in cyberspace—just keeps growing.”
[47]
Scholar P.W. Singer recently noted,
“Today, it is the United States that has the conventional edge on its adversaries, and thus
many of its attackers see cyberattacks as their asymmetric way to work around a power
imbalance.”
[48]
The same highly interconnected architecture of the Internet that allows billions of people
around the world to communicate instantaneously also allows for a planet full of potential
attackers, making extreme geographic decentralization a standard feature of cyber armies.
Hostile actions in cyberspace are also unconventional in nature, as described by retired
Army General Wesley Clark: “There is no form of military combat more irregular than
an electronic attack: it is extremely cheap, is very fast, can be carried out anonymously,
and can disrupt or deny critical services precisely at the moment of maximum peril.”
[49]
But while online attacks are quick, frequent and can be persistent, they are also as yet
unable to replicate the kinetic effects of combat in the physical world. With few rare
exceptions, such as the tangibly destructive power of Stuxnet,
[50]
virtually all conflicts
in cyberspace are of low intensity and will, therefore, require a protracted, persistent and
committed effort to degrade capabilities and erode willpower over time. By recognizing
all these asymmetrical features of cyber warfare, it will become easier to develop strateg-
ies to counteract and mitigate threats in cyberspace.
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NOTES
1. Chris Summers, "Hacker accesses ISIS's radio channel and taunts Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi by saying: 'Mosul will be liberat-
ed'", January 13, 2017, hp://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arcle-4116338/Hacker-accesses-ISIS-s-radio-channel-taunts-
Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi-saying-Mosul-liberated.html.
2. e term hackvist, a portmanteau of hacker and acvist, has been credited by some to the former hacker group Cult of
the Dead Cow. P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecuri and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know, New York: Oxford
Universi Press, 2014, 77.
3. Quinn Norton, “How Anonymous Picks Targets, Launches Aacks, and Takes Powerful Organizaons Down,” Wired,
July 3, 2012, hp://www.wired.com/2012/07/_anonymous/.
4. ANON OPS: A Press Release, ANONNEWS, December 10, 2010, hp://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/
2010/12/ANONOPS_e_Press_Release.pdf.
5. Parmy Olson, We Are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker World of LulSec, Anonymous and the Global Cyber Insurgency, New York:
Lile, Brown and Company, 2012, 92 – 99.
6. bid., 74.
7. bid., 64.
8. Quinn Norton, “2011: e Year Anonymous Took On Cops, Dictators and Existenal Dread,” Wired, January 11, 2012,
hp://www.wired.com/2012/01/anonymous-dicators-existenal-dread/.
9. Ma Bradley, “ISIS Declares New Islamist Caliphate: Militant Group Declares Statehood, Demands Allegiance From
Other Organizaons,” e Wall Seet Journal, June 29, 2014, hp://www.wsj.com/arcles/isis-declares-new-islamist-
caliphate-1404065263.
10. Lawrence Joe, “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi obituary,” e Guardian, June 8, 2006, hp://www.theguardian.com/
news/2006/jun/09/guardianobituaries.alqaida.
11. Hisham Melhem, "Keeping Up With the Caliphate: An Islamic State for the Internet Age," Foreign Aairs, November/
December 2015, hps://www.foreignaairs.com/reviews/keeping-caliphate.
12. Sco Shane and Ben Hubbard, “ISIS Displaying a De Command of Varied Media,” New York Times, August 30, 2014,
hp://www.nymes.com/2014/08/31/world/middleeast/isis-displaying-a-de-command-of-varied-media.html.
13. Faisal Irshaid, “How Isis is spreading its message online,” BBC News, June 19, 2014, hp://www.bbc.com/news/
world-middle-east-27912569; M.L. Nestel, Gilad Shiloach and Amit Weiss, “ISIS Forums Share Pipe Bomb Insucons for
Aacks on NYC, Las Vegas,” Vocav, September 16, 2014, hp://www.vocav.com/world/isis-2/isis-pipe-bomb-aack-
america/; Shiv Malik et al, “Isis in duel with Twier and YouTube to spread exemist propaganda,” e Guardian, Septem-
ber 24, 2014, hp://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/24/isis-twier-youtube-message-social-media-jihadi; "Flames
of War - AMAZING bale footage," LiveLeak video, 55:14, posted by "KIWalid," September 20, 2014, hp://www.liveleak.
com/view?i=5c2_1411222393.
14. Emerson Brooking, "e ISIS Propaganda Machine Is Horrifying and Eecve. How Does It Work?," Defense in Depth
(blog), Council on Foreign Relaons, August 21, 2014, hp://blogs.c.org/davidson/2014/08/21/the-isis-propaganda-
machine-is-horrifying-and-eecve-how-does-it-work/.
15. “Charlie Hebdo Aack: ree Days of Terror,” BBC News, January 14, 2015, hp://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-30708237.
16. “Anonymous - #OpCharlieHebdo” YouTube video, 2:58, posted by “Anonymous France,” hps://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=oqbwqmb8P00, accessed September 25, 2016; Guest, Untled, Pastebin, hp://pastebin.com/Pdj2Z0wC,
accessed October 24, 2016; Rose Troup Buchanan, "#OpCharlieHebdo: Anonymous Take Down French Exemist Website
Aer reatening 'Reibuon' for Charlie Hebdo Aacks," e Independent, January 12, 2015, hp://www.independent.
co.uk/life-sle/gadgets-and-tech/opcharliehebdo-anonymous-take-down-ench-exemist-website-aer-threaten-
ing-reibuon-for-9972013.html.
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NOTES
17. Wang Wei, “Hackvist Group Anonymous (#OpISIS) Takes Down Islamic State (ISIS) Social Media Accounts,” e
Hacker News, February 8, 2015, hp://thehackernews.com/2015/02/anonymous-isis-cyber-aack.html; Rick Gladstone,
“Acvist Links More an 26,000 Twier Accounts to ISIS,” New York Times, March 31, 2015, hp://www.nymes.
com/2015/04/01/world/middleeast/acvist-links-more-than-26000-twier-accounts-to-isis.html?mref=undened&
mref=www.nymes.com&_r=0; Andrew Grin, "Paris Aacks: Anonymous Vows to Avenge Charlie Hebdo Shoongs
with Cyberaacks on Islamist Websites," e Independent, January 9, 2015, hp://www.independent.co.uk/life-sle/
gadgets-and-tech/news/paris-aacks-anonymous-vows-to-avenge-charlie-hebdo-shoongs-with-cyberaacks-on-
islamist-9968813.html; Guest, #OpISIS- Twier/Facebook, Pasbin.
18. Keely Lockhart and Myles Burke, "#OpISIS: Why Anonymous has declared an online war against Isil - in 90 seconds,"
e Telegraph, December 11, 2015, hp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/12003242/OpISIS-
Why-Anonymous-has-declared-an-online-war-against-Isil-in-90-seconds.html.
19. E.T. Brooking, "Anonymous vs. the Islamic State," Foreign Policy, November 13, 2015, hp://foreignpolicy.
com/2015/11/13/anonymous-hackers-islamic-state-isis-chan-online-war/.
20. Russell Brandon, "e Anonymous 'War on ISIS' Is Already Falling Apart," e Verge, November 23, 2015, hp://www.
theverge.com/2015/11/23/9782330/anonymous-war-on-isis-hackvism-terrorism; Jesse Hirsch, "Aer Orlando, Anony-
mous Vows To Leave ISIS Alone," Good, June 14, 2016, hps://www.good.is/arcles/anonymous-says-peace.
21. Simon Parkin, "Operaon Troll ISIS: Inside Anonymous' War to Take Down Daesh," Wired, October 6, 2016, hp://
www.wired.co.uk/arcle/anonymous-war-to-undermine-daesh.
22. Jose Pagliery, "Inside the $2 Billion ISIS War Machine," CNN Money, December 11, 2015, hp://money.cnn.
com/2015/12/06/news/isis-funding/.
23. Jack Moore, "Mosul Seized: Jihadis Loot $429m om Ci's Cenal Bank to Make Isis World's Richest Terror Force,"
Inrnaonal Business Times, June 11, 2014, hp://www.ibmes.co.uk/mosul-seized-jihadis-loot-429m-cis-cenal-bank-
make-isis-worlds-richest-terror-force-1452190.
24. Pagliery, "Inside the $2 billion ISIS war machine."
25. Anthony Cuthbertson, "Operaon Isis: Ghostsec Hackers Launch Crowdfunding Campaign in Fight Against
Islamic State,” Inrnaonal Business Times, July 29, 2015, hp://www.ibmes.co.uk/operaon-isis-ghostsec-
hackers-launch-crowdfunding-campaign-ght-against-islamic-state-1513104.
26. Anthony Cuthbertson, "Anonymous #OpParis: Hackvists Publish 'Noob's Guide' for Fighng Isis Online," Inrnaonal
Business Times, November 17, 2015, hp://www.ibmes.co.uk/anonymous-opparis-hackvists-publish-noobs-guide-
ghng-isis-online-1529173.
27. Ari Levy and Anita Balakrishnan, “What can Anonymous really do to ISIS?,” CNBC, November 18, 2015, hp://www.
cnbc.com/2015/11/18/what-can-anonymous-really-do-to-isis.html; Evan Schuman, "Anonymous Just Might Make All the
Dierence in Aacking ISIS," Computerworld, November 16, 2015, hp://www.computerworld.com/arcle/3005475/
cyberaacks/anonymous-just-might-make-all-the-dierence-in-aacking-isis.html.
28. Mary Louise Kelly, "ISIS Uses Cyber Capabilies To Aack e U.S. Online," NPR, April 25, 2016, hp://www.npr.
org/2016/04/25/475631277/isis-uses-cyber-capabilies-to-aack-the-u-s-online.
29. "Anonymous denion," Technopedia, hps://www.techopedia.com/denion/27213/anonymous-hacking, accessed
October 24, 2016.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Brooking, "Anonymous vs. the Islamic State.”
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Rick Gladstone, "Behind a Veil of Anonymi, Online Vigilantes Bale the Islamic State," New York Times, March 25,
2015, hp://www.nymes.com/2015/03/25/world/middleeast/behind-a-veil-of-anonymi-online-vigilantes-bat-
tle-the-islamic-state.html.
ANONYMOUS’ CYBERWAR AGAINST ISIS
FALL 2017
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105
NOTES
36. Jasper Hamill, "Anonymous' Four Weirdest Taccs in ISIS Cyber-War: Here's How Hackvists Are Undermining the
Exemists," e Mirror, November 19, 2015, hp://www.mirror.co.uk/news/technology-science/technology/anony-
mous-four-weirdest-taccs-isis-6859278.
37. John Shammas, "Anonymous Hacker Reveals How ey Will Desoy ISIS and Its Abili to Carry Out Terror Aacks,"
e Mirror, December 1, 2015, hp://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/anonymous-vs-isis-hacker-reveals-6931331.
38. Chris Smith, "Hackers vs. Terrorists: How Anonymous Wants to Beat ISIS, BGR, November 30, 2015, hp://bgr.
com/2015/11/30/anonymous-hackers-isis-terrorists-war/.
39. Hamill, "Anonymous' Four Weirdest Taccs.”
40. Callum Borchers, "Operaon ISIS: Anonymous Member Discusses How Group Is Waging War on Militant Group," e
Independent, November 28, 2015, hp://www.independent.co.uk/life-sle/gadgets-and-tech/news/operaon-isis-
anonymous-member-reveals-how-they-are-waging-war-on-the-militant-group-a6752831.html.
41. Cale Guthrie Weissman, "9 ings You Can Hire a Hacker to Do and How Much It Will (Generally) Cost," Business
Insider, May 8, 2015, hp://www.businessinsider.com/9-things-you-can-hire-a-hacker-to-do-and-how-much-it-will-
generally-cost-2015-5.
42. Josh Halliday, "Lulzsec Mastermind Sabu: An Elite Hacker and Star FBI Informant," e Guardian, March 6, 2012,
hps://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/mar/06/lulzsec-mastermind-sabu-hacker-i-informant.
43. Hamill, "Anonymous' Four Weirdest Taccs.”
44. Brooking, "e ISIS Propaganda Machine Is Horrifying and Eecve.”
45. ClSec, Twier post, November 13, 2015, 5:10 AM, hps://twier.com/ClSec/status/665109376684961792.
46. Brooking, "Anonymous vs. the Islamic State.”
47. John Arquilla, “Beware the Few,” Foreign Policy, April 16, 2013, hp://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/16/beware-the-few/.
48. P. W. Singer, “How the United States Can Win the Cyberwar of the Future,” Foreign Policy, December 18, 2015, hp://
foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/18/how-the-united-states-can-win-the-cyberwar-of-the-future-deterrence-theory-securi/.
49. Wesley K. Clark and Peter L. Levin, "Securing the Informaon Highway," Foreign Aairs, November/December 2009,
hps://www.foreignaairs.com/arcles/united-states/2009-11-01/securing-informaon-highway.
50. Joby Warrick, “Iran's Natanz Nuclear Facili Recovered Quickly om Stuxnet Cyberaack,“ Washington Post, February
16, 2011, hp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arcle/2011/02/15/AR2011021505395.html; Kim Zeer,
“A Cyberaack Has Caused Conrmed Physical Damage for the Second Time Ever,” Wired, January 8, 2015, hps://www.
wired.com/2015/01/german-steel-mill-hack-desucon/; Mark ompson, “Iranian Cyber Aack on New York Dam
Shows Future of War,” Time, March 24, 2016, hp://me.com/4270728/iran-cyber-aack-dam-i/.
RALPH MARTINS
