ISIS and Innovative Propaganda: Confronting Extremism in the Digital Age

ISIS and Innovative Propaganda

Confronting Extremism in the Digital Ag e

Dylan Gerstel

In the wake of the horriﬁc Paris terror

attacks in November President Obama de-

clared, “ISIS is the face of evil [and] our

goal is to... destroy this barbaric organ iza -

tion.” (White House, 2015) Global leaders

and organiza t io n s have echoed this call to

arms. Yet it has been more than a year

since the fall of Mosul and ISIS is not signif-

icantly weakened. In his statement to the

G20 President Obama outlined the United

States’ military, diplomatic, and countert-

error strategy for containing ISIS. This ap-

proach is failing because it does not ad-

equately challenge ISIS’s propaganda ma-

chine. Although the President acknowl-

edged ISIS is “very savvy when it comes

to social media , and able to inﬁltrate the

minds of. . . disa↵ected individu a ls around

the world” there has been no comprehen-

sive counter-messaging response from the

West.

Despite ISIS’s brutality, they have re-

cruited thousands of people from advanced

democracies. Recent intelligence reports

estimate that over 4,500 citizens have de-

fected from Europe and the United States

to join ISIS since 2011.(Schmitt & Sen-

gupta, 2015) Many of these people know

little about Islam, are disillusioned with so-

ciety, and are searching for a sense of mean-

ing. The Islamic State’s recruiting tech-

niques are unlike those of any other ter-

rorist organization since they have adapted

their propaganda to the digital age. ISIS

uses centralized propaganda to prey on

a target’s weak sense of identity and so-

cial networks to disseminate their mes-

sage. Twitter accounts sympathetic to ISIS

use themes of purpose and camaraderie

among jihadists to attract isolated Western

youths. Visually and emotionally appeal-

ing videos and magazines depict a utopian

society where all Sunnis are prospering.

The a sto n ishin g success of these methods

requires governments to adapt to the cur-

rent digita l environment, rather than recy-

le counter-messaging tactics of the past.

There

are several challenges to devel-

oping an e↵ective policy response to ISIS

propaganda. First and fo remost is the

ungoverned and loosely regulated nature

of social media. Although it is possi-

ble to shut down individual Twitter ac-

counts aﬃliated with t erro rist organiza-

tions, they oft en reappear within hours

under a slightly di↵erent account name.

While the hacker collective Anonymous

boasts of suspending 20,000 ISIS-related

Twitter proﬁles, (RT International, 2015)

these users will simply create new accounts.

Second, the media airing “ n ews-worthy”

propaganda assists ISIS. The gruesome ex-

ecution video of American journalist James

Foley circu lat ed with the help of CNN and

the BBC, rather than ISIS agents. Fi-

nally, governmental agencies have lost the

ﬁght over messaging with ISIS. Although

many groups are dedicated to counter pro-

paganda, ISIS has thousands of social net-

working accounts and media specialists

who have crafted a more e↵ective recruit-

ing campaign.

Counterterror organizations can work

with motivated private stakeholders and

third parties to blunt the e↵ectiveness of

ISIS propaganda and stem the tide of re-

cruits from Western countries. These ini-

tiatives should focus on three major objec-

tives:

Restricting communication channels.

ISIS has a dominant position on social net-

works that allows them to easily c o mmuni-

cate with potential recruits. Any social me-

dia counter-o↵ensive will not succeed wit h -

out community policing of social networks.

Citizens should be encouraged to report

ISIS related acco u nts and tech companies

should be pressured to more aggressively

suspend these users. This initiative should

ISIS and Innovative Propaganda 2

aim to create a grassroots movement that

can keep up with the thousands of ISIS

sympathizers online. This will allow gov-

ernment agencies to focus on more complex

outlets, such as shutting down apps and ac-

counts made by ISIS.

Dele

gitimizing the central messages of

the propaganda. ISIS media presents a

utopian society where recruits can ﬁnd

meaning. Cou nter-messaging should focus

on describing the rea lity of the situation,

with an emphasis on the stories of defec-

tors and refugees ﬂeeing the Islamic State.

pporting at-risk youths who are likely

to be targets. Many Western recruits follow

similar patterns of isolation from society.

Improving o u trea ch on a personalized ba-

sis can o↵er these people an alternative to

jihad.

Understanding ISIS Propaganda

ISIS’s propaganda machine d i↵ers from

previous terrorist organizations in its so-

phistication, content, and distribution

mechanisms. ISIS has two divisions dedi-

cated to propaganda , Al-Hayat Media and

Mu’assassat al-Furqan. The former focuses

on recruit in g and presenting an idyllic so-

ciety, while the latter focuses on spread-

ing fear. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 38)

These organizations have a prominent role

within ISIS. According to one defector,

“The media people are more important

than the soldiers and their monthly income

is higher.” (Miller & M ekh en n et , 2015)

This bureaucracy includes many former

tech and news employees who are adept at

video editing and graphic design. While

the top media boss is a 36-year-old Syrian

named Abu Amr al-Shami, there are sev-

eral Westerners near the top of the hier-

archy. (Talbot, 2015) Mult ip le reports ref-

erence an American in charge of editing

several key videos. (Miller & Mekhennet,

2015) Until his death former German rap-

per Deso Dogg played a key role within Al-

Hayat Media. (Talbot, 2015)

This wealth of foreign talent means

that ISIS has more media capability than

Al-Qaeda and its aﬃliates ever had, and

this is reﬂected in the high production

value of ISIS propaganda. In sharp

contrast to the grainy videos of Osama

Bin-Laden, ISIS disseminates Hollywood

style, hour-long movies about life in the

Caliphate and the victories of the Is-

lamic State. John Cantile, a British news

hostage that was taken prisoner, hosted

many expose-style p ro g rams about life in

the Caliphate. The ISIS magazine, Dabiq,

is visu a lly impressive a n d is ﬁlled wit h ar-

ticles written by Westerners. ISIS has even

developed several original nasheed s, or ji-

hadi songs, that play in the background of

videos. (Schatz, 2015)

Appealing to Potential Recruits

ISIS propaganda in the West targets 16-

25 year old s who are isolated from their

societies and who do not have a strong

sense of identity or purpose. (Callimachi,

2015) (Yan, 2014) They often know lit-

tle about Islam or have learned ab o u t

religion from ISIS operatives. A recent

study identiﬁes four th emes ISIS uses to

attract recruit s: Urgency, Agency, Authen-

ticity, and Victory. All Sunni Muslims are

called to come ﬁght immediately to prevent

the slaughter of their religious b ro th ers at

the hands of the inﬁdels. They are told

that they will have an impact, that they

are ﬁghting for the only legitimate Mu s-

lim State, and that their actions will lead

to victory. (Fernandez, 2015) Viewers feel

that they are needed and have an obliga-

tion to ﬁght for ISIS. Potential recruits are

shown a sense of purpose and identity that

they did not have before. If they come

to the Caliphate then their life will have

3 Dylan Gerstel

meaning. Recruits may discount the bar-

barity of ISIS as a nec essa ry evil to cre-

ate a utopian society. Many defectors ex-

plain their rationale for joining ISIS along

these lines. One thought he was going “to

help in a humanitarian sense the people of

Syria” and another wanted to live und er

strict Islamic law and accepted the stoning

of adulterers. (De Freytas-Tamura, 2015)

They only prepa red to leave once they re-

alized ISIS was very di↵erent than the pro-

paganda.

This image of purpose is supplemented

by the theme of camaraderie among the

soldiers of the Islamic State. ISIS goes to

great lengths to illustrate the multi-ethnic

background of its members. The ﬁrst issue

of Dabiq contains pictures of jihadists from

many backgrounds embracing each other

and huddling together like sport s players

before a game. (The Clarion Project, 2014)

Several videos showcase Western recruits

discussing the great friends they have made

in the Caliphate and the acceptance of for-

eigners in their society. With these mes-

sages ISIS emotionally appeals to its target

demographic by o↵ering a n accepting and

inclusive community. ISIS operatives will

often chat online or Skype with potential

recruits for hours, o↵ering them the hope

of friendship they do not have at home.

Rather than emphasizing religious al-

truism, which Western recruits may not

engage with, ISIS propaganda focuses on

utopian living and the exploitation of

women. Instead of preaching abstinence

from sex before marriage a n d alcohol, ISIS

gives viewers an image of the good life. One

movie, entitled Five Star Jihad,“depicted

life for Islamic State ﬁg hters as lavish,

with access to hillside mansio n s, gleam-

ing SUVs and swimming pools overlook-

ing the group’s conquered terrain.” (Miller

&Mekhennet,2015)ISISmediadiscusses

religion, but there is a much larger fo-

cus on adventure, community, and persona l

power, once again appealing to the lonely

Westerner. There is also a clear empha-

sis on the foot soldier and the purposeful

life they can live in the Caliphate rather

than the leaders. IS I S gives “the world

access, willingly, to the daily lives of ji-

hadists” and humanizes them in the pro-

cess. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 43) M o st

importantly, the propaganda is shown as

inclusive to Sunni Muslims of all nation-

alities. Foreigners have no barrier to en-

try and can rise up the ranks as quickly as

Arabs.

To reinforce these themes, ISIS por-

trays women in two di↵erent ways based

on the intended audience of the messaging.

For propaganda aimed at women, they are

described as “jihadi brides,” participating

in the al-Khansaa police brigade and carry-

ing AK-47s. (Ali, 2015) Unlike the Taliban,

which hid women from all propaganda and

conﬁned them to the home, ISIS media

“emphasize[s] themes of sisterhood and be-

longing—and highlight[s] the role of mar-

riage and family.” (Talbot, 2015) Women in

ISIS, su ch as UK defector Asqa Mahmoud,

reach out to others on social media encour-

aging them to travel to the Caliphate in

order to fulﬁll their duty, contribute mean-

ingfully to the Caliphate, and to ac t ively

participate in jihad.

The propaganda aimed at males gives a

much more accurate image of how women

are treated and exp lo it ed in ISIS terri-

tory. Magazine articles promote the idea

of sexual jihad, which argues that men

are allowed to relieve sexual tensions so

they can ﬁght more e↵ectively. Although

sex before marriage is impermissible un-

der normal circumsta n c es, a highly c o ntro-

versial Fatwa attributed to Wahhabi cleric

Sheikh Mohamad al-Arefe in 2013

Some sources, including the report I use in this paper, link the concept to Sheikh Mohamad

al-Arefe during the unrest in Tunisia in 2013.‘ He has denied issuing the Fatwa.

au-

thorized this behavior during t imes of ji-

had.(Ali,2015)ISIShasusedthistolegit-

imize sexual slavery and abuse in the ter-

ritory it c o ntrols. One particularly graphic

Dabiq article boasts of selling captured

Yezidi women and girls as young as n in e

into sex slavery. (Ali, 2015) Such material

appeals to lonely, sexually frustrated young

males who are ISIS’s target audience.

ISIS and Innovative Propaganda 4

Digital Age Innovations

A Quilliam found a t io n report lists th ree

major areas of innovation: th e global dis-

semination of threat, decentralized mes-

saging, and the development of new soft-

ware. (Saltman & Winter, 2014) Social

networks allow ISIS sympathizers to dis-

tribute propaganda more eﬃciently than

previous terror groups were able to. At

the peak of Al-Qaeda’s prominence, oper-

atives could only air their videos throu g h

the Al-Jazeera network or speciﬁc web-

forums. This meant that they could only

disseminate videos to a limited audience al-

ready looking for terrorist propa g an d a . To-

day, an ISIS member on Twitter can hi-

jack a thread on unrelated trending top-

ics. For example, during the 2014 World

Cup ISIS users tagged their tweets con-

taining videos with #brazil 2014. (Saltman

& Winter, 2014, 40) This gave them ac-

cess to a g lo b a l network of casual Twit-

ter users who were simply browsing for

sports updates. The a↵ordability of smart-

phones and pro lifera t ion of social n etwork-

ing means millions of people could see this

information. ISIS even dominates more

traditional media outlets. The sheer bru -

tality of ISIS videos oft en makes them

“newsworthy” material for Western net-

works. When these news channels contin-

uously play and analyze execution videos,

such as that of James Foley, it only in-

creases the audience for ISIS’s pro p a g a n d a .

Although most people will be repulsed by

these videos, a few will be recept ive and

may be inﬂuenced to jo in ISIS.

Perhaps the most impressive aspect of

the ISIS propaganda machine is its use

of social media to rapid ly spread its mes-

sage. In 2014 ISIS created the Al-Battar

media battalion, which was “designed to

push ISIS propaganda,” “coordinate hash-

tag campaigns,” and “castigate ISIS oppo-

nents.” (Fernandez, 2015, 19) In addition,

there are many sympathetic “fan-boys”

outside ISIS territory that distribute videos

online and directly message potential re-

cruits. Between these two groups there are

as many as 3,000 users that have the capa-

bility to produce as many as 90,000 tweets

a day. ( Fernandez, 2015, 7) ISIS can ﬂood

targets with messages and the sheer vol-

ume makes it hard for governments to keep

up. Since the “fan-boy” acco u nts originate

from outside the Caliphate, airstrikes have

a limited e↵ect on limiting media distribu-

tion. Reports from soldiers are instanta-

neously uploaded and sent across networks,

leading to “profound success in intimidat-

ing, recruiting, and fundraising.” (Saltman

& Winter, 2014, 41) Wherea s previous ter-

ror groups needed rigid structures to dis-

tribute propaganda, ISIS has taken advan-

tage of technological advances to create a

ﬂexible and decentralized system that is

constantly b eing updated.

To further streamline operations ISIS

has developed new software, an unprece-

dented move for a terrorist organiza t io n .

The most prominent innovation, a Twit-

ter app called “Dawn of Glad Tidings,” al-

lows users to p o st tweets without manual

input. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 41) The

Al-Battar battalion designs the tweets and

the app coordinates them based on a tim-

ing mechanism to avoid detection by al-

gorithms. This app was available on the

Google Play store until it was removed,

and was “responsible [for] posting almost

40,000 tweets in a single day as IS marched

into Mosul.” (Saltman & Winter, 2014,

41) Even when ISIS sympathizers are away

from th eir devices, t h eir acco u nts c o ntinue

to update at a proliﬁc rate.

Existing Counter-Measures

Governments and ind ependent organiza-

tions have implemented several programs

to counter ISIS propaga n d a bu t have had

very limited success. Ma ny of th ese focus

5 Dylan Gerstel

on delegitimizing ISIS and p resenting an

alternative narrative.

In the United States, the Center for

Strategic Counterterrorism Communica-

tions (CSCC) has released several videos

aimed at discrediting ISIS. “Think Again

Turn Away,” a similar program run by the

state department, has been called an em-

barrassment by counterterror experts and

does not have source credibility. (Singal,

2015) In the UK, the “Prevent” program

aims to curb non-violent extremism. Un d er

this initiative, schools need to identify vul-

nerable

The UK government website speciﬁes 22 factors that may induce someone to join a terrorist

group. Many of these categories are vague, such as a desire for political or moral change, relevant

mental health issues, and a desire for status.

children a n d since 2012 over 2,000

students have been sent to the govern-

ment’s anti-radicalization program. (Min-

istry of Justice, 2012) (Khaleeli, 2015) Crit-

ics argue that this program is too inva-

sive, leads to racial proﬁling, an d turns

teachers into spies. (Khaleeli, 2015) Ironi-

cally, Saudi Arabia claims to have one of

the more successful programs in the Al-

Sakinah campaign, which is run by an in-

dependent NGO that is support ed by the

government. This online service matches

Islamic scholars with users on jihadi web-

sites vulnerable to radicalization. (Casp -

tack, 2015) After this initial contact, par-

ticipants are sent to a rehabilita tio n clinic,

and their families are ﬁnancially compen-

sated. This program boasts a remark-

able 90% success rate

The program claims that 90% of participants are de-radicalized and rejoin society. This num-

ber may be so high because many potential recruits never entered counseling. These ﬁgures are

all reported by the center and are thus diﬃcult to independently verify.

with those that en-

ter counseling. (Casptack, 2015) Yet Saudi

Arabia remains one of the largest terror-

ist recruiting grou n ds, and the g overnment

continues to fund many extremist groups.

Policy Challenges

ISIS’s innovative p ro p a g a n d a presents mul-

tiple policy challenges that will require

Western counterterror agencies to adapt to

the digital age. The primary obstacle to

e↵ective policy is the ease of access to so-

cial media. If a Twitter account is sus-

pended, a n in d ivid u a l can just open a new

one. Filtering and blocking proﬁles man-

ually is a time costly endeavor with al-

most no results. The Quilliam Foundation

tracked several ISIS related accounts and

found that many suspended accounts reap-

peared within days with a slightly di↵er-

ent handle. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 42)

Surprisingly, these accounts were quickly

able to re-gain their fo llowers by instruct-

ing them to search for similar usernames

For example, an account would reapp ear with a n extra letter or numb er in the h andle.

One user was blocked twenty times and his

twenty-ﬁrst account still has 20,000 sub-

scribers. (Saltman & Winter, 2014, 42)

Anonymous, the hacker collective, recently

declared war on ISIS and reported 20,000

ISIS-related Twitter accounts. While this

makes for a good headline and adds some

extra work for ISIS sympathizers, it does

not seriously hamper their ability to dis-

seminate propaganda via social media.

Counter-messaging programs have

struggled to match the quality of ISIS

content. “Welcome to the ”Islamic

State” land”, the most viewed US anti-

propaganda video, seems like an ama-

teur production made on iMovie and was

mocked by comedian John Oliver. These

agencies have little funding a n d sta↵ and

cannot compete with ISIS. The US CSCC

has a meager $5 million annual budget,

a sta↵ of ﬁfteen, and access to 350 State

Department Twitter ac co u nts. (M iller &

Hingam, 2015) ISIS has hundreds of peo-

ple working in it s media division and thou-

sands of social media proﬁles. Up to this

point governments have lacked the required

talent to creat e h ig h quality videos or to

ISIS and Innovative Propaganda 6

beat ISIS at its own game.

The ﬁnal major policy challenge is

reaching potential recruits with these mes-

sages. Since many of these individuals are

disillusioned with their societies, it will be

diﬃcult for government agencies to appeal

to them on an emotional level. Videos

with the State Department seal, such as the

widely-viewed “Welcome to the ”Islamic

State” land,” which sarcastically displays

brutal ISIS videos in an e↵ort to scare away

recruits, do not have credibility amo n g peo-

ple who distrust the government. (Miller &

Hingam, 2015) Even the e↵orts of Islamic

clerics have had a minimal impa c t . While

almost all prominent Muslim religious lead-

ers have publicly denounced ISIS, this has

failed to slow their recruiting e↵orts. (Fer-

nandez, 2015, 14) These approaches may

have failed to connect because they are im-

personal. ISIS op erat ives speaking directly

to recruits on social media for hours will

have more inﬂuence than distant ﬁgures of

authority. Once these people believe they

are friends with jihadists, they will likely

ignore blanket messages. More personal-

ized rehab ilit a t ion that is tailored to t h e

proﬁle of each at-risk individual is neces-

sary.

Policy Recommendations

A multifaceted approach is required to re-

spond to ISIS’s sophisticated propaganda

machine. Governments and counter-terror

organizations must destabilize ISIS’s sys-

tem of messaging, delegitimize their propa-

ganda, and reach out to at-risk individuals.

These st ra teg ies must a d a p t to the na tu re

of social media and the global appeal of the

Islamic State. I recommend the fo llowing

policies:

Taking ISIS O✏ine

ISIS enjoys unprecedented dominance in

social media that has led to ease of dis-

tributing propaganda. A combination of

community policing, coop erat io n with tech

companies, and selective a irst rikes will

hamper ISIS’s ability to attract recruits.

As discussed earlier, e↵orts to suspend

social media accounts linked with ISIS have

largely failed due to the public nature of

these platforms. This current response is

frustrating ISIS, b u t it has a minimal long-

term impact once new accounts are cre-

ated. However, the e↵ort t o identify sus-

picious accounts has been limited to small,

dedicated groups of hackers (Cottee, 2015)

or resource-constrained g overnment agen-

cies. En c o u ra g in g a larger proportion of

the social media community to participate

in this e↵ort will lead to more success.

Facebook and Twitter already allow any

user to report a suspicious account, and

both sites prohibit threats of violence a n d

other abuses. (Altman, 2014) It does not

take a skilled hacker to recognize and re-

port an account that is distributing ISIS

materials. This will allow companies to fo-

cus on reviewing and suspending suspicious

proﬁles, rath er than looking for them. Bil-

lions of people are active on social media. If

even a small percentage of them are watch-

ing for suspicious accounts, this will limit

ISIS’s ability to distribute propaganda.

To supplement this community p olic-

ing, tech companies should be encour-

aged to utilize existing software to au-

tonomously identify ISIS-related acco u nts.

One such program is PhotoDNA, a ser-

vice currently used by Facebook, Twitter,

Google, and others to track down photos

of child pornography. PhotoDNA “tags”

o↵ending images with a unique ID that al-

lows computers to remove similar photos

without the intervention of humans. (Bur-

gett, 20 1 4) This minimally invasive ser-

vice only runs through metadata of im-

ages without searching thro u g h personal

inboxes. (Burgett, 2014) Tech companies

should expand the scope of PhotoDNA to

7 Dylan Gerstel

identify accounts that share ISIS propa-

ganda videos and images. Once a database

of this content is assembled it will be easy

to begin reporting u sers. Most impor-

tantly, th is process will be able to keep up

with the fast pace of social media because

it does not require human identiﬁcation of

accounts. This algorithm will be able to

track down new acc o u nts onc e they post

a video with the same ID as ISIS propa-

ganda.

Cyber-policin g will be most e↵ective if

paired with surgical airstrikes on high-level

ISIS media opera t ives. Recent airstrikes

have killed German rapper Deso Dogg, a

high ranking operative in the Al-Hayat me-

dia division, (The Gu a rd ia n , 2015) and Ju -

naid Hussein, a leader in ISIS’s hacking di-

vision. (Post, 2015) Although I S I S will be

able to replace these people, killing high

value targets will severely delay, if not dis-

rupt, the capacity of ISIS to develop propa-

ganda. At some point ISIS will run out of

skilled developers. The threat of airstrikes

alone will force high-rankin g oﬃcers into

hiding, further hindering this process. Any

air strikes should be highly selective and

seek to avoid civilian casualties. The ur-

ban setting of ISIS’s media headquarters

complicates this but does not make it im-

possible. Strikes should target convoys and

rural areas to minimize collateral damage.

Improving Counter-messaging

E↵orts by governments to provide an al-

ternate message to ISIS propaganda have

not been successful because they do not

match the content, volume, and emotional

appeal of ISIS media. With their compara-

tive lack of talent, counter-messaging agen-

cies cannot hope to match the quality of

ISIS videos. Instead, they should empha-

size the stories of defectors and the truth

about life in the Islamic State.

The most viewed counter-propaganda

videos are sarcastic, emot io n less, and do

not focus on creating a compelling nar-

rative to oppose ISIS. (Fernandez, 2015,

15) This is a ﬂawed approach since it fails

to u n d erst a n d the psychological proﬁle of

most Western recruits, who are isolated,

emotional and idealistic. They are drawn

to ISIS since they believe it will give them

purpose and meaning , a n d they are un-

likely to trust State Department oﬃcials

arguing otherwise.

Governments should use the stories of

ISIS defectors to reach potential recruits.

The stories of defectors will be credible and

relatable, will appeal on an emotional level,

and most importantly will dispel false ideas

about ISIS. 58 defectors, nine of them from

the West, have gone public with their sto-

ries. (De Freytas-Tamura, 2015) Almost all

of them left once they became disillusioned

with ISIS. Governments should focus their

messaging on these stories to delegitimize

the utopian image of ISIS with voices that

have experienced the Calip h a t e ﬁrst hand.

An alternative communication policy

should focus on personal interventions with

at-risk individuals. If ISIS has estab-

lished direct contact with someon e, they

are unlikely to interact with counter pro-

paganda. The only way to reach them

may be through direct messagin g . This

would be modeled in a similar fa sh io n to

the Al-Sakinah program in Sa u d i Arabia

that matches potential extremists with Is-

lamic experts. Online users that have been

reported as potential targets will be paired

with a counselor who can answer questions

about Islam and discuss the true nature of

ISIS. It should also incorporate e↵orts by

smaller organizations to de-radica lize peo-

ple over the Internet. For example, the

London think tank Strategic Dialogue ran

experiments “in which it found people at

risk of radicalization on Facebook an d tried

to steer them away.” (Talbot, 2015) Al-

though the sample size was small, this indi-

vidualized approach could have more suc-

cess than broad, de-personalized messaging

campaigns.

ISIS and Innovative Propaganda 8

Help

ing Those at Risk

Most people who join ISIS from the West

are not making a well-informed decision,

though there will always be a small per-

centage of hard-liners tha t truly believe in

what ISIS stands for. They leave isolated

lives in developed societies for a barbaric

state because they are inﬂuenced by false

ideas and a misguided sense of purpose.

Based on the stories of defectors, we know

that many are desperate to leave ISIS once

they realize its true nature. (De Freytas-

Tamura, 2 0 1 5 ) Community outreach can

eliminate the reasons why most p eo p le join

ISIS, namely isolation and a search for

meaning. Once at-risk individuals are iden-

tiﬁed online, there must be o✏ine e↵orts to

reintegrate them into society. Connecting

them to ISIS defectors and former targets

can provide networks of assistance. Local

leaders, such as imams, and family mem-

bers can contribute to this process. Exist-

ing de-radicaliza t io n programs for return-

ing defectors, such as peer-to-peer counsel-

ing, should also be extended to these po-

tential recruits.

Conclusion

Governments have been unable to stop the

ﬂow of ISIS recruits from Western coun-

tries. Un d ersta n d in g the innovations and

appeal of ISI S propaganda is the ﬁrst step

to developing a successful counter narra-

tive. Unlike previous extremist groups

like Al-Qaeda, ISIS has exploited social

media and other digital age technology

to e↵ectively spread their message. This

propaganda emphasizes purpose and ca-

maraderie that potential recruits lack at

home. By utilizing social networks and

preying on a lack of identity in recruits,

ISIS has developed an unparalleled mes-

saging operation. Successful responses to

this propaganda should take ISIS accounts

o✏ine, delegitimize the promise of utopia

in the Caliph at e, and improve outreach to

at-risk individuals in developed countries.

The policies I suggest raise critical

questions of the ethics of surveillance and

censorship of the Internet. While an in

depth discussion is beyond the scope of

this paper, policy makers should take sev-

eral ideas into account when debating this

issue. First, such measures should be as

minimally invasive as possible. The right

to privac y should not be unnecessarily vi-

olated. The PhotoDNA software I dis-

cuss ﬁts this criterion by tagging o↵ending

media without searching personal inboxes.

Similar initiatives should strive to balance

the privacy of cit iz en s with the value of

the knowledge obtained. Second, questions

of censorship should be publically debated

with the goal of reaching a consensus. If we

can establish child pornography guidelines,

a similar set of laws can be reached with re-

gards to extremist propaganda. Stopp in g

ISIS’s propaga n d a machine is a crucial pri-

ority for Western governments. However, if

these important issues are left unsolved we

risk undermin in g our fundamental rights in

the process.

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